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PREFACE
Jeffrey D. McCausland
Douglas T. Stuart
William T. Tow
Michael Wesley
The idea for this volume grew out of a previous
collaboration between Jeffrey McCausland and
Douglas Stuart. Arguing that the bilateral relationship
between the United States and the United Kingdom
was both underappreciated and understudied, they
organized a series of conferences in 2005 which brought
together a group of well-known American and British
academics, journalists, and policymakers to discuss
political, military, and economic aspects of the “special
relationship.” The conference proceedings, published
by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War
College under the title U.S.-UK Relations at the Start
of the 21st Century, proved to be extremely popular—
requiring a second printing and generating followon public discussions on both sides of the Atlantic.1
Conversation during these public events tended to
focus on one basic question and a couple of ancillary
questions: Was the U.S.-UK relationship unique? If so,
in what respects? And why?
Scholarly inquiry into the “other special relationship” between the United States and Australia flowed
logically from these discussions. With the generous
financial and administrative assistance of the U.S.
Army War College, Dickinson College, the Australian
National University, and the Griffith University
Asia Institute, and with the indispensable scholarly
collaboration of William Tow and Michael Wesley, a
vii

series of professional conferences was organized in
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC, on the U.S.
side, and in Brisbane and Canberra on the Australian
side. A team of American and Australian experts came
together in all four locations to discuss issues relating
to foreign policy, economics and business, domestic
politics and public opinion, and security and defense
affairs. The U.S. Army War College also enriched
our discussions with panels in Carlisle and Canberra
relating to the Global War on Terror.
This volume is designed to summarize the major
findings of our fruitful collaboration over the last year.
To provide the participants with a common lexicon, all
of the contributors to this volume were asked to return
to their dog-eared copies of Arnold Wolfers’ wise
and wide-ranging book, Discord and Collaboration.2
Although Wolfers’ book is more than 40 years old, it
was selected because of its valuable (and still-valid)
insights regarding alliance behavior, the goals and
interests of nations, and the interaction of individual,
national, and international factors as determinants of
foreign policy. Readers will find references to Discord
and Collaboration throughout this volume.
It came as no surprise when many of the themes that
surfaced in the study of U.S.-UK relations resurfaced
in our deliberations on U.S.-Australian relations. One
recurrent theme was the importance of leadership in
both the U.S.-UK and the U.S.-Australian relationships.
Both Tony Blair and John Howard have cultivated
close personal relationships with George W. Bush,
based on the shared “Anglosphere” values of political
and economic liberalism and a shared appreciation of
the need to act assertively, and globally, in defense of
these values.3 The result has been a level of comfort and
mutual trust among the three leaders that has greatly
facilitated international cooperation.
viii

In contrast to Prime Minister Blair, who was able
to maintain a close friendship with both Bill Clinton
and George W. Bush, the personal chemistry between
John Howard and Clinton was never strong. President
Clinton’s oscillations on China policy, his relative lack
of interest in Japan, the absence of tangible progress
on bilateral free trade negotiations, and Howard’s
disappointment regarding U.S. support in East Timor,
all worked to impose strains on the relationship. This
all changed, however, with the arrival of George W.
Bush. As Paul Kelly observes in this volume, “Howard
and Bush are political soul mates” whose close personal
ties have provided the foundation for what Kelly
describes as “the new intimacy” between America and
Australia.
Beyond the thematic resemblance between this
volume and the previous study of U.S.-UK relations,
another similarity is the importance of two events
in determining London and Canberra’s relations
with Washington. The terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 (9/11) represent the first turning point. The
British and Australian governments reacted similarly
to these attacks—immediately identifying 9/11 as
a transformative moment in international relations.
But the Australian Prime Minister’s presence in
Washington, DC, during the 9/11 terrorist attacks
intensified the personal impact of the events, and within
a few days his government had invoked the ANZUS
Treaty to offer its full support to the United States. This
development would have been hard to imagine a halfcentury before, when the Australians who negotiated
the ANZUS Treaty tended to assume that if the alliance
were ever called into action, it would be done to apply
American power on behalf of Australian security.
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The second “big event” dominating both U.S.-UK
relations and U.S.-Australia relations has been America’s management of the Global War on Terror and, in
particular, its leadership of the ongoing operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Once the Iraq campaign began
to look like a quagmire, a growing number of critics
in both Britain and Australia began to question the
wisdom and the propriety of close collaboration with
the American “hyperpower.” In Britain, this has taken
the form of Tony Blair’s “poodle problem,” which
has contributed to demands from both the British
public and Mr. Blair’s own Labour Party for the Prime
Minister’s resignation.
John Howard has confronted his own “poodle
problem” (often portrayed in the Australian news
media as a “deputy sheriff problem”). To date, Mr.
Howard has managed this problem more effectively
than his British counterpart. Mr. Howard is nonetheless
likely to face increasing domestic criticism about
the substantive results he has achieved in his efforts
to translate his support for the United States into
economic and political benefits. Don Russell addresses
one aspect of this cost-benefit issue in his discussion
in this volume of the Australia-United States Free
Trade Agreement. John Hulsman addresses the same
problem at a more general level, arguing that “the U.S.
must get away from taking Australia for granted” in
its management of foreign affairs.
The Australian Prime Minister will also find it
increasingly difficult to manage the vigorous debate
which has developed in Australia over what it means
to be an ally of a superpower in trouble. Mr. Howard
has argued that strong allies do not desert each other
when they experience unanticipated difficulties in
fulfilling their missions.


I ask people to contemplate the impact on the
authority of the United States, the impact on
the west, of a defeat in Iraq . . . If people think
that is going to strengthen the West, is going to
strengthen America and strengthen Australia, I
think they have taken leave of their senses . . .
[it] would do great long-term damage to our
alliance.4

The Prime Minister’s increasingly strident critics
have responded that a genuinely valuable junior ally
would have told its senior partner that its policy was
bankrupt, that it needs to change course, and that it
would no longer support the current policy with its
own manpower and resources.
Mr. Howard also must resolve, or at least
effectively manage, a number of difficult strategic
decisions concerning when, where, and how to employ
Australian military forces in the future. It would have
been hard to imagine at the end of the Cold War that
Australian-American military collaboration during
the first decade of this century would be taking place
primarily in areas other than the Asia-Pacific. The
deployment of Australian forces in Afghanistan and
Iraq in support of America’s Global War on Terror
triggered a monumental strategic debate in Canberra
over how to structure Australia’s future military
capabilities (to defend Australia or to be part of
future expeditionary forces abroad?). Michael Evans
describes the two sides of this debate in this volume
as the “defender-regionalists” and the “reformerglobalists,” concluding that “at the higher policy level,
the intellectual uncertainty with regard to Australia’s
defence posture needs to be filled not by a new Defence
White Paper but by an articulated National Security
Strategy.”
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Australia’s evolving relationship with China must
be at the core of any new national security strategy.
Many of the chapters in this volume deal directly or
implicitly with the rise of China as a regional and
global actor. Some of the contributors have interpreted
this issue as a potential source of U.S.-Australian
disagreement (or worse!), while others accept the
Howard government’s assurances that Canberra
can manage both an increasingly close relationship
with Beijing and continued close strategic ties with
Washington.
As the United States and Australia adapt their
foreign and defense policies to new regional and global
challenges, they can take considerable reassurance from
the historical record of each government’s handling of
the inevitable alliance disputes over the last 55 years.
Washington and Canberra have resolved bilateral
disputes over accusations of alliance entrapment and
abandonment, as well as disagreements over financial
and military burden-sharing, in a way that has
contributed to the continuous transformation of the
ANZUS Alliance. Initially created to protect Australia
and New Zealand from an early postwar threat that
never materialized—a remilitarized Japan—ANZUS
subsequently was rationalized as part of the American
global containment architecture directed against
international communism. But neither Australia nor
New Zealand elected to apply the alliance to U.S.
confrontations against China over Taiwan during
the 1950s or to go beyond relatively short-lived
commitments to fight communism in Indochina over
the following decade. Australia kept ANZUS together in
the mid-1980s after New Zealand challenged elements
of America’s nuclear deterrence doctrine. Following
the end of the Cold War, Australia enthusiastically
xii

endorsed Washington’s prescription for a “new world
order,” while at the same time seeking new links with
its northern Asian neighbors as they became more
important economic and geopolitical actors. In the
wake of the catastrophic events of 9/11, ANZUS has
once again taken on a new identity and new missions.
This volume provides valuable insights into the way
in which Washington and Canberra have responded
to these new missions. It also highlights many of the
complexities of “the other special relationship” that
are often overlooked in the welter of fiery domestic
political rhetoric and media sensationalism. The
“politics of intimacy” between close allies is generally
more nuanced, less strident, and more resilient than
we are led to believe by some politicians and policy
analysts. This volume illustrates that this fact is
nowhere more true than in the case of the U.S.-Australia
relationship.
Many of the contributors to this volume agree with
Michael Evans’ conclusion that “in the first decade of
the new millennium, the Australian-American Alliance
is at its strongest since the height of the Vietnam War in
the mid-1960s.” But if there is one overarching theme to
be found in this book, it is that such an intimate alliance
relationship cannot be taken for granted. As a general
rule, Arnold Wolfers is correct that “their own selfinterest will usually suffice to hold allied countries in the
alliance.”5 Both governments nonetheless must guard
against the danger that international developments
will stir concerns in either population which will lead
to uncontrollable fluctuations in public opinion. One
such concern on the Australian side is abandonment
anxiety, often given voice by figures such as former
Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (see William Tow’s
chapter). If such sentiments are given momentum by
xiii

a serious U.S.-Australia policy dispute (over China,
for example), they could tap into deep Australian
sensitivities about reciprocity and gratitude.6 On the
American side, similar political problems could arise
as a result of the “loyalty test” (referred to by Tow in
his chapter) if Australia were to stand aside from a
significant American security commitment.
The key to sustaining and adapting the relationship
is a constant dialogue, supported by a network of
facilitative institutions, to ensure that both parties
understand the other’s values, interests, and concerns
relating to successive hardships and contingencies. If
this is the criterion for enduring ties, the AustralianAmerican relationship clearly stands at the pinnacle
of those bilateral relationships that matter most in the
world today.
ENDNOTES - PREFACE
1. Public events were organized at the Heritage Foundation in
Washington, DC, and at the Chatham House in London.
2. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1962.
3. Regarding “Anglosphere” cooperation, see Douglas
Stuart, “NATO and the Wider World: From Regional Collective
Defence to Global Coalitions of the Willing,” Australian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 33-46.
3. “Labor Plan would bring defeat—Howard,” The Australian,
October 25, 2006.
4. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays of International Politics, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, p. 229.
5. One example of this dynamic is recent tensions between
Australia and Indonesia over the jailing for 20 years of an
Australian woman convicted of smuggling marijuana to Bali, and
the freeing after a jail term of 30 months of Jemaah Islamiyah cleric
Abu Bakar Bashir, implicated in the October 2002 Bali bombings.
In many Australian minds, these episodes have prompted feelings
of Indonesia’s “ingratitude” for Australia’s help after the 2004
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Boxing day tsunami, and calls for Australian aid to be returned
and for Australians to boycott Indonesia. See Michael Wesley, The
Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia 1996-2007, Sydney:
ABC Books, 2007.
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INTRODUCTION
The Honorable Bill Hayden
I am honored to have been invited to address
this conference, comprised as it is of key scholars,
government officials, representatives of various defense
services, and, of course, informed representatives of
the general community.
There is a wide canvas of issues to be explored,
and all are of sustaining importance to the future of
the alliance. The ANZUS Treaty was formally entered
into by the three signatories more than half a century
ago. In that time, our relationship with the United
States has gone through many changes which largely
have been unremarked upon as major refinements of
the original conceptualization behind the treaty. The
treaty document has not changed in 54 years, but it is
propelled by a different engine; actually, it probably
always was but our politicians were too wiley to tell
us.
From the start there was a significant difference
of emphasis between the United States and Australia
as to the thrust of the treaty. Australia emphasized
guarantees of its regional protection by the United
States, while the United States was preocccupied with
containment of communism in which ANZUS was one
link in a chain of global treaties and arrangements. This
difference of preoccupation was the continuing cause
of perplexity, perhaps even impatience, on the part of
some U.S. officials.
 	 In 1962 the Australian government sternly opposed
the incorporation of Irian Jaya into Indonesia and
sought to invoke U.S. support under ANZUS. The


U.S. rebuff was a severe jolt to Australian domestic
confidence in its government’s assurances about the
nature of the treaty.
President Richard Nixon’s so-called Guam doctrine
of 1969 announced that the U.S. Government would
“furnish military and economic assistance when
requested in accordance with our treaty commitments.
But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to
assume the primary responsibility . . . for its defense.”
These words again rattled community confidence in
the nature of the alliance.
 	 The 1986 defection of New Zealand from the
alliance put ANZUS under extreme political stress in
Australia, leading to a comprehensive review of it with
the United States and a statement which refined and
updated its nature. It was more a polishing exercise
than a new body job. Nonetheless, as a political exercise, it was extremely successful in managing a potentially difficult domestic political problem in Australia
and emphasizing, in association with a number of other
foreign policy initiatives taken by the government, the
nature of the alliance as one of reassuring closeness
yet giving Australia considerable independence of
judgment and action.
The end of the Cold War brought a marked and, for
the Australian intelligentsia, disturbing, wind-down
of the relationship. I will come back to that below. It
nonetheless caused some important critical questioning
of the durability of the alliance.
The 1999 notice from the U.S. Administration that
it would not be putting American troops’ boots on the
ground in East Timor following an overture by the
Australian government, once again shocked many in
Australia.
 	 Prime Minister Howard’s invoking of ANZUS
in 2002, following the terrorist attack on the World


Trade Center in New York, soberly demonstrated
to Australians just how globally wide Australia’s
commitments were under ANZUS.
To all intents and purposes, ANZUS is now a
bilaterial agreement although, curiously, still often
spoken of as if it had effective trilateral status; it has
changed dramatically and is unlikely to revert to what
it was.
 	 The alliance treaty, centered on the Cold War
ANZUS agreement of 1952, is, in a fundamental sense
and for many reasons, an obsolescent document. The
concerns of the partners have moved on; the concerns
now are terrorism, rogue states, rogue leaders, and new
major powers emerging on the scene whose intentions
are not exactly clear and whose potential goals may
not be entirely benign. Much of this is happening in
Australia’s broad geostrategic region of interest.
These views of the changed nature of ANZUS are
strongly implicit in the recent report of the Australian
House of Representatives titled Australia’s Defence
Relations with the United States:
The future of the ANZUS alliance is a framework
under which modernization and policy adjustments can occur between Australia and the U.S.
(and preferably New Zealand) in the face of a
rapidly evolving strategic reality. Arguably the
text of the treaty . . . becomes less important as
the years pass. Instead the treaty will continue as
a formal declaration of trust between countries
that share values and ideals.1

The end of the Cold War suddenly found that
Australia was, in the words of one American
commentator, “relegated to geostrategic marginality
notwithstanding its solid alliance with the U.S.-led
western alliance.”2 And yet, this happened despite


Australia’s having kept its insurance premiums paid
up in full. Here, for example, is a view coming from
the Heritage Foundation, a respected American think
tank.
Without peer, Australia has been America’s most
reliable ally and most valuable security partner in
the Pacific basin for many years. Australia fought
beside the United States in every war during the
last century, including the less popular conflicts
such as Vietnam, when many of its people
objected to its involvement.3

We have certainly taken some risks for the alliance.
High among them has been hosting key joint bases
on Australian soil which would have been, in certain
circumstances, critical priority nuclear targets for the
former Soviet Union. For instance, Professor Paul
Dibb has revealed that joint modeling involving U.S.Australian defense representatives, when he was
with the Defense Department, identified locations in
Australia actually targeted by Moscow. In fact, the
team estimated that an SS-11 nuclear-armed ballistic
missile launched from Svobodny in Siberia was capable
of inflicting one million instant deaths and 750,000
delayed radiation deaths in Sydney, not to mention the
carnage at other locations also targeted.4
 	 Some commentators go so far as to claim that
Australia now is the United States’ best ally, after
Britain, and thus the question many will ask is, “Is that
just for now, while we’re involved with the United
States in Iraq and Afghanistan?” Well, it won’t be just
an ephemeral interest on our part, because there are
some big potential stresses looming in this region of
the world—China, in particular, which will be notably
tricky challenges for Australia.



Nonetheless the question of how deep and sustainable the U.S. interest in Australia is will continue to be
raised. The skill in managing the relationship and its
public presentation will determine whether confidence
in it is maintained. Opinion polling shows something
like 90 percent of the public support the alliance, but
that could change in a flash if political management
becomes slack, and in particular if stress rises to the point
of alarming a public already sceptical as to whether
Australia has been exercising the independence it
should.
Based on past observations, we know the United
States can have difficulty handling displays of
independence by allies, as though it expected them,
especially smaller ones, to hew to particular roles it
notionally has assigned. It is understandable why
a superpower, grown now to a hyperpower, reacts
like this. Its international agenda of responsibilities
is huge, the demands on its attention and energies
limitless, but if friendly states are confronted with
impatience or worse for engaging in sensible displays
of independence, they can drift away.
We should not forget that in the course of exploring
these recondite international issues, the ultimate arbiter
of it all is public opinion, and skillful political handling
of that in a democracy is critical. This situation reminds
me of a quotation by the English writer, Hilaire
Belloc, favorably commenting on the performance
of a guileful politician: “He’s like a skillful oarsman.
While he resolutely focuses on an objective in front of
him he is furiously rowing in the opposite direction.”
The United States must not assume such an imperial
attitude that it makes it impossible for the Australian
political leadership to row ultimately to the mutually
shared objective.


A notable problem with the relationship is that
it is so asymmetrical. Our defense spending is about
1.9 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) per
year, while the United States spends over 4 percent.
The United States accounts for 32 percent of world
GDP, 43 percent of world military expenditures, half
of world arms production, and at least 60 percent of
world military research and development (R&D); it
is a hyperpower and sometimes an impatient one.5
These factors, combined with America’s strong sense
of exceptionalism and manifest destiny plus powerful
elements of religious fundamentalism, sometimes
incline it to leap out in front, idealizing, moralizing,
and incidentally forfeiting international support and
respect, as has happened to a large extent in connection
with Iraq. It remains the most powerful country in the
world, and will remain so for the foreseeable future, but
it has isolated itself too sharply from the international
community. It desperately needs such ties if it is to
formulate an effective and credible exit policy from
Iraq.
 	 But even as a hyperpower, it cannot successfully
handle some major commitments alone; it must
rebuild its international leadership credibility. Let us
now discuss in turn several areas of the globe where
events have particular salience for both America and
Australia.
China.
I mentioned earlier the tricky nature for Australia
of handling tensions with China. To be more specific,
with respect to tensions between the United States
and China over Taiwan, the United States wants our
commitment of support. China, however, is stipulating
that it expects neutrality from us.


It has been made crystal clear, in a statement by a
senior U.S. State Department official at a conference at
the University of Sydney, that “we do not consider our
relationship with Australia to be a ‘regional alliance’ in
the narrowest sense. Rather, we see our two countries
joined in a global partnership.”6 Clearly, the United
States has big expectations of the alliance and, in
particular, of Australia’s role within the alliance. In
response to a maladroit comment by the Australian
Foreign Minister that the ANZUS treaty would not
apply in the case of conflict with China, the United
States has made it forcefully clear to the Australian
government that ANZUS Treaty Articles IV and V
would apply. The Foreign Minister is reported to have
replied wanly that while the treaty could be invoked
if war broke out, “that’s a very different thing from
saying we would make a decision to go to war.”
The minister might rather recall the advice that
our best policy on this topic is “calculated ambiguity.”
About a year ago, China publicly stated that the
ANZUS Treaty should be reviewed, warning that the
alliance could threaten regional stability if Australia
were drawn into a Sino-Taiwan conflict. Now,
however, trade and investment here are being grandly
underwritten by China. Our surging prosperity
and the generous cash dividends the government is
lavishing on politically popular domestic programs in
each budget—the serendipitous dividend of chronic
revenue underestimates—are being pumped up by
trade with China to meet its economic requirements.
We can be reasonably sanguine that the Taiwan
issue is containable—and indeed it is being contained.
U.S. Influence with Taiwan is such that it should be able
to discreetly direct Taiwanese conduct into less strident
and provocative channels. China could undertake


reprisals if we got involved, and the United States
could if we didn’t; either way we’d be in a bind.
There is another set of reasons for handling this issue
cautiously. China’s history does not suggest there is
an inherent territorially expansionist nature to the
country. What its history does show is a tendency
toward cycles of strong central government followed
by decaying at the center and outer fragmentation
and disorder as the writ of government breaks down.
China appears as if she may be headed in that direction
currently. Unfortunately, popular mythologizing
would have us accept that China is a magic dragon that
can defy the basic laws of economics and still succeed.
 	 A closer look at China’s overall performance
should temper this popular view greatly. The economy is overheated; resources are squandered through
a combination of bad policy decisions, an inefficient
banking system, and the Chinese variety of widespread
cronyism and corruption. Economic and social
development is occurring at greatly unequal rates
between urban areas and countryside, with consequent
economic and social inequities and the strong likelihood of political upheavals. Wealth distribution in
China is now more regressive than in the United States
or Australia. About 0.5 percent of China’s population
own some 60 percent of the country’s wealth.7
 	 China should have embarked on a program of
economic austerity well before this. The longer it
defers action, the worse the economic impact of that
action when it finally comes. The political conundrum
for China is inescapable: Can she afford the dislocation
of several years of economic austerity? Well, scarcely.
But can she afford to do nothing? Certainly not. Does
she become more repressive and re-erect barriers, as
in the not-so-distant past, while she tries to impose


economic discipline? That will scarcely wash with her
people, and there is some basis for believing that the
only legitimacy her government has with the people
comes from the economic prosperty it has presided
over.
Economic discipline is only part of the solution; she
will have to root out a lot of rottenness in the system.
The World Bank estimates more than a third of bankunderwritten investment decisions in China between
1991 and 2000 were misguided. The Chinese central
bank estimates that politically-directed lending was
responsible for 60 percent of bad loans in 2001-02. The
banking system costs the Chinese government about
30 percent of annual GDP in bailouts. Minxin Pei, in an
illuminating essay on these topics, writes that “China
has seen its future leaders, and a disproportionate
number of them are on the take.”8 Minxin also reveals
the underinvestment in crucial social services, in
particular education and public health, and shows the
crippling revenue burden that falls on poor peasants.
China’s main test in the immediate future will be the
effort to accommodate the huge gulf between urban
wealth and rural squalor.
The task looks to be well nigh impossible. If it proves
so, the stability of its large domestic empire will be at
stake. In fact, the Indian economy is performing better
than that of China, with a published average economic
growth rate over 8 percent. Moreover, in the confident
words of the Economist, “India is producing far more
world-class companies than China.”9 The buildup of
the Chinese navy has a long way to go before it can
hope to match the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, but
the Seventh Fleet is only one fleet of a very large, global
navy.
To match the global U.S. Navy would be
prohibitively expensive. The state of the Chinese


economy is such that even if the Chinese were foolish
and wasteful enough to try to do so at this stage of their
development, it would take more than a generation to
do.
Japan.
It is difficult to take much of the speculation on the
Taiwan issue seriously. What can be taken seriously
is the mounting tension between China and Japan.
Both are energy-hungry countries. Both are keenly
interested in offshore oil and gas deposits under the
East China Sea. Each is challenging the other’s claims
disputing the border defined by the other. China has
been provocative, with a submerged nuclear-powered
submarine navigating Japanese waters and Chinese
military surveillance aircraft intruding into disputed
airspace. Japanese legislators and government leaders
have been provocative too, preparing bills designed
to protect the operations of Japanese drillers and
fishermen in disputed waters, by force if necessary.
Moreover, Miti has authorized Japanese companies to
explore contested ocean areas for natural gas. Prime
Minister Koizumi insists on making annual visits to the
Yasukuni shrine where Japanese war dead are buried.
China plays these issues up domestically and
regionally with marked effect. Japan is still distrusted in
much of the region. It seems that all the ingredients for
a major clash over resource extraction by two energyhungry countries are in place. That is a very worrying
development. It has clear consequences for the United
States, the rest of the region, and, most certainly, for
Australia.
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North Korea.
Should conflict break out on the Korean peninsula,
the United States would expect an Australian
commitment, and our Abrams tanks then would have
more relevance. They are part of the new and unwise
expeditionary force restructure of the Australian
Defense Force (ADF). This restructure does not make
much sense for defense of Australia in the near regions.
It is usually best to proceed on the principle that one’s
own interests come first, in case the United States is
otherwise engaged, or has other priorities, or disagrees
with our sense of crisis. Big powers can have an outlook
different from that of small states like us.
South Asia.
The only concern about India is the suggestion
that we may sell it uranium without it having the de
rigueur nuclear safeguards in place. Of course, it is
now moving to the status of U.S. ally.
Pakistan is an altogether different case. President
Mushariff has been courageous in supporting U.S.
actions in Afghanistan, but if he were to be removed
from office by Islamic militants and suceeededed by
one, then we soon would face an extreme militant
Islamic nuclear power. That would be a power not just
with nuclear warfighting capability itself, but one able
to export nuclear weaponry know-how, components of
weapons, and even weapons to like-minded sources.
The consequences probably would be calamitous,
and Australia would be drawn into the thick of the
conseqeunces of this development.
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Afghanistan.
Our troop commitment in Afghanistan, particularly
in Uruzgan province, carries high risks. Uruzgan
province is a recognized danger area, and combat
casualties cannot be ruled out. If that happens, it would
cause serious public discontent. Afghanistan could
unravel before renewed Taliban activity, resurrecting
a narco-economy and warlord cruelty and repression,
even though they are now nominal allies of President
Karzai, who of recent date charmingly appointed 13
such people to senior positions in the police force. These
were people, according to a recently leaked United
Nations (UN) report, with “links to drug smuggling,
organized crime, and illegal militias.” The same report
names “leading Afghan politicans and officials accused
of orchestrating massacres, torture, mass rape, and
other war crimes.”10
As these dreadful acts of government malfeasance
become better known, it will be mountingly difficult
to keep a public commitment to this engagement in
place.
Iraq.
I consistently have believed that the United States
and its coalition-of-the-willing partners should not
have intervened in Iraq. Secretary of State Colin
Powell’s justification was overdrawn, based on the
facts he alleged. If there had been a little more U.S.
patience with UN inspection procedures, the United
States and its partners could have been spared the
embarrassment of igniting and even “winning” a war
there but thus far being unable to keep the peace.
The lessons of history, however, do not provide
cause for optimism. The current situation and the hope12

ful rhetoric accompanying it remind one of Britain’s
folly entering Iraq in 1922 and being confronted with
revolt. Then, in 1927, after empty promises that Iraq
was ready to stand on its own feet—all this was well
before the 1952 expiry date of the British mandate—
Britain removed its troops. There was bloodshed
when Britain pulled out, later to be replaced by Sunni
repression. Now, in this re-run of that sad experience,
the prospect is a balkanization of the country, with the
Kurd segment creating major instability in Turkey and
Syria.
Nor do the complications end here. Iran aims to use
its influence to get control of the southern oil fields.
And there will be internal fighting among Iraq’s major
players to see which dominates the rich Basra fields.
Since al-Zarqawi’s death, fighting has broken out
among Shia factions jockeying for power and future
control. At this writing, General George Casey,
commander of the coalition forces, has announced
“that he may call for more troops to be sent to Baghdad,
possibly by increasing the overall U.S. presence in Iraq,”
in the face of rising bloodshed.11 This sharp reversal in
withdrawal plans contrasts with the earlier announced
decision not to replace two brigades of combat troops
when they return to the United States in September
2007, and to make big drawdowns of troops by the end
of that year It is to be hoped that such backing-andfilling is not a shadow play of the British tactics in 1927.
In any case, it would be interesting to learn the views
of conference participants about whether Australia’s
commitment in Iraq is in accord with the contemporary
spirit of its alliance with the United States. The great
shame is that any hope of a UN option seems to have
been squandered from the start.
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Southeast Asia.
Australia’s major concerns here revolve around
our bilateral relationship with Indonesia, one which
unfortunately seems to blow hot and cold with
regularity. The success with which we deal with
this relationship will be seen by other nations as the
measure of our skill, maturity, and intellectual depth
as a nation in handling international relations.
Our first foray into East Timor was fraught with
dangers that could have led to a national humiliation. If
Indonesia had supplemented the guerrilla forces with
Indonesian troops in mufti, carrying out hit-and-run
raids as a tactic of attrition, our relatively small forces
would have been pressed over time to the point of
exhaustion. We would have found it difficult, perhaps
impossible, to sustain the commitment and would have
been forced to seek a bailout by the UN, an institution
unfairly derided by so-called neoconservatives. U.S.
intervention at very high levels ensured that an SOS
did not occur. President Habibe misread and acted
unwisely in this matter, but our strident, up-front
diplomacy did not help either. Indonesia and Malaysia
both attributed Australia’s interest in East Timor to its
oil and gas resources. In short, we were chacterized as
neo-colonial resource bandits.
Now we have an issue over West Papua. West
Papua is very resource rich, and Indonesia will not
give it up. It cannot afford to, and it has legitimacy
on its side. Furthermore, no government of Australia,
whatever its political complexion, could reasonably
challenge that contention. Whatever might be thought
of the process, the incorporation of West Papua into
Indonesia has UN sanction, and that should be final. It
would be most surprising if a Labor government in a
similar situation were to conclude otherwise.
14

The position of President Yudhoyono is tenuous.
Indonesia is a new and fragile democracy straining
to hold together a widely diverse and potentially
fissionable community with the added stresses of
a vociferous Islamic fundamentalist movement. At
times, President Yudhoyono will have to manage his
electorate by massaging popular sentiments carefully.
The quality of our own maturity will determine the
degree of restraint we can muster in response to such
situations.
This sort of diplomatic management is not helped
by commentators who sound as though their sole
experience with public diplomacy comes from onthe-job learning as an Australian sports writer—loud,
boastful, conflictive, and not well thought-through. We
should soberly recognize the intense pressure we could
be subjected to, and learn to deal with it in measured
tones.
Cross-border, hit-and-run incursions in Papua
New Guinea by ADF elements, as a retaliation on
some pretext or other, could be a major difficulty for
Australia. We could not sustain ground forces in a
jungle war in Papua New Guinea for any length of
time. Yet, there would be a clear expectation that we,
as the erstwhile former colonial power, had such an
obligation to our former charge.
Oceania Region.
Papua New Guinea is eroding fast. There could be
unpleasant fragmentation there. How do we handle
such a situation if it happens? Making greedy demands
on our limited resources at the same time Vanuatu falls
apart, and with us still committed in the Solomon’s?
Then there is that prickly little mess in East Timor. Some
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sort of patchup this time cannot guarantee it is finished
for the long term. It has the smell of a nasty little internal
problem involving ambitions and jealousies in an
unsteady micro-state. Our prompt intervention, again,
has injected considerable moral hazard in the equation.
The East Timorese may adopt an attitude of “don’t
worry—Australia will come to our rescue.” That is not
good. All of these untoward events happening at once
is unlikely, but is not incredible. Where would we get
the military resources for a longer-term commitment
in the field? A credible journalist, Fred Benchley, has
reported quite recently that Washington, in replying to
British complaints about Australia’s limited role in Iraq,
says “it expects Australia to take the full load managing
security problems in its own neighborhood.” Benchley
concludes: “If the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea,
or East Timor—Australia’s ‘arc of instability’—go belly
up, don’t call Washington.”12 If Benchley is correct, this
in turn would raise questions about the wisdom of our
defense restructuring, designed more for large-scale
operations with the big hitters rather than for defense
interests in our immediate region.
CONCLUSION
Australia has quite enough on its plate working
out the shape of its contemporary regional and global
foreign policy and explaining to a possibly restive
public how this fits into the gambit of an old alliance
arrangement.
Conferences like this one are essential for the
relevant hard think they can elicit and for preparing
the public for the sort of engagements Australia might
be expected to fight.
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CHAPTER 1
PANEL I CHAIRMAN’S INTRODUCTION
Douglas T. Stuart
The first thing that readers will notice when they
compare the chapters by John Hulsman and Paul Kelly
is that, like the proverbial hedgehog and fox, Hulsman
(Chapter 2) focuses on one thing, while Kelly (Chapter
3) focuses on many. Hulsman’s essay is a warning
to American policymakers about the risks associated
with taking a trusted and dependable ally for granted.
Kelly’s article is a more wide-ranging analysis of the
Washington-Canberra relationship from an Australian
point of view.
Although the two authors differ in terms of their
goals and their styles of argumentation, they exhibit
a great deal of similarity in their points of emphasis
and, more importantly, their conclusions. Both authors
assume that foreign policy in the United States and
Australia is a “three-level game,” the outcome of which
is determined by the personalities and goals of the
leaders, national and societal factors, and regional and
global forces. Both writers pay tribute to the shared
histories and common values which undergird and
facilitate U.S.-Australian relations, but in the end they
are both realists who assume that the direction and
intensity of future bilateral relations will be determined
by national interests.
Beginning with the individual level of analysis,
Hulsman and Kelly both accord a great deal of
importance to the close personal relationship which
has developed between President George W. Bush
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and Prime Minister John Howard. The two leaders are
“kindred spirits” (Hulsman’s phrase), who share a deep
commitment to “Anglosphere” values.1 Kelly reminds
us, however, that the relationship also is based upon a
“strategic bond.” Howard has sought close cooperation
with the United States because he is convinced that a
globally dominant America is good for the world, good
for the Asia-Pacific region, and very good for Australia.
Both authors contrast Howard’s decision to accord top
priority to the cultivation of a U.S.-Australian bilateral
partnership with the more nuanced and conditional
policies of his immediate predecessor, Paul Keating.
While Mr. Keating was unquestionably pro-American,
he tended to place a higher priority on engagement
with Australia’s Asia-Pacific neighbors.
The contributors to this section survey the most
important tests of the U.S.-Australian partnership
over the last decade. Mr. Howard’s views on the indispensability of American leadership were influenced
by his experiences with the East Asian economic crisis
of 1997 and the violence which followed the vote for
independence in East Timor in 1998. But it was the Prime
Minister’s immediate and unconditional expression
of support for the United States after the September
11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks and his willingness to
deliver on that expression of support in Afghanistan
and Iraq, which transformed the bilateral relationship
into what Kelly describes as “the New Intimacy.” Mr.
Howard also has taken unilateral actions—including
his quick response to the devastating tsunami of 2004
and his deployment of military and police units to
the South Pacific and East Timor—which have been
applauded warmly by Washington.
With reference to Australia’s contributions to the
coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Roy
Eccleston has observed: “That Howard has become
22

such a favored US ally with a relatively small military
commitment is testament to his political skills. . . .”2
This assertion is correct, but it should be placed in
the context of Australia’s limited military capabilities
and competing military obligations as well as the
effectiveness of the forces which have been deployed.
Furthermore, Mr. Howard should be commended for
understanding that, in a democratic society, sustaining
support for his administration is an indispensable
precondition for the success of any controversial longterm strategy. It is a measure of Mr. Howard’s skill as a
domestic politician that he was elected to a fourth term
in 2004.
As noted in the preface to this volume, it is widely
assumed that Mr. Howard’s active support has been
good for America, but there has been a great deal of
debate within Australia about the costs and benefits of
this policy. Kelly assures readers that the Australian
public still values the U.S.-Australia alliance, but
criticism of the way that the alliance is managed in
Canberra “can be intense.” Many of Mr. Howard’s
domestic critics use the same arguments that have
been leveled against British Prime Minister Tony
Blair—that he has not been discriminate in his support
of Washington, and that he has not been adequately
compensated for his loyalty. It can be argued, however,
that Mr. Howard already has begun to adjust both
the rhetoric and the substance of his foreign policy in
order to avoid Mr. Blair’s “poodle problem.”3 Since
2005, he has been engaged in a sophisticated campaign
to develop a more multifaceted foreign policy, which
Maryanne Kelton has described correctly as a “US plus
approach.”4 At the core of this strategy is Howard’s
assertion that “. . . close links to the United States are
a plus—not a minus—in forging stronger links in
Asia.”5
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Hulsman and Kelly agree that Prime Minister
Howard’s ability to manage this more flexible foreign
policy both at home and abroad will depend on the
support he receives from the United States. At the core
of Hulsman’s chapter is the contention that the Bush
administration has placed both the U.S.-Australia
relationship and the Howard government in jeopardy
by “taking Australia for granted.” Hulsman also
asserts that even if Mr. Bush were to recognize that Mr.
Howard needs and deserves more public support and
more substantive rewards for his yeoman service, the
American president would be constrained in what he
could actually accomplish as a result of his “ongoing
political weakness.” Indeed, John Mueller has argued
that this progressive political paralysis has been felt
since early 2005, when public opinion polls indicated
that more than half of Americans viewed the U.S.
invasion of Iraq as a mistake.6
No matter how politically constrained President
Bush is during the last 2 years of his presidency, he will
still have an obligation, and numerous opportunities,
to contribute to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific
region. The good news is that the Bush administration
already has taken the first essential step by refocusing
its attention on the area. The next step should be to
take a page from Mr. Howard’s play book by treating
close ties to Canberra as a “plus . . . in forging stronger
links in Asia.” An “Australia plus” strategy would
involve two progressively more difficult policies for
U.S. policymakers. First, the Bush administration
should respond to Hulsman’s warnings about taking
Australia for granted. This should involve more than
“public displays of affection.” It should utilize the
well-developed network of institutional ties between
the two governments, in conjunction with high-level
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consultations, in order to enhance the influence of
Australian foreign and defense policymakers within
the Washington policy community. On an interpersonal
level, this should be a relatively painless adjustment,
since, as Kurt Campbell has observed: “It’s fair to say
that Americans generally like Australians, and it doesn’t
hurt that senior Australian diplomats and officials are
particularly expert at engaging Americans—and even
manipulating them on occasion!”7 The challenge will
be for both sides to get beyond comfortable social
interaction so that Washington can benefit from
Australia’s rich foreign policy experience—especially
as it relates to the Asia-Pacific region.
The second and more difficult policy which the
United States should pursue corresponds to Kelly’s
“essential truth” that “alliances work better when
mutual respect . . . incorporates a margin of difference.”
As several contributors to this volume have noted,
U.S. and Australian interests are likely to diverge on a
number of key foreign policy issues in the near future, as
the two nations adjust to significant structural changes
in the Asia-Pacific region. However, this does not mean,
as Doug Bandow has argued, that it is time to scrap
the ANZUS alliance so that both nations can pursue
more flexible and independent foreign policies. On the
contrary, in accordance with my first recommendation,
the ANZUS relationship should be strengthened in
order to facilitate U.S.-Australia consultation. And to
the extent that bilateral consultation is improved, it will
make it that much easier for both nations to prepare for
situations of foreign policy divergence.
Hulsman and Kelly agree (as do most of the
contributors to this volume) that the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) poses the biggest long-term challenge
to the U.S.-Australia relationship. Over the last 5
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years, Beijing has been engaged in an extraordinarily
successful “friends with everybody” campaign in
the Asia-Pacific region. China’s success is partly
attributable to the fact that the PRC has reached the
stage in its economic development where it is able to
use financial inducements as a highly effective form of
“sticky power.”8 In the case of Australia, this has taken
the form of a dramatic increase in Australian exports
to China—at a time when Australia faces a serious
problem with its overall trade deficit.9
The PRC also has been able to challenge, and in
some cases displace, the United States as a regional
power because Washington’s attention was concentrated elsewhere in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. By the time the Bush administration noticed
that China was “eating our lunch” in the Asia-Pacific
region, the PRC had established a probably irreversible
position of political and economic influence throughout
the region.10 Unfortunately, the Washington policy
community has responded to this changed geopolitical
situation by tilting toward a posture of anti-Chinese
containment. The change of tone is evident in
Department of Defense documents such as the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2006 Annual Report
to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China, and in the 2005 Annual Report of the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission.
If Washington continues down the path toward
explicit anti-Chinese containment, it will undermine
not only the U.S.-Australia relationship, but its ties
to most of its friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific
region. As Hulsman observes, “China will emerge as a
great power whether the U.S. objects or not.” China’s
neighbors accept this fact, and have been adapting
their policies accordingly. Washington must learn from
their example. In some cases, it must also rely upon its
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most trusted friends to take the lead in what will be
a complex process of adjustment. No nation is more
deserving of this trust than Australia.
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CHAPTER 2
The Future of U.S.-Australian Relations
and the Curse of George Harrison
John C. Hulsman
The Problems of Being the Third Beatle.
In the late 1960s, the Beatles were at the height of
their cultural and creative power. In John Lennon and
Paul McCartney, they had the most talented and artful
songwriting duo in pop music history. To complement
their artistic prowess, the band’s ability to fuse catchy
pop tunes with profound and moving lyrics made
them the rarest of creatures—an artistic and popular
success. Seen as the embodiment of 1960s togetherness,
most cultural commentators fatuously expected that
the band would go on forever.
But all was not well. George Harrison, their superb
lead guitar player, had been growing artistically as the
1960s progressed. Yet his increasingly interesting lyrics,
showcased in such songs as “While My Guitar Gently
Weeps,” “Taxman,” and “Here Comes the Sun,” largely
were ignored. After all, with Lennon-McCartney as
your primary songwriters, why should the Beatles look
elsewhere for material? Over time, Harrison’s lament
that he had to fight for song slots (and often lost), that
the other members of the band took his abilities as “the
quiet Beatle” for granted, crystallized into resentment.
In his search for artistic fulfillment, neglect had left him
with the options of either remaining third wheel in an
amazingly successful partnership, or going off on his
own. There are many reasons for the Beatles’ shattering
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breakup in 1970, but not the least were the neglect of
Harrison’s budding talent and the stark choice such
neglect had left him.
So it is for U.S.-Australian relations. If Britain is
seen as Paul McCartney to America’s John Lennon, so
Australia under John Howard can be viewed much as
George Harrison—quiet, talented, dependable, a vital
part of an amazing partnership—but also very much
overlooked. As was the case for the Beatles with George
Harrison, America ignores its successful relationship
with Australia at its peril.
Come Together: The Bush-Howard Years.
Seen simply, Australian foreign policy often
has been characterized as a struggle between Asialeaning and Anglo-leaning tendencies. If former Prime
Minister Paul Keating is seen as the embodiment of
the former, Prime Minister Howard symbolizes the
latter, manifested by Australia’s close ties with the
United States. Howard often has been denigrated by
Australian public policy intellectuals, but his largely
successful four-term premiership (characterized by a
decade of strong economic growth, budget surpluses,
tax cuts, and falling unemployment) underscores the
fact that he has remembered and imbibed certain basic
home truths that others have deigned to forget.
Howard’s closeness to the Bush administration
in particular and America in general is founded on
the fact that the United States is and will remain the
only superpower for the foreseeable future, a fact that
gives Australia, with its close cultural ties to America,
a competitive advantage in foreign relations. Both
Australia and the United States are settler cultures,
“better” and more meritocratic offshoots of the
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British homeland. Both are more broadly immigrant
cultures, beyond their common Anglo roots. Both are
enthusiastic capitalist cultures, having relatively low
rates of taxation and a deep deference to the rule of law.
Both broadly welcome and benefit from globalization;
in the last decade Australia and the United States
have almost unrivaled growth rates for developed
nations. Both, in the 20th century, were reluctant but
vital internationalists. These common characteristics,
a similar way of looking at the world—economically,
socially, politically, diplomatically—have allowed
Howard to enjoy the good graces of the sole remaining
superpower, while at the same time leading Australia
to its status as a leading regional power.
But much as Keating’s overly one-sided Asiacentric approach had certain basic problems (it breezily
underestimated the effects of living in an increasingly
one-superpower world), so Howard’s approach is
marked by a number of flaws. Don’t let the personal
intimacy of the Bush-Howard relationship fool you;
that era is ending, largely due to the President’s
political weakness (the most recent AP-IPSOS poll has
his approval rating at a lowly 38 percent).1 Howard
saw in George W. Bush a kindred spirit—a tough man
disparaged by and disparaging of much of the political
establishment, socially conservative, fiscally bound to
tax cuts—who has been underestimated much of his
political life. Thus the generally close U.S.-Australian
ties were enhanced further by the personal closeness
of these two conservative leaders. But in the words of
George Harrison, “All things must pass.”
Completely apart from the fact that the American
half of the partnership is in dire political straits (with the
Democrats retaking the U.S. House of Representatives
and the Senate during the 2006 mid-terms, President
Bush’s flexibility on the international scene is now
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constrained even further), there are other factors that
limit the chances for the U.S.-Australian relationship to
continue as before. Prime Minister Howard himself is
unlikely to remain the political colossus he has been for
most of the past decade. Though his partnership with
Treasurer Peter Costello has been fruitful, increasingly
the pair seem to be doing a fairly good impression of
Gordon Brown and Tony Blair. As Howard announced
his intention to run for a fifth term, Costello confirmed
press reports that the Prime Minister privately assured
him in far-off 1994 that he would hand over the Liberal
Party leadership to the Treasurer one-and-a-half terms
into a Liberal-dominated government. Howard has
denied this. As was the case in Canada for Jacques
Chretien and Paul Martin, as well as for Blair and
Brown, it is almost inevitable that the poison of a
prolonged succession controversy will come to weaken
the present Liberal dominance. Howard’s political road
ahead is likely to be far more bumpy than it has been
up to now.
Further, objective strategic facts limiting America’s
pull on Australia remain in play. If Prime Minister
Keating based his Asia-centric approach on the rise of
Asia and especially China and the relative U.S. decline
in the region, that process, perhaps interrupted by the
Asian financial crisis, continues. For both America
and Australia, the great strategic question is whether
the two great allies can coordinate their positions
concerning the rise of China. Even the halcyon days
of the Howard-Bush partnership do not provide a
clear answer to this seminal question. It is here that
the American strategic response to China must be
communicated far more clearly. Above all, as was the
case for the Beatles and George Harrison, the United
States must avoid a foreign policy towards China that
32

forces Australia and its Asian neighbors to choose
between the two; it might not like the answer it gets.
China as Yoko Ono.
As this conference has made crystal clear, though
America looks at China as a threat, its Australian ally
sees it as a vital economic partner. Paul Kelly (Chapter
3) is correct in asserting that Mr. Howard “purchased a
degree of immunity” from U.S. criticisms of its dealings
with China, but it is only temporary immunity. The
longer-term questions about China’s rise will not allow
this state of affairs to continue. In the neo-conservative
Bush administration, the two fundamental questions
about China have been as follows: Should the United
States oppose China’s rise to great power status or seek
to shape it? Should the United States focus on carrots
or sticks in dealing with the PRC?
As is typical for the neo-conservatives, both these
questions largely miss the point. Worse, if they come
to define the American relationship with Beijing, they
could well imperil Washington’s standing throughout
the region. Speaking as an ethical realist, my position
is that China will emerge as a great power whether the
United States objects or not—that horse already has
left the stable.2 With growth rates regularly in excess of
9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), the largest
military force in the world, the third highest level of
global defense spending, and a vast trade surplus
with the United States, China is by any stretch of the
imagination a “rising power.”
Worse, futile grandstanding efforts to hinder this
process will only strengthen the very anti-American
forces in China most likely to urge that Beijing attempt
to become a revolutionary power in Asia over the long
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term. This big question should be substituted for the
American neo-conservative’s first question: While it
is virtually certain that China will emerge as a great
power, will it evolve into a status quo or revolutionary
power? That is, will it come to be a generally responsible
member of the present community of nations, a partner
in the Great Capitalist Peace in Asia (though, of course,
one that defends its own interests), or will it try to
displace the United States as the region’s ordering
power?
If this should be America’s new first question, then
we also should adopt a new perspective in answering
the second question—carrots or sticks? Instead of
either-or, the answer should be both. In terms of carrots,
the United States should continue to draw China
further into the global financial system, to induce it to
live up to the World Trade Organization (WTO) fine
print and continue to liberalize its economy. Such an
approach will lead to the rise of a robust middle class
over time, as well as an increase in pluralism. Beyond
neo-conservative simplisms, this is the truly subversive
approach; it increases the likelihood that China will
remain a status quo power, as it enjoys the fruits of
the Great Capitalist Peace evolving in Asia. Beijing is
unlikely to want to risk its increased standing for highly
risky adventurist policies designed to displace the
United States as the dominant power in the region. To
see the likelihood of the status quo outcome, one need
only look at the events in China that have occurred in
my lifetime. I was born in the late 1960s, at the height
of both the Beatles frenzy and, more insidiously, the
Chinese Cultural Revolution. Since that time, the
Chinese Communist leadership, particularly that of
Deng Xiaphong, has embraced the very notions of
capitalism that Mao and the Gang of Four so reviled.
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As such, China’s middle class has blossomed, a private
space has been created beyond government control,
and, while remaining far from democratic, China has
rejoined the international community, particularly in
the economic sphere. The crazy days of dunce caps,
defenestrations, mass killings, and bellicose rhetoric
seem far away. Surely the carrot has yielded tangible
progress.
At the same time, the stick must not be forgotten. The
United States presently has the best politico-military
ties in its history with both Japan and Australia. It
retains close ties to the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) countries, the Philippines, and
(though not without problems) South Korea. The Bush
administration wisely has seen that closer economic,
political, and strategic ties with India are perhaps the
highest priority for American diplomacy over the
course of the next decade. The United States must
continue to push for ever-closer linkages in the region,
making it perfectly clear that military ties between
Washington and its allies in Asia are defensive and
bilateral in nature, and are not overtly anti-Chinese.
Such an approach flies in the face of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) paradigm,
so close to the hearts of many Americans. But that
paradigm does not fit the situation in Asia. For one
thing, given Japan’s frustrating failure to come to terms
publicly with its atrocious war record in the same
manner that the Germans have, many likely members
of such a multilateral organization, such as South
Korea, continue to feel deep psychological alienation
from their potential Japanese “allies.” Second, the
NATO approach would increase greatly the chances
that China would choose the revolutionary power
option in response to this encirclement. Third, the last
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thing the countries of the region, as this conference
has made clear, want is to be forced to choose between
Beijing and Washington. Such an approach ironically
could make a permanent rise in tensions in the AsiaPacific region a self-fulfilling prophecy. Yet, a loosely
constructed bilateral concert of powers centered around
Washington could make the Chinese leadership hesitate in opting to become a revolutionary power. Having to watch India at its back, with Japan and Taiwan
at its front, is likely to bolster those within the Chinese
leadership calling for a continued peaceful rise.
We must be under no illusions; ultimately it is
the Chinese and not we who will decide China’s
strategic fate. But a more realistic policy, beyond being
compatible with Australian strategic thinking, is likely
to tip the Chinese leadership’s calculations in a more
benign direction. Further, American failure to adopt
this approach is certain to strain the U.S.-Australian
partnership, perhaps to the breaking point. If not dealt
with properly, China could well be the Yoko Ono of
the grand strategic partnership formed between the
United States and Canberra over the past decade. We
must not let this happen.
Conclusion.
First, the good news. The Australian-American
relationship could well be a precursor of the way
alliances are going to be managed in the new era.
For it was due to the endemic close ties between the
two peoples that a profoundly new way of working
together has begun to evolve. Stung by President Bill
Clinton’s refusal to send troops to East Timor, Prime
Minister Howard went ahead anyway. This is an
entirely different model from the simple cliché that
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Australia is merely the American Deputy Sheriff in the
Asia-Pacific. Rather, Australia acted on what Howard
perceived to be its own unique interests; not every
operation is dependent on the American calculation
of its own specific interests. While America supported
the East Timor mission, it did not lead it. Given the
failure of the present multilateral system—be it the UN,
ANZUS, ASEAN, or NATO—to function effectively
as peacemakers, such ad hoc coalitions of the willing
are likely to remain a primary tool of international
relations. Given their complementary views of the
world, this means that Australia and the United States
have a head start in creatively working together to
solve such problems.
But for this to work, certain psychological hangups, which became established in the Cold War, have
to come to an end. There are three diplomatic “rules”
for dissipating these hangups. First, both the United
States and Australia must get used to living in a world
where the other says “no”; such an answer does not
mean, as Chicken Little would have it, that the sky is
falling and that the partnership is at an end. Second,
as proved true in the case of East Timor, a lack of
agreement about what to do should not necessarily
stop the other partner from acting. An alliance where
interests are similar, but not the same, can thrive only
if this more fluid approach is put into practice.
But this leaves us with the problem of George
Harrison, for the third diplomatic rule of the new era
is in many ways the most important. The United States
must stop taking Australia for granted. It must stop
viewing the relationship through the complacent, outdated lenses of the Keating/Asia-centric or Howard/
Anglo-centric alternatives. Rather, America must
recognize that an Australia fundamentally engaged in
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both these realms at the same time is an Australia most
profoundly suited to advance American interests in the
post-Cold War era. This means not forcing Australia to
choose in some either-or fashion between the United
States and China. First of all, such a forced choice,
with the Australian economy booming largely due
to China’s insatiable demand for Australian natural
resources, is the single greatest threat to the continued
centrality of the relationship for both sides. Second,
moving closer to Australia’s more nuanced view of
China, using both economic carrots and military sticks
to affect the Chinese leadership’s decisionmaking
process about its ultimate role in the region, is far more
likely to serve American interests well into the future.
In moving away from the dead-end zero sum game,
the United States can avoid forcing Australia into
George Harrison’s dilemma. Let it be.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2
1. The AP-IPSOS polling results for October 2006 are available
at www.ipsos-na.com/news/pa/presidential_approval.pdf.
2. For a fuller discussion of an alternative to present U.S.-China
policies, see Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, Ethical Realism: A
Vision For America’s Role In The World, New York: Pantheon Press,
2006, pp. 169-177.
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CHAPTER 3
THE AUSTRALIAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE:
TOWARDS A REVITALIZATION
Paul Kelly
In June 2002, Prime Minister John Howard told
the U.S. Congress that “America has no better friend
anywhere in the world than Australia.”1 It was an
assertion of strategic, political, and personal intimacy.
The Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) Treaty,
now 55 years old, has enjoyed a revitalization during
the era of Howard and President George W. Bush. I
call this the New Intimacy. The purpose of this chapter
is to assess its meaning and implications.
Australia has drawn closer to the United States at a
time when many other nations have kept their distance.
Any discussion of the Australia-U.S. relationship must
penetrate the fog of mutual self-congratulation that
surrounds it. The New Intimacy, however, testifies to
the astonishing durability of the spirit that characterizes
the relationship and suggests that the ties binding
Australians and Americans together may be sturdier
and more complex than generally assumed.
This current high tide is driven by the Howard-Bush
personal concord, the cathartic impact of the September
11, 2001 (9/11), crisis, and a common strategic view that
the alliance has a new relevance. The pivotal question
is, What endures from the Howard-Bush era and what
disappears?
Such an intimate personal concord probably will
disappear. Howard and Bush are political soul mates,
united by shared social and cultural values. This
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interaction between an Australian Liberal leader and
an American Republican leader was reinforced by their
identity as radical conservatives. The New Intimacy
was the creation of this radical conservative political
identity. They have enjoyed a special relationship, and
that means, by definition, it will not be duplicated by
their successors. To take this stance is merely being
realistic, not pessimistic, about the ties between future
heads of government. This surmise leads directly to the
question, How deeply entrenched is the New Intimacy?
Can it survive the passing of its political architects?
Any survey of the New Intimacy should begin by
noting that it is polarizing, not only in America but in
Australia as well. The opposition, the Australian Labor
Party, opposed Australia’s commitment to Iraq and
wants to withdraw all Australia’s forces. A majority of
Australians dislike the war. Polls show that positive
feelings about the United States are down to 58 percent,
a low figure by historical norms. This compares with the
Australian public’s positive feelings towards Europe
at 85 percent, towards Japan at 84 percent, and towards
China at 69 percent.2
In this chapter I will address three issues—the
origins of the New Intimacy, the strategic conditions
and challenges that underpin the New Intimacy, and
the prospects for the New Intimacy’s consolidation
into a stronger and closer alliance.
The origins of the New Intimacy are more complex
than usually recognized. They began with Howard’s
vision from the time of his 1996 election victory to
realign Australia to a position closer to the United
States. This was a fascinating aim since bilateral ties
in the previous era already were widely and correctly
assumed to be close, and there was an effective personal
and ideological connection between Prime Minister
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Keating and President Clinton, a Labor-Democrat
association.
Howard held the unfashionable view that the postCold War era would create fresh opportunities for a
deeper alliance relationship. Few Australian analysts
agreed with such an assessment. Howard and Keating
have both conducted successful policies towards the
United States, but their approach has been different.
First, Howard put a premium on values with an
enthusiasm that Keating did not embrace. Indeed,
Howard’s entire foreign policy philosophy represents
an effort to find a new Australian synthesis between
values and realpolitik. Howard has shaped Australian
foreign policy with a profound sense of cultural
traditionalism and the idea that Australia as a nation
is immersed deeply in the Western tradition. Keating,
more interested in Australia’s engagement with Asia,
placed less emphasis on its cultural affinity with the
West and the United States.
Second, Keating and Howard had different strategic
approaches to America. Keating was interested in
Asia’s regional architecture and crafted an Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) diplomacy, dazzling
in scope, that sought to institutionalize the United
States in regional institutions. Influenced by the
trans-Atlantic strategic ties that had bound America
to Europe, Keating obsessed about creating transPacific institutional ties to bind America to Asia. With
Clinton’s support, the meetings of APEC leaders were
Keating’s main innovation. Howard, by contrast, did
not think in terms of regional architectures, but in
terms of bilateral relations. Howard’s view of the U.S.Australian alliance was elemental—that such an asset
should be strengthened and enriched. His answer to
the question, “What should an Australian leader do
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with the alliance?” was unhesitatingly simple—you
add layers of value. This view was informed by a deep
strategic conviction, not widely shared in Australia
in 1996, that U.S. power was on the rise and that the
21st century, like the 20th century, would belong to
America. This made preservation of the alliance a
greater prize than ever.
Third, the differences in the Keating-Howard
mindsets arose from the contrasting eras in which they
governed. The imprint on Keating’s mind was the Asian
economic miracle and Australia’s participation in that
process. The influences for Howard were scepticism
about the Asian model, arising from the Asian financial
crisis of the late 1990s. This reinforced his belief in the
superiority of U.S. power.
Despite Howard’s pro-U.S. views, there was little
decisive action during the 4 years in which he dealt
with the Clinton administration. Howard and Clinton
had little personal rapport, though their governments
had a strong functional relationship. The turning point
was the U.S. 2000 presidential election season, when
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer flew
to Texas to meet George W. Bush after being advised
that Mr. Bush might become the Republican nominee.
He reported to Howard that George Bush was “our
kind of candidate.” Meanwhile, Australia’s new
ambassador to the United States, Michael Thawley, a
Howard confidant and a critical figure in the evolving
relationship, had established ties with key Republicans
and advised Howard that a bilateral trade deal would
be possible with a Bush administration.
In this environment, the Howard cabinet privately
cheered Bush along the way to his election win over
the Democrats’ Al Gore. In anticipation of his victory,
the cabinet took a bold decision—to seek a free trade
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agreement (FTA) with the United States. Expectations
within the Howard government about Bush were
unrealistically high. Yet Howard’s judgment was
vindicated in the end.
Howard’s motive regarding the FTA transcended
trade. For Howard, it was an effort to institutionalize
an economic partnership with the United States to
match the security partnership represented by ANZUS
and to deepen the overall strategic relationship. In this
sense, Howard and Bush were fellow travellers. Much
to the dismay of free market economists, they saw trade
policy in strategic as well as economic and monetary
terms.
By 2001, Howard’s 5-year-old prime ministership
had reached its maturity. At this stage, his foreign
and security policy decision of greatest moment had
been the assumption of Australian leadership in the
UN peace enforcement operation in East Timor after
that country’s vote for independence from Indonesia
in 1999. This operation entailed Australia’s most
important military deployment since Vietnam. It was
the making of Howard as a foreign policy leader—
one who negotiated with world leaders, managed a
regional crisis, and accepted Australian responsibility
for leading and defining the terms of intervention as
a strictly UN authorized operation in order to
minimize the risk of hostilities between Australia and
Indonesia.
Central to the intervention was the military
guarantee the Clinton administration gave Australia
and the warnings issued by U.S. Defense Secretary
William Cohen in Jakarta that if Indonesia’s troops
challenged the Australia-led forces, they would face
U.S. Marines. Howard knew the intervention was
underwritten by the U.S. alliance. The Prime Minister,
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meeting President Bush for the first time in September
2001, then had the confidence of one who had conducted a highly successful military deployment. Moreover, his profound belief in the alliance now had been
validated by his own experience.
Howard’s September 2001 visit to the United States
became the most important of his prime ministership,
with the establishment of the Howard-Bush concord
falling on September 10. The Bush administration had
made its own decision about Howard—he was being
inducted into the inner sanctum of valued foreign
leaders. The informal barbeque hosted the previous
evening by Ambassador Thawley set the scene—all
the notables attended, the Cheneys, the Rumsfelds,
the Powells. The next day Howard spent 5 hours with
Bush, including a welcoming ceremony, a drive, a chat,
formal talks, a joint press conference, and lunch. At
the press conference, the normally cautious Howard
declared that he and Bush were “very close friends.”
The U.S. side gave its preliminary approval to the
FTA negotiations. The Howard-Bush bandwagon was
rolling. The emotional and strategic bond was literally
sealed in blood the next day. On the morning of 9/11,
Howard, from his Willard Hotel window, saw terrorist
smoke rising from the Pentagon, where he had met
Rumsfeld only 24 hours before.
The 9/11 attack revealed a wellspring of emotional
support among Australians for America that Howard
instinctively articulated. In the immediate days after
9/11, Howard made some of the most important
statements in the history of the alliance. His response
fused values and interests. “Of course, it’s an attack on
all of us,” Howard said immediately. It was a startling
statement. This interpretation guided his policy for
years. The attack, though technically on U.S. territory
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lying on the other side of the earth from Australia, was
actually on “all of us” because of shared values. But
Howard could not have been more emphatic. He kept
repeating the words like a mantra—the 9/11 attack
was also an attack on Australia’s values.3
At the same time, Howard, aware that this was
a defining moment for America, offered strategic
assistance. He felt that America would identity its
true friends from their responses to this event. Going
beyond a mere pro forma declaration of moral support,
within 48 hours after the attack, he proclaimed: “I’ve
also indicated that Australia will provide all support
that might be requested of us by the United States in
relation to any action that might be taken.” In response
to follow-up questions, Howard said: “We would
provide support within our capability.4
Bush had made no such request. Howard had no
obligation to make such a statement, but he volunteered
a military commitment from Australia, and there was
no qualification to this core principle. Howard’s action
was deliberate. This was no rush of blood to the head;
he knew exactly what he was saying and he intended
to say it. For Howard, this was an exercise in prime
ministerial discretion and authority. He chose to stand
with America. The origins of Australia’s involvement
in Afghanistan and Iraq lie in this pledge. In a radio
interview, Howard said the attack was “an appalling
act of bastardry . . . in some ways worse than Pearl
Harbor.”5
Upon learning that the mutual defense provisions
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
alliance had been invoked, Howard and Foreign
Minister Downer, after consulting the U.S. side, decided
that the ANZUS Treaty also should be invoked. This
action was formalized at a special cabinet meeting in
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Canberra on September 14. Howard said it was an
Australian initiative taken in consultation with the
United States.
This action and Howard’s statements constituted a
significantly broad interpretation of ANZUS, a treaty
that legally was limited to the “Pacific area.” This
interpretation testified to Howard’s global view of
Australian security policy, an outlook shaped by his
Empire and Cold War historical perspectives. Howard,
realizing that the international terrorist threat cut
across treaty boundaries, saw ANZUS in global as well
as regional terms. This was also the view of the Bush
administration, an outlook that predated 9/11. The
Director of Policy Planning in the State Department,
Richard Haass, had stated in mid-2001 that the United
States viewed ANZUS not so much as a regional
alliance but rather as “two countries joined in a global
partnership.”6
As a consequence, an alliance conceived for the Cold
War in Asia and seen by Australians as an insurance
guarantee for their nation, now was invoked for the
first time as a result of attacks on the U.S. east coast by
nonstate actors enacting Islamic terror. Nothing could
have been more remote from the 1950s vision of Percy
Spender and John Foster Dulles, who negotiated the
original treaty. This result was equally remote for an
Australian public, psychologically unprepared for such
a turn. ANZUS, a Cold War arrangement negotiated
against the backdrop of the Chinese revolution and the
Korean War, was now being adapted for a new and
different threat environment.
The immediate consequence was Australia’s
military commitment to Afghanistan, announced
in October 2001 following talks between Bush and
Howard. Bush’s aim in deposing the Taliban was not
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just to pursue al-Qai’da, but to remove the regimes
that harbored terrorists. Downer was specific about
the war’s justification—the U.S. action was validated
under the self-defense provision of Article 51 of the UN
Charter in addition to the Security Council resolution
passed after 9/11. From the standpoint of domestic
politics, Australia’s support was initially bipartisan,
but bipartisanship later evaporated as a result of the
Iraq war.
Iraq would become the site of Howard’s most
contentious actions in support of Bush’s “war on
terrorism,” later branded the Long War. Taken in
increments over 2002 and 2003, with the final decision
in March 2003, Howard’s decisions comprised a
traditional Australian response to a nontraditional
war. Despite the contentious nature of Bush’s war, it
was no surprise that Howard went with him. Staying
aloof from Iraq would have defied Howard’s history,
his values, and his strategic instincts, thus violating his
political essence. Such was the start and the end of his
Iraq decision.
There were, however, important differences of
emphasis between Howard and Bush. Howard was
pro-American, but, unlike Bush, he was not a foreign
policy revolutionary. Howard never subscribed to the
desirability of regime change as a justification for the
war. Indeed, Howard’s own justification was almost
cautious, namely, that “disarming Iraq is necessary for
the long-term security of the world and is therefore
manifestly in the national interest of Australia.”7
Howard lacked British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s
idealistic enthusiasm for the undertaking and, even
in proportionate terms, made nothing rivaling the
British military commitment. Howard won Bush’s
agreement that Australia would be involved in the
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“sharp end” of the war but would not remain in Iraq
for long, a commitment that had to be modified given
the subsequent insurgency.
It should be no surprise that Howard has emerged
far less politically damaged from the war than either
Bush or Blair. As a leader, Howard likes to make decisions but is reluctant to close off options—he presents
the decisions as proof of his convictions and the options
as proof of his flexibility. In Iraq, Howard committed to
the war but had the flexibility to limit that commitment.
More than 3 years later, no Australian had been killed in
action.8 Australia’s military contribution was designed
to maximize Australia’s political leverage with the
United States and minimize military casualties.
Howard is not a cynic. He believed Saddam Hussein
was a threat; he accepted the intelligence assessments
about the dictator’s weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) capability; and he felt after 9/11 that the world’s
margin for error with such regimes and such weapons
had disappeared. But Howard, unlike Bush, did not
carry the political responsibility for the intervention.
The public knew that Australia was in Iraq as a junior
partner, not a principal player. For Australia, Iraq
triggered neither the national agony nor strategic
trauma that occurred in the United States.
The Iraq war revealed the gap that had opened
between the U.S. leadership and UN interventionist
sentiments over the years since the First Gulf War. Lack
of UN authorization has been pivotal in Australia’s
domestic politics, with the Labor Party’s formal
opposition to the Iraq invasion of 2003 resting upon
that point. Opposition leader Kim Beazley noted that
the Hawke government’s 1991 commitment to the
First Gulf War had not been under alliance auspices
but rather under those of the UN. The distinction
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was critical. In explaining the decision, Labor’s Prime
Minister, Bob Hawke, said in 1991: “We are not sending
ships to the gulf region to serve our allies; we are going
to protect the international rule of law which will be
vital to our security however our alliances may develop
in the future.” Similarly, in Beazley’s words some 12
years later, Labor was attracted by the post-Cold War
“possibility for a real international community under
the United Nations.”9
In the early 1990s, there was no conflict for the Labor
Party between Australia’s responsibility under the
alliance and its responsibility as a global citizen. But
George W. Bush’s policies shattered this congruency.
In 2003, when Howard chose the U.S. alliance, Labor
stayed with the UN and opposed the war.
While Howard’s decision reflected his concern
over Iraq, his greater concern was the health of the
U.S. alliance. Howard saw Iraq as an instrument
of deeper purpose. He could have abandoned the
Iraq commitment only by abandoning his pre-9/11
strategic objective of realigning his country closer to
the United States. Howard, therefore, had much to lose
by absenting himself from the war as well as much
to risk by attending it. His aim was to maximize his
returns while minimizing his risks.
It is wrong to see Iraq as the price Australia paid
for its U.S. alliance. It was the price Australia paid for
Howard’s more ambitious alliance. Howard, ultimately, went to Iraq to seal the New Intimacy, thereby
realizing his greater aspiration dating from 1996.
The second issue I wish to address relates to the
strategic conditions and challenges that underpin the
New Intimacy. They arise in two areas: (1) the Long
War against Islamist terrorism; and (2) the rapidly
changing power balance in East Asia driven by China’s
rise, Japan’s reaction to it, and future U.S. directions.
49

Howard is best understood as an agent of synthesis.
He seeks a synthesis between Australia’s history as
a Western multicultural nation on one hand and its
geographical position in the Asia-Pacific region on
the other. He seeks a strategic synthesis that combines
Australia’s role as a regional power with its genuinely
global interests. And he seeks, above all, to synthesize
the U.S. alliance with its East Asian relationships.
Despite the huge value of U.S. intelligence to
Australia, it remains an open question whether the
Long War will unite U.S. and Australian interests as
closely as did the Cold War. Much depends upon the
tactics and strategy the United States follows. Since
the struggle against Islamist terrorism is likely to be
long and unpredictable, there is no easy answer to this
question and the answer may change over time in any
event.
Australia lives more in an Islamic geographical
setting than a Christian one. Its nearest neighbor of
moment, Indonesia, is the world’s largest Islamic nation
and is undergoing active ferment in all of its defining
institutional structures, with important implications
for its religious, political, economic, and security
future. Relations with Indonesia will become more
important and probably more difficult for Australia
with the passage of time. Australia will need nerve and
commitment to maintain an effective relationship with
a volatile nationalistic Islamic country.
Each year for the past 5 years, there has been a
planned or actual attack on Australians or Australian
assets in Indonesia or elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
In October 2002, 88 Australians were killed in the
Bali bombing, an action perpetrated by the Islamist
terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). After the Bali
attack, Australia assumed a new regional role in
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counterterrorist collaboration with Indonesia. The
two nations moved closer in police, intelligence, and
political cooperation. This was helped by the new
Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
with whom Howard enjoyed a relationship based
on a good measure of mutual trust. Australia began
negotiations for a new bilateral security agreement
with Jakarta. It also completed counterterrorism
agreements with a range of Southeast Asian nations.
These initiatives reveal the centrality for Australia of an
effective counterterrorism strategy with its Southeast
Asian neighbors, a region where both Indonesia and the
Philippines pose high risks so far as Australian peace
and security are concerned. Australia’s challenge is to
reconcile such regional interests with its commitment
to the U.S. alliance, a task accomplished well to this
point.
In this challenge, Australia will be directly affected
by future U.S. strategy, the fate of Bush’s doctrine of
preemption in the post-Iraq world, the outcome of
America’s inevitable strategic reappraisal, the image
and moral authority of the United States in the world at
the time, the legitimacy attaching to future U.S. military
initatives, and the sentiment towards America among
moderate Islamic nations and leaders. Australia will be
one of many losers if tensions between Islam and the
West are broadly interpreted as part of what Samuel
Huntington has called a “clash of civilizations.” Given
Australia’s geography, any further deterioration in
relations between America and the Islamic nations
would be seriously adverse for those of us “down
under.” As a junior ally, Australia has a great interest
in seeing that U.S. policies are successful.
There is concern within Australia’s broad strategic
community—its think tanks, retired officials, aca51

demics, security specialists, and commentators—that
the battle of ideas is not being won. While much of alQai’da’s structure has been dismantled, the jihadists
seem to have a plentiful supply of new recruits.
Globalization has helped to create a situation where all
Muslims feel sympathy for events adversely affecting
other Muslims (witness the Danish cartoon issue and
hostility to remarks by Pope Benedict). There would
be concern in Australia about any U.S. resort to the
military option against Iran, because it would alienate
sentiment further in the Islamic world.
The other alliance challenge is different, founded as
it is in classic state-to-state realpolitik. We are speaking,
of course, of the epic interaction between China and
America, a story that will shape much of the coming
century. The most vital question for Australia is whether
U.S.-China relations are defined by shared interests or
dangerous rivalry. This question is pivotal because the
intellectual and political foundations of the alliance
rest upon the idea that Australia’s close ties with East
Asia and America are mutually reinforcing and not
a zero sum game. That is, the alliance is supposed to
maximize Australia’s options rather than limit them.
Prime Ministers from Sir Robert Menzies to John
Howard have been able to validate this proposition.
Indeed, Howard’s major foreign policy achievement
is not his realignment with the United States, but his
ability to deepen Australia’s ties simultaneously with
both America and East Asia.
China poses an unprecedented test for this strategy.
This huge nation eventually will replace Japan as
Australia’s major trading partner. But China, unlike the
U.S. ally, Japan, is a potential strategic rival of America.
For the first time in its history, therefore, Australia will
be called upon to reconcile its ties to America as its
52

security partner, with its ties to China as its principal
economic partner.
Howard’s China policy is one of the hallmarks of
his prime ministership, a result that defied prediction
in 1996. Nowhere is Howard’s transition from novice
to veteran more apparent. One of the first lessons
that Howard learned is that a successful China
policy is essential for a successful Australian prime
ministership. As possibly the most pro-U.S. leader
in Australia’s history, Howard’s commitment to the
China relationship testifies to the power of this idea in
Australia.
In his second most important overseas visit as
PM, to China in 1997, Howard and China’s President
Jiang Zemin defined the basis for the relationship. It
would rest upon “the twin pillars of mutual interest
and mutual respect.” When Howard repeatedly
referred to the “national interest,” he spoke a language
invented by the Chinese.10 Howard’s subtext was that
the Australia-China relationship would profit from a
mutual acknowledgment that it was between nations
with different values.
In 2003, China relations reached a new pinnacle
with President Hu Jintao’s visit to Australia, including
his speech to the Australian Parliament the day after
President Bush’s own speech. It was the first time a
non-U.S. leader had been extended such an honor. For
Howard, the message was manifest—that Australia
was building successful ties with the two nations of the
world likely to dominate the next century.
Howard’s policy revealed how much the politics
of China played differently in Australia as compared
to its reception in the United States. Contrasting
public perceptions and strategic outlooks seem to be
embedded in the political cultures of Australia and
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America vis-à-vis China. Such differences should
neither be exaggerated nor ignored. Consider the
list. While America often sees China as a “strategic
competitor,” Howard believes the rise of China is
beneficial for Asia and the world. While the United
States has a formal commitment to Taiwan, Australia
has no such commitment. While America is a global
power with a tradition of Wilsonian idealism aspiring
to promote democracy around the world, Australia
has no such tradition and no such aspiration. While
American politics is alert to the threat posed by
China’s exports, Australia is more influenced by the
huge economic complementarity between the nations,
and sees China’s rise overwhelmingly as an economic
opportunity. While America views China from the
other side of the world’s widest ocean, Australia sees
China as a neighbor within the orbit of East Asian
regionalism.
There is no doubt that Howard’s close ties with the
Bush administration has purchased him a degree of
immunity in following a more independent approach
to China. But Australia’s ambivalence over Taiwan was
exposed in August 2004 when Downer, in an indiscreet
remark, said that ANZUS involvement was not triggered automatically by any war over Taiwan. His
mistake was to speculate publicly. But his comment
accurately signalled that Australia’s political community had little taste for a war over Taiwan. Labor’s
leader, Kim Beazley, has made a similar point.11
These comments offer a revealing insight to
Australia’s Iraq commitment. Especially with Howard’s
pro-U.S. stance, there was no overriding national
imperative for Australia to remain aloof from the Iraq
war. Indeed, Australia had few national interests that
were automatically put at risk. The situation over
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Taiwan, however, would be the exact opposite—
Australia’s relations with China would be put at risk,
thereby constituting a serious limitation on the scope
of Australia’s support.
During the period 2004-06, Howard elaborated
Australia’s strategic position in relation to the United
States and China. He rejected any “inevitable” clash
between the two giants and refused to frame Australia’s
policy in terms of any hypothetical requirement
to choose between them. Howard told China that
Australia was an aligned nation, with the implication
that the alliance was immutable and that China should
forget any dream about Australia’s Finlandization.
But he also assured China that the alliance is “not in
any way directed against China,” a critical qualifier. It
prompts the question: “Does the United States agree
with Howard in that assessment?” A good measure
of U.S. understanding of Australia’s predicament was
revealed by the two leaders in their joint White House
media conference of July 2005, when Bush, referring to
China, conceded that Australia “has got to act in her
interest.”12
This may be a prophetic comment. In a region
where there are two guiding stars to Australia’s
future, one star leads to closer economic, political, and
regional links with China, enabling it to exert more
leverage over Australia’s foreign policy. The other
star leads Australia into a closer partnership with its
traditional friends, America and Japan, in the evolving
Asian balance of power. Is there a conflict between
the promptings of these two stars? It would be wrong
to assume the strategic tensions are irreconcilable.
But achieving harmony between these stars presents
Australia with unique demands on managing foreign
policy.
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An intimately related question is how far Australia
can support the “normalization” of Japan. Under
Howard and Prime Minister Koizumi, the AustraliaJapan relationship assumed a strategic dimension.
Howard supported Koizumi’s more assertive foreign
policy. An upgraded ministerial-level security dialogue
involving America, Japan, and Australia occurred for
the first time in Sydney in early 2006. Downer also raised
the prospect of a bilateral security agreement with
Japan. A vital issue is whether this Australian support
extends to revision of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution,
now declaring: “The Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation.” Any such
revision to the present constitutional declaration is
sure to inflame Chinese opinion.
Australian leaders realize full well that their Asia
strategy depends heavily on U.S. policy towards China.
Their ability to influence the U.S. approach is extremely
limited. But Australia has its own strategic decisions
to make in the evolving East Asian power balance
that concern not just the U.S. alliance but the pivotal
relationship between China and Japan. It is entirely
possible that Japan-China tensions will outweigh
America-China tensions as a potential problem for
Australia. The enduring objectives of Australian leaders
will be to integrate Australia’s East Asian ties with its
U.S. alliance and to ensure the changing East Asian
power balance does not degenerate into conflict.
The third and final broad issue I want to address is
the future outlook for the New Intimacy. A tantalizing
crux is the changing nature of alliances and how the
United States sees its allies. Former Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld gave all U.S. allies a wake-up call
when, speaking of future “coalitions of the willing,”
he explained that “the mission will determine the
coalition.” Despite America’s more accommodating
56

stance towards allies in recent utterances, nobody has
forgotten the earlier warning.
In the evolving post-Cold War environment, alliances are more flexible and more linked to improvised ad hoc expeditionary groupings. They also
face more unpredictable challenges. Assuming that
terrorism, rogue states, WMD proliferation, natural
disasters, and health pandemics are the emerging
threats, these alliances must adapt further. They will
be less static, more supple, and geared to operational
initiatives.
While Australia has strengthened its military ties
with the United States, the political conditions for
alliance cooperation are more fluid than before. In
this context, it is worth asking how important it is
for Australia to keep fighting in all of America’s big
wars. This Australia-U.S. tradition, extending from
World War I to Iraq, is proud and honorable. But the
future will be more than an extension of the past. In
the coming century, it may be better for both sides
to realize that a strong alliance does not necessarily
mean Australia’s automatic involvement in every U.S.
conflict, particularly if Australia has contravening
commitments elsewhere.
This reality leads directly into another challenge—
how the alliance adjusts to Australia’s new responsibilities within its own region. The Howard era has
seen a spreading of Australia’s regional as well as global
responsibilities. The United States likes to interpret
the alliance in “global” terms, yet the pressures on
Australia suggest that future strategic priorities will
refocus on the region itself. This is likely to be an
important strategic event for the alliance. For Australian leaders, the Long War against Islamist terrorism
will occur close to home. This is obvious given the
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Islamic profile in Southeast Asia. This view is reinforced
by regional instability, domestic imperatives, and the
permanent task of managing relations with Indonesia.
The Labor Party’s main critique of the Iraq venture
is the allegation that it has sapped Australia’s regional
counterterrorism energies. Howard and Downer
share Bush’s view of the Islamist threat, with Downer
having been instrumental in the 2004 White Paper on
International Terrorism describing a global ideological
challenge in which “we are engaged in a battle of ideas,
a struggle to the death over values.”13 Having said this,
Howard and Downer are drawn increasingly to the
region where Australia must live and must address
a combination of weak nations, poor economies, and
struggling leaderships. This is a long-run challenge,
and the Long War indeed is aptly named.
Since its decision to participate in the Iraq war,
Australia has intervened on request in the Solomon
Islands, a de facto failed state, and returned on request
to East Timor to help curb residual violence in that
nation, one of the poorest in Asia. Australia’s further
concern is that Papua New Guinea’s decline will become
systemic, precipitating Australian intervention there.
The South Pacific includes several potentially failing
states, thus presenting Australia and New Zealand
with a joint management task. Howard has terminated
the neocolonial mindset of the past generation that
shunned Australian paternalism, and implemented
instead a new realism based upon acceptance of
regional responsibility. Recent decisions to expand the
Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal
Police reflect concerns over the deepening regional
instability and an acceptance that Australia must
shoulder a greater responsibility in its geographical
neighborhood. The success of this policy remains an
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open question and probably will vary from country to
country.
The United States should not be alarmed about
this trend. Australian policy always pivots around
a balancing point between global and regional
commitments. Each Australian prime minister is called
upon in turn to judge this balance. Howard is a classic
study—he made the most extensive global military
commitments (Iraq and Afghanistan) since Vietnam,
yet he also launched Australia’s most interventionist
military and police policy in the region.
The defining feature of Howard’s regional policy is
that of Australia operating as an initiator and leader.
This stance is the opposite of the U.S. “deputy sheriff”
role widely used to characterize Howard’s policy. From
the 1999 East Timor intervention onwards, the United
States, in effect, has assisted Australia to achieve its
regional goals. This suggests that the alliance is best
seen as a compact under which Australia safeguards
regional interests with U.S. support, as well as
operating beyond its immediate region, depending
upon capability and interests, in support of U.S. global
objectives.
For Howard, commitments to Afghanistan and
Iraq were not inconsistent with regional priorities.
And meeting regional priorities did not exclude wider
global commitments. Yet priorities must be set—and
the balance is likely to shift back towards the regional.
This will be accentuated if Labor comes to office in
the near future, and if the Iraq intervention is seen by
Australians to be a failure.
For all Howard’s national security profile, defense
spending has been kept to just under 2 percent of GDP.
When he came to power in 1996, Howard exempted
the defense portfolio from his steep spending cuts,
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producing the fiscal surplus that is such an embedded
feature of his governance. He subsequently initiated a
long-term basis for defense spending and programs.
Cost overruns and expanding commitments may see
the defense budget running at a higher level than
projected. The point, however, is that Howard has
not used the heightened national security climate
post-9/11 to justify a significant increase in defense
spending as a proportion of GDP. This is a reminder of
a reality too little observed—that the alliance subsidizes
Australia’s security policy, thus permitting a level of
social spending that otherwise would be required for
the defense budget.
The New Intimacy has bequeathed a stronger
institutional framework. The most obvious is the
Australia-America FTA designed to secure increased
economic, investment, and corporate links. Howard
had high hopes for the FTA. In a few years, the balance
sheet will be drawn: Was the FTA a sound judgment on
Australia’s part or did Australia delude itself about the
benefits? The answer will play into the wider economic
relationship as well as political attitudes.
Another strengthened institutional link is at the
military-security-intelligence level. Australia-U.S.
intelligence ties are closer than before. Military and
equipment interoperability have assumed a new
saliency from the momentum of Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Howard era has seen an even greater emphasis in
defense procurement for integration with U.S. forces.
These changes, of course, are essential in a meaningful
alliance.
A mjor test for the alliance’s future is the verdict of
public opinion. Australia’s public supports the alliance,
and the wellsprings of that support run deep. Criticism
of the alliance in Australia is confined overwhelmingly
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to how it operates and not whether it should exist.
But that criticism can be intense, driven by views
about presidential popularity and U.S. foreign policy.
Australia’s public has never been enthusiastic about
the Iraq war, yet it is realistic about the threat posed by
Islamist terrorism.
Australia’s political mind was formed in the context
of a relatively small population holding sovereignty
over a relatively large continent. The strategic culture
of working within an empire or grand alliance is
engrained in the majority but disputed by a noisy
minority.
One lesson from Howard’s alliance experience is
reinforcement of an ancient verity—the Australian
public likes to see independent Australian discretion
exercized within the alliance. It wants to know there
is an independent Australian mind in the partnership.
The people know the reality of alliances—that nations
support each other and enter wars for each other. Yet
the public grasps an essential truth—that alliances
work better when mutual respect is apparent, and
such respect incorporates a margin for difference. The
Howard government has not emphasized sufficiently
the essentiality of such discretion.
Australia, like all U.S. allies, is affected deeply
by the quality of U.S. global leadership. Australians
evaluate American presidents. They want an American
leadership that is tough yet persuasive, that uses both
hard power and soft power, properly proportioned
and modulated. It is in Australia’s interest for the
United States to exercise multilateral leadership, not
just unilateral leadership.
Americans might reflect on what Australia brings
to the table as an ally: it is prepared to fight; it is a
country on the rim of East Asia with standing in the
region; it is the metropolitan power within its own
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immediate and unstable region; it is a global player in
trade, security, governance, and environmental issues;
and it is an independent partner with shared values
and a capacity to provide informed private counsel to
assist the United States.
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CHAPTER 4
PANEL II CHAIRMAN’S INTRODUCTION
William T. Tow
A major finding of the workshops related to the
present project was that the global and regional
dimensions of Australia-U.S. alliance politics are
becoming increasingly amalgamated. The forces of
international terrorism can strike in any Asian city,
precipitating extensive adjustments in the homeland
security policies of Australia, the United States, and
other states worldwide. Proliferating weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), coupled with modern delivery
systems, can hit Australian or American targets from
great distances within or beyond Asia. Nontraditional
security threats such as pandemics originating in
southern China and Africa, or the forced movement
of peoples in the aftermath of natural disasters or
human security contingencies, can quickly overwhelm
developed societies and economies. Emerging security
challenges in the Asia-Pacific region merely reflect the
larger global challenges that promise to be even more
severe than those that the Australia-New Zealand-U.S.
(ANZUS) alliance confronted and prevailed against
during the Cold War. The ultimate alliance objective,
however, whether applied regionally or globally, has
not changed: as Andrew Scobell correctly observes at
the outset of Chapter 5, it is stability.
Several important themes emerge from Scobell’s
and Robert Ayson’s chapters that deal with the American outlook and the Australian outlook, respectively,
on how ANZUS relates to the Asia-Pacific region.
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While the region has undergone a historic structural
transformation over the past decade, the AustralianAmerican alliance has held up well as a relevant
component of U.S. grand strategy. However, the
authors warn that both allies face the danger of policy
miscalculation in this new and uncertain regional
security environment, and must therefore work
assiduously to avoid it. Another theme of both authors
is that weak states can be as lethal to ANZUS alliance
objectives as strong ones. Weak or failing states, and
substate threats such as terrorist groups, can test the
alliance as sharply as a rising China (the ultimate
powderkeg state according to Scobell), an awakening
India, or a more normal Japan. Finally, they posit that
alliance expectations must be constantly monitored
and adjusted by both Canberra and Washington.
U.S. Strategy: Reconciling Australia’s Regional
and Global Role.
As Robert Ayson (Chapter 6) observes, Australia’s
extra-regional commitments to Afghanistan and Iran
have earned it a special place of honor in the George
W. Bush administration’s alliance politics. Australia
is a prominent member in what Kurt Campbell has
termed “a new international cohort” of core allies that
work closely with the United States in the global war
on terrorism and that rank highly on the loyalty index
that the administration has relied upon to build its
coalitions of the willing.1 Prominent Australian defense
analyst Paul Dibb has gone even further, claiming that
“Australia is America’s closest ally in the [Asia-Pacific]
region and the second most important U.S. ally in the
world after the United Kingdom.”2 In part, this may be
due to a resurgence of Anglosphere solidarity in the
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aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11), international
terrorist threat.3 Perhaps even more important, Australia
has developed and deployed diplomatic and military
niche capabilities that constitute nice fits in U.S. global
strategy: Australian Special Air Service Regiment (SAS)
forces adeptly clearing points of advance for coalition
forces in Afghanistan and Iraq; Australian Federal
Police (AFP) units mediating in internecine conflict in
South Pacific failed-state environments; and envoys
executing and managing middle power diplomacy
with respect to arms control and human security.
This global role notwithstanding, Australia’s
regional position and its potential ability to facilitate
what American policy-planners regard as a stable
regional balance is probably more important to U.S.
global strategic planning. Critics have, however,
labeled Australian support for controversial Bush
administration postures, and its own intervention
actions in East Timor and the South Pacific, as nothing
more than the sycophantic behavior of a U.S. strategic
proxy or “deputy sheriff.”4 An alternative view is that if
Australian regional security interests do not mesh with
U.S. interests, abandonment by Washington would
become a distinct possibility. Former Australian Prime
Minister Malcolm Fraser, now a frequent alliance
detractor, has encapsulated this view: “When there
have been concerns in our region, the United States has
made it plain they didn’t really want to be involved. . . .
We should not allow the American relationship to
blind ourselves.”5
Supporters of a more coordinated AustralianAmerican strategic role in the Asia-Pacific region such
as Scobell, however, view Australia as a critical linchpin
state whose “formidable” and “viable” democracy
can serve effectively as outposts in behalf of both
Australian and American objectives in Asian settings
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and institutions, especially where U.S. power may be
less directly assertable. At his confirmation hearing in
January 2001, Secretary of State-designate Colin Power
graphically encouraged a strong Australian regional
identity in recognition of the close affinity between
Australian regional security interests and those of
the United States. “In the Pacific,” he stated, “we are
very, very pleased that Australia, our firm ally, has
displayed a keen interest in what has been happening
in Indonesia. So we will coordinate our policies. But let
our ally, Australia, take the lead as they have done so
well in that troubled country.”6
Who is right between those who oppose Australia
integrating more closely with U.S. global strategy, and
those who support it? To employ the old adage, “the
truth is probably somewhere in between.” U.S. global
preoccupations continue to oscillate between addressing strategic threats that are clearly extra-regional in
nature, and applying traditional balancing strategies
toward the Asia-Pacific region’s rising powers.
As a Western industrialized democracy, Australia
undoubtedly has a stake in supporting Washington’s
predisposition to lead the quest against counterterrorism
and WMD proliferation. Yet, it has a primary interest
in staking out an independent regional identity in
diplomatic and strategic terms. That identity should
not be subject to an American loyalty test as a measure
of alliance durability in the event that Australian and
American interests diverge on one or more critical
regional security issues.
Avoiding Misguided Policy Expectations.
There is a need to avoid policy miscalculations within this other “special relationship.” Such miscalcula68

tions can be engendered by false expectations or
ambiguous communications about what are each ally’s
actual national security interests. Robert Ayson alludes
to past instances where miscalculations have prevailed
in Asia-Pacific strategic settings: U.S. differences with
Labor governments in the 1980s over missile testing
and South Pacific nuclear-free zone politics; AustralianAmerican differences over the value of regional
multilateral security dialogues and institutions; and
the perception, within various Australian circles, of
a lack of American material support for Australia’s
1999 intervention in East Timor. This litany is cited
often by alliance critics such as Fraser when raising
the fundamental question about ANZUS: “There were
a number of leaders throughout Asia that believed
that ANZUS reinforced American involvement in
the region . . . they believed that this provided some
assurance of American support in times of crisis. In
retrospect, however, how much support did we get?”7
Andrew Scobell correctly argues that good alliance
management often does not flow easily from the
course of events; policymakers need to work hard at it.
In general, however, ANZUS officials have risen to the
task, and the history of alliance collaboration that has
spanned over half a century is a generally positive one.
Although less central than NATO during the Cold War,
of course, ANZUS helped contain Soviet power in Asia
and in the wider Pacific. It contributed to the planning
and resources applied by the Western powers to defeat
Chinese-backed Communist political or military
insurgency movements in a number of Southeast
Asian countries. Australia and New Zealand (even
after the latter country’s de facto exit from the ANZUS
Council in August 1986) largely were successful in
preventing Cold War politics from entering the South
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Pacific region. ANZUS became an invaluable conduit
for exchanges of intelligence relevant to the area’s
strategic balance.
As the post-Cold War regional security order
evolves, however, the emerging challenges to AsiaPacific stability are laden with potential for intra-alliance miscalculations. The rise of China is the most
significant of these developments. Both chapter contributors in this subsection of the volume emphasize
that China will affect alliance politics in highly
diverse ways. Scobell acknowledges that the United
States, by its engagement policies toward China, can
affect significantly what type of power that country
eventually becomes. Australia also can contribute
to a positive outcome by encouraging successive
U.S. administrations to stay the course in cultivating
stronger economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing.
It can counsel against U.S. support for any increased
separatist tendencies on the part of Taiwan, urging
that such support would work against U.S. core
national security interests. If such counseling is
deemed necessary but proves to be unsuccessful,
Australia risks confronting what Ayson terms the stuff
of nightmares—having to choose between a regionally
dominant China and an American superpower serving
notice that it expects Australia to adhere to the loyalty
criteria of alliance politics.
The recent deterioration of relations between China
and Japan presents a similar dilemma for Australia,
especially if U.S.-Japan security cooperation continues
to grow along the lines of the May 2006 roadmap
agreement that effectively integrates the command
structure of U.S. forces operating in Okinawa and
other parts of Northeast Asia far more closely with
that of Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF).8 Australia
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recently has announced its own intentions to move
toward a more formal security relationship with Japan,
although this relationship will not be as encompassing
as the ANZUS alliance.9 How will Australia interact
with a Japan that is clearly shifting toward the status
of a military power in Northeast Asia without inciting
Chinese apprehensions that it is working in league
with the United States and Japan to curb any Chinese
move toward hegemony? Balancing its increasingly
comprehensive economic and political ties with
China against a more explicit security relationship
with Japan will sharply test Australian policymakers’
communications and diplomatic skills.
Coordinating Responses to Asymmetrical
Threats and Powderkegs.
With regard to how emerging asymmetrical threats
such as terrorism and rogue states affect alliance politics, two countervailing interpretations emerge. One
is that such threats are so diverse and numerous that
alliance managers will have no choice but to become
more risk tolerant in formulating policies and applying
resources to meet them. Rod Lyon has argued that
globalization, the “demassification” of military forces
into smaller units, and technological proliferation
have created a new generation of “raiders” (i.e.,
terrorists) that are redefining the classical battlefield
for international dominance. He states that Australia’s
future security partnership with the US [therefore] needs
to address a new security environment characterized
by technological diffusion and the rise of smaller warmaking units able to exploit global networks. It also
needs to address a broader set of security challenges,
and to think through the logic of interdependency that is
needed if [ANZUS is] to offset new adversaries.10
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An opposing perspective is conveyed by John
Ikenberry, who believes that the postwar international
order and the alliances that underwrite it are sufficient
to withstand emerging asymmetrical threats:
The Bush administration is launching its war on
terrorism from a foundation of stable and cooperative
relations built over many decades . . . . Certainly the
terrorist events present the United States, Europe, and
other states with an opportunity to renew and expand
the political bargains on which the current international
order rests.11

Australian Prime Minister John Howard activated
Article IV of the ANZUS alliance—an existing but
previously unused alliance mechanism—immediately
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington. Five years later, Australia is regarded
by U.S. leaders as an ally sharing core U.S. values,
pursuing common strategic objectives, and willing to
share common political and military risks. Indeed, one
of America’s most authoritative experts on international terrorism has predicted that Australia will incur
a major terrorist strike in the near future.12
To date, the arguments of both Lyon and Ikenberry
are correct. Alliance preoccupations with state-centric
threats that were dominant in the Cold War are now
giving way to concerns about weak actors compensating for their lack of conventional power with creative
and lethal strategies of high risk. Suicide bombers,
limited and rudimentary Iranian or North Korean
nuclear weapons capabilities, and criminal gangs holding South Pacific microstate governments at bay are all
illustrative. Yet state-centric power and competition
persist in our international system, and Scobell’s concern with powderkeg states validates this reality.
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A future Sino-American conflict, a Sino-Japanese
confrontation, or a renewed Korean War would have
immense repercussions for Asian-Pacific prosperity
and for Australia’s own physical and economic security.
Over half of Australia’s trade is with Northeast Asia, and
increasingly strained American military forces cannot
patrol the wider Pacific in any such contingencies.
The challenge for alliance managers is to identify and
implement a carefully balanced set of strategies that
can respond to both state and nonstate threats. That
can be done only if Australian policymakers work
with their American counterparts to decide wisely and
proactively which contingencies should be assigned
priority in their strategic planning.
Multilateral Security Involvement.
Ayson considers to what extent growing multilateralism in Asia is a bus which Australia has to
get on, and to what extent American participation
is desired or required to facilitate regional security
community-building. The existing international order,
as envisioned by Ikenberry and others, remains shaped
by an American hegemon projecting hard power, but
whose values are increasingly under attack by radical
jihadists, ardent nationalists, and other dissident
contenders. Asian countries, like the United States and
Australia, are striving to find the middle ground to
accommodate the most reasonable grievances of these
dissenters within existing international processes
and structures without relinquishing the benefits of
globalization and liberalization.
A consensus is developing on which approach to
multilateral security politics is best suited to achieve
that middle ground. The Bush administration has
remained wedded to the hub-and-spokes formula,
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with America at the center, for managing its security
relationships in Asia. Although Scobell insists that
this architecture “continues to function with great
relevance,” it nevertheless is viewed by many of
America’s friends in the region as too lopsided. After
initially concurring with the American approach and
arguing that the predecessor government had slighted
traditional Australian friendships in favor of a too
rapid move toward Asia, the Howard government now
has come to endorse much of the policy it previously
condemned. It has struck a judicious balance between
alliance cultivation and regional affiliation.
This has been a hard learning experience for an
Australian prime minister, who is an unmitigated
Anglophile by background and by emotional inclination. It is one that, at least in part, has led to Canberra’s
ultimate rejection of the logic of Colin Powell’s
mechanistic “sphere of national influence” concept
alluded to above. Later, when U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice failed to attend a key ministerial
meeting in Southeast Asia, Australian interests as
well as American ones were affected adversely.13 This
incident, and others like it, tends to drive Australia
toward making a choice between appearing as
Washington’s regional proxy or appearing as an
increasingly soft American ally that gradually can be
weaned away from the American orbit by a China that
cleverly leverages the regionalist angle.
Both of the succeeding chapters tender policy
prescriptions for avoiding either outcome, supporting
these prescriptions with in-depth and highly valuable
empirical analysis in support of their conclusions. As
ANZUS has become more global in scope since 9/11,
it also has remained a key element in the Asia-Pacific
region’s future security equation. Part II of this volume
thus is intended to provide a coherent explanation of
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how America’s other special relationship can influence
Asia’s future security environment in a constructive
and mutually beneficial fashion.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ALLIANCE AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:
AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
Andrew Scobell
This chapter assesses U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific
region and the principal threats to those interests for
the next 20 years, focussing especially on the role of the
U.S.-Australian alliance in promoting such interests.1
It will conclude with recommendations for future U.S.
strategy in the region. In this chapter, the term “AsiaPacific region” refers to the area that stretches from
Hawaii to Pakistan and from the Aleutian Islands to
Australia.
U.S. INTERESTS
The United States has a number of vital interests
in the Asia-Pacific region. Paramount among these is
the continued peace and prosperity of the region. This
often is abbreviated to a single word—“stability.” Peace
cannot be said to be simply the absence of war; peace
should be defined rather in robust terms. “Enduring
peace” can be defined as the presence of thriving
regional and subregional cooperation mechanisms
in the arenas of politics, economics, security, and
environment.
Other critical U.S. interests include the prevention
of attacks against the U.S. homeland or its forces
deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, the quelling of
terrorist movements (especially in Southeast Asia),
access to regional markets, and the promotion of
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democratic political systems there.2 Recent concerns
about Chinese and North Korean ballistic missile
capabilities, the intensification of terrorist problems in
the Philippines and southern Thailand, the growth of
ASEAN + 3 following the Asian financial crisis, and
the defense of robust democracies in South Korea and
Taiwan all impact upon these interests. U.S. alliances
with key regional allies such as Australia are designed
to realize key U.S. regional security objectives.
WHERE THE MILITARY FITS IN
A fundamental assumption of this chapter is that
a U.S.-oriented security architecture, underscored by
regional alliances, and a U.S. military forward presence,
in some form or another, are essential for peace and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. The particular shape
and substance of this security architecture should be
adaptable since it will likely need to evolve over time.
The U.S. bilateral alliance architecture shaped around a
hub-and-spokes concept has served American strategic
interests well in the region throughout the postwar
time frame, and it continues to function with great
relevance in a post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), context.
While the precise positioning, size, and mix of
forces will depend on specific threats and conditions,
it is vital that such a forward presence include a
significant land power component. In a region as
vast and ocean-dominated as the Asia-Pacific, naval
and air forces are extremely important. Nevertheless,
the Army is the ultimate symbol of an enduring
U.S. commitment to peace and prosperity of the
region. The Army is the core service in the laborintensive business of peacetime security cooperation.3
Continued U.S. land force deployments on the Korean
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peninsula and recent arrangements to integrate U.S.
Army components more closely with the operations of
counterpart Japanese Self Defense Forces in Okinawa
are cases in point. They serve as effective deterrents
to conflict escalation in Northeast Asia and as flexible
components of a U.S. global strategy that is evolving
to neutralize asymmetrical threats in Asia and in other
regions.
It should be remembered, of course, that the military
is but one component of American national power.4 To
ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region,
the United States must employ the full array of both
hard power and soft power instruments at its disposal:
economic, diplomatic, and informational. These must
be employed in a coordinated and coherent fashion
and, again, in close conjunction with the interests and
strategic support of U.S. allies in the Pacific.
In this context, the Australian-American alliance
(still most commonly known by the acronym,
ANZUS) fits well with U.S. regional politico-security
and economic interests. Along with Britain, Australia
perhaps is viewed as Washington’s most loyal
global security partner on counterterrorism, antiproliferation and other key international security
issues. As one of the Asia-Pacific’s most advanced
industrialized democracies, it plays a key role in such
regional institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asean Regional
Forum (ARF) in advancing values and interests
highly commensurate with those of the United States.
Along with Japan and perhaps Singapore, it is the
only defense actor in the region capable of operating
in a high-tempo, cutting-edge combat environment
shaped by U.S. military power and led by U.S. forces.
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Yet Australia also maintains workable, even cordial
trade and political relations with China and formal
diplomatic ties with North Korea, affording it a
measure of diplomatic leverage as a middle power
in an increasingly competitive Asian geopolitical
environment that is disproportionate to its own
modest (if highly proficient) defense capabilities. In
many ways, Australia might be deemed as an ideal
American ally.5
KEY THREATS AND CHALLENGES TO THE
STABILITY OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Over the next 20 years, the stability of the AsiaPacific is likely to face complex threats from four key
geographic hot spots. Moreover, the United States and
its regional allies will be faced with four fundamental
strategic challenges. The four threats emanate from
Korea, the Taiwan Strait, South and Central Asia, and
Southeast Asia. If current trends continue, the threats
posed on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan
Strait are likely to become permanent, remaining
the most serious flashpoints in the region. South and
Central Asia, meanwhile, are subregions of significant
instability and are increasingly likely to cause complex
and multidimensional threats to the stability of
the entire Asia-Pacific region. In contrast, trends in
Southeast Asia seem to be more positive, although
significant security threats could emerge to undermine
stability in this subregion as well.
The four fundamental challenges likely to confront
the United States in the Asia-Pacific region during
the first quarter of the 21st century are (1) managing
relations with allies and friends in the region (aka
“linchpin states”); (2) shaping countries at risk (aka
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“powder keg states”); (3) maintaining a credible
forward presence; and (4) managing and deterring
the flashpoints identified above. These threats and
challenges are addressed below.
Key Flashpoints.
Korea. The situation on the Korean Peninsula appears
to be a principal challenge to peace and prosperity in the
Asia-Pacific, and without a fundamental reorientation
of the eroding totalitarian regime in Pyongyang,
tensions are unlikely to dissipate in the foreseeable
future.6 North Korea’s July 2006 missile launches
and October 2006 nuclear test have underscored how
quickly an erosion of diplomatic negotiations and
confidence-building can occur as the so-called Six
Party Talks now appear stymied in the aftermath of
United Nations (UN) Resolutions that condemn North
Korean strategic behavior and Pyongyang’s absolute
transigence in the face of worldwide condemnation of
its missile and nuclear testing.
Although President Roh Moo Hyun of South Korea
has been supportive of the U.S.-Republic of Korea
(ROK) alliance and Chairman Kim of North Korea
reportedly has indicated a willingness to accept a U.S.
military presence on the Korean Peninsula even after
a posited unification, this does not represent any firm
commitment by either government.7 On the other hand,
it reflects their distrust of other foreign powers and can
be a point of great U.S. leverage.8 The Perry Commission
concluded 7 years ago that the status quo on the
Korean Peninsula did not appear to be “sustainable.”9
Yet, in 2006 the Pyongyang regime seems stable and
sustainable enough to last for perhaps another 10 to
15 years.10 The leaders of both North and South Korea
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desire at least some limited form of reconciliation.
However, while in general accord on the concept of
unification, they both seem to believe that the process
should move forward gradually. Both sides, each for
its own reasons, want to see the continued existence of
the two separate Korean regimes and steady progress
toward some kind of confederation. Seoul is concerned
about shouldering the staggering costs incident to
unification, while Pyongyang is fearful that unification
will mean the end of the regime.11
The current relationship between North and South
Korea appears highly skewed. The ROK had initiated
the vast majority of positive inducements to reduce
protracted tensions with the North. The Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) posture appears
to be one of presumed entitlement for nothing conceded in return. Certainly, unification on the peninsula
is possible in the next 2 decades, but it would require
a Korean peace agreement, a framework for regular
trade, travel, and communication between North and
South, and an intensive, continuing dialogue leading
up to the event itself.12 Reconciliation would be a
drawn-out and graduated process.
Hence the United States must remain vigilant
and continue to work hand in glove with its allies,
including the ROK and Japan, to ensure it is prepared
for any eventuality. The Australian connection also is
important here. Australia has undertaken a leading
role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that
originated in 2003, largely in response to alleged North
Korean shipments of materials for weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) on the high seas. It also has assumed
a higher profile in regional security coordination
via the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, the ministeriallevel consultations between Australia, Japan, and the
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United States to manage joint strategy toward North
Korea and, more indirectly, toward China’s rise.
As part of an initial diplomatic response to North
Korea’s mid-2006 missile tests, Australian diplomats
reportedly queried their North Korean counterparts
about a “secure energy deal, probably coal shipments,
if the rogue state returned to peace talks as part of an
attempt to solve the missile crisis.”13 Yet, along with
Japan, Australia continues to engage in advanced
missile defense technology research with the United
States that, when deployed, is intended to intercept
limited missile strikes of the type that North Korea may
well be able to launch over the next decade. Australian
alliance cooperation with the United States and Japan
thus is targeted discriminatingly to generate maximum
benefits while sufficiently multifaceted to respond
effectively to North Korean oscillations in strategic
behavior. The DPRK’s October 2006 detonation of an
actual nuclear device, of course, adds an enormously
ominous complication to the Korean problem, one that
all players, including even the UN, are scrambling to
deal with as this chapter goes to press.
Taiwan Strait. In the first decade of the 21st century,
tensions in the Taiwan Strait appear moderate and
manageable but chronic. Strait tensions seem likely to
remain a principal threat to peace and prosperity in the
Asia-Pacific for the foreseeable future. Reconciliation
between Beijing and Taipei is certain to be very difficult
to attain, and unification probably is unachievable in
the short term. This situation will constitute a major
challenge to ANZUS because Australia and the United
States often entertain different perspectives on the
meaning of China’s rise to regional security. We shall
discuss this topic in greater depth in the pages to
follow.
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American perceptions are shaped more by the
specter of an intensifying Chinese military threat
in the East China Sea and beyond. Currently, China
appears wary, even if momentarily satisfied, over
perceived trends in the Taiwan Strait. But Beijing, and
especially the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has
been increasingly frustrated over the lack of tangible
progress toward Taiwan’s political assimilation by the
Chinese mainland.
Before discussing this flashpoint’s implications for
ANZUS, it may be useful to offer a brief review of its
evolution. Unification with Taiwan has been a core
Chinese national security objective for half a century.
More than 25 years after the moderate and pragmatic
“one country, two systems” policy was formulated by
the late Deng Xiaoping, it has yet to bear tangible fruit.
This is all the more disappointing in Beijing’s view
when measured by the successful returns of the former
British colony of Hong Kong in mid-1997 and former
Portuguese enclave of Macao in late 1999. Beijing’s
expectations also were heightened by a dramatic SinoTaiwanese rapprochement of the late 1980s and early
1990s when cross-Strait trade and investment developed and travel for family reunions, business, and tourism
expanded virtually overnight.14 Most noteworthy
was the significant diplomatic groundwork: the
establishment of quasi-official organizations in Beijing
and Taipei to manage bilateral relations. The high point
was the summit held in 1993 in Singapore between the
chiefs of these two organizations.
The goodwill and progress evaporated in mid-1995
when Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui was granted a
visa to visit the United States. Lee’s rhetoric during
the visit, combined with other initiatives launched by
Taipei, led Chinese leaders to conclude that Taiwan was
84

embarked down a path toward independence. China’s
missile tests off the Taiwan coast and naval exercises
near the Taiwan Strait during late 1995 and during
Taiwan’s first contested presidential election in early
1996 were orchestrated to persuade the Taiwanese to
rethink the advisability of such a course of action.15
For several years China’s saber-rattling appeared to
have had its intended effect: Taiwan cooled its rhetoric
and gestures. But in mid-1999 Taiwan’s President Lee
suggested that relations between China and Taiwan
should be treated as “state to state.” This triggered
a further round of vitriolic rhetoric and threats from
China, culminating in the Taiwan White Paper of
February 2000.16 This official Chinese government
document added a third justification for the use of
force against Taiwan: lack of progress on negotiations
directed at unification. Further statements issued in
the lead-up to Taiwan’s presidential elections of March
2000 admonished the island’s electorate not to vote for
long-time pro-independence candidate Chen Shuibian. The attempt at intimidation seemed to backfire
when Chen won the election.
Tensions cooled following Chen’s 2000 inauguration, with China reverting to a wait-and-see policy.17
Despite periodic tensions, the climate of cross-Strait
relations has remained relatively calm during the past 6
years. Beijing has tended to be restrained in its rhetoric
and reactions to events in Taipei, including the March
2004 reelection of Chen Shui-bian. More recently, some
Chinese officials have issued stern warnings over
Chen’s plans for constitutional reform on the island.
But the visits in 2005 of several prominent Taiwanese
politicians to the mainland appear to have helped to
reassure Beijing that the trends are working in China’s
favor.18
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This episode represented the first testing of how
ANZUS might respond to a scenario involving
possible Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan.
From Washington’s perspective, newly elected Prime
Minister John Howard passed this test with flying
colors, as Australia was the only state in the region
that openly supported the United States’ deployment
of two aircraft carrier task forces adjacent to the East
China Sea as a signal to China that further conflict
escalation could have dire consequences for Beijing’s
own security. However, Australia paid a steep price for
such support: China effectively severed commercial and
political ties with the Howard government for about a
year. Howard was forced to visit Beijing and reassure
the Chinese leadership that Australia still adhered to
a one-China policy and that it would not deal on an
official basis with Taiwanese representatives.
By 1999, Sino-Australian relations had warmed to
the point that respected American policy observers
such as Richard Armitage (later to become Deputy
Secretary of State in the George W. Bush administration)
felt obliged to speak out. Participating at an AustraliaAmerican Dialogue session convened in Sydney
during August 1999, Armitage warned his hosts that
the United States would expect Australia to provide
meaningful military support to the United States in
order to carry out “dirty, hard, and dangerous” work.
He insisted that Canberra’s interests as well as those
of the United States directly related to the outcome of
such a confrontation, and that the future of ANZUS
could hinge on whether such Australian support was
forthcoming. The Australian government responded
merely that it could not speculate on specific outcomes
to hypothetical contingencies, but Armitage’s warning
aggravated already raw nerves over the nightmare
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of Australia having to choose between China and the
United States over Taiwan.
The ensuing years witnessed the Howard
government’s pursuit of an adroit dual strategy of
cultivating strong economic and diplomatic ties with
Beijing by insisting that no such choice needed to be
made. Australia could deal with Beijing as a growing
and respectable regional power, counting on the
Chinese to understand the imperative of Australia
continuing to sustain and strengthen its natural
alliance with the United States. Because the so-called
global war on terror (now labeled “The Long War”)
had defused Sino-American tensions early in the
Bush administration, this strategy proved to be a
workable one from Canberra’s perspective. At various
intervals the Chinese attempted to test this Australian
proposition, most notably following the PRC’s adoption
of an anti-secession law directed at Taiwan in early
2005. At least one Chinese official recommended that
Australia might reconsider the ANZUS commitments,
formally exempting a Taiwan contingency from any
alliance application. This suggestion was politely and
firmly refused by Australian officials. The Chinese
probe in this instance may have been prompted by
the musings of Australian Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer when visiting Beijing the previous year, to the
effect that ANZUS might be exempted from a defense
of U.S. forces in a Taiwan conflict depending on the
circumstances that arose. But Downer was immediately
enjoined to deny this supposition by his own Prime
Minister and by forceful admonishments of U.S. State
Department officials who interpreted any attack on
American forces in the Pacific region as an automatic
trigger for ANZUS activation.
Tensions in the East China Sea could flare up
again at any time. As of December 2004, the PRC
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officially characterized the situation in the Taiwan
Strait as “grim.”19 It is important to note that the PRC
government has never renounced the use of force to
achieve unification with Taiwan (or to prevent the
island from gaining independence). Moreover, the
Taiwan Strait conflict remains the PLA’s dominant
war scenario. The Chinese military believes it has been
entrusted with the sacred mission of unifying Taiwan
with the Chinese mainland.20 There is significant
potential for miscalculation or misperception in the
coercive diplomacy and calculated risk-taking that
China is in the habit of pursuing.21 In some future
round of saber-rattling, a missile launched simply to
intimidate Taiwan could veer off its intended course
and hit a civilian target. Or a massive military exercise
in the Taiwan Strait could be misinterpreted by Taipei
as the prelude for an imminent attack. A deliberate
decision by Beijing to launch a military operation
against Taiwan also cannot be ruled out. The issue of
unification with Taiwan is sensitive, emotive, and, most
importantly, a core element of the Chinese Communist
Party’s political legitimacy. With that being the case,
many of China’s elites appear to believe that the
party-state might not be able to survive the righteous
indignation of the masses should the regime not fight
to keep Taiwan. Thus, under certain circumstances, the
PLA might be ordered to launch an operation against
Taiwan even if it were thought to have little or no
chance of success.22 The bottom line is that political
expediency—not military feasibility—will be the
paramount determinant of whether or not China uses
armed force.23
PLA war planning appears to be focused on either
of two options: a sudden whirlwind military campaign
to subdue Taiwan so rapidly as to present the United
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States with a fait accompli; or a more gradual and
carefully calibrated campaign targeting selected key
military, political, or infrastructural targets that would
produce maximum psychological pressure but minimal casualties. In the first scenario, PLA planners
would assume that the United States had too little
time to marshal forces to defend Taiwan and therefore
almost certainly would be forced to accept the situation.
In the second scenario, Beijing would do its best not
to cross the threshold that would trigger U.S. military
intervention.24 In either case, in the context of deterring
U.S. military support for Taiwan, Chinese military
modernization focuses on operations against Taiwan
and the United States. An outright invasion scenario
with maximum-effort amphibious landings is highly
unlikely but cannot be ruled out.25
If ANZUS were to be activated in a future Taiwan
conflict, how would a posited Australian role play out?
As an integral part of the U.S.-allied global intelligence
network, the Australian signals installation at Geraldton in Western Australia links up with the Taiwan
National Security Bureau’s signal intelligence base at
Pingtung Lee on the Yangmingshan Mountain north
of Taipei to provide information on Chinese satellite
communications.26 Australian maritime elements such
as the extraordinarily quiet Collins-class submarine fleet
could be introduced into the waters of the Taiwan Strait
in an interdiction role. It is more likely, however, that
they would join Australian surface elements to monitor
patrolling lanes normally assigned to the U.S. Seventh
Fleet if the latter were to be diverted to Northeast Asia.
Land and sea elements of the Australian Defence Force
(ADF) also would be preoccupied with securing rear
areas of maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific
to ensure unconstrained passage of U.S. forces from
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CONUS bases into the Northeast Asian and East Asian
theaters of operation.
With regard to any future Asia-Pacific security
vision, Australia has a keen interest in furthering the
declared U.S. strategy of swaying China to embrace
the role of “responsible stakeholder,” in the words
of former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert
Zoellick. Thus engagement should be the dominant
strategic frame of reference rather than containment.
Given Taiwan’s extensive involvement in China’s
own trade and investment sectors, the engagement
approach promises to be the best long-term chance of
sustaining some form of Taiwanese autonomy vis-àvis the mainland until the forces of political change
can work within China to bring about greater political
liberalization.
South and Central Asia. Much attention in both the
United States and Australia has focused on the Asian
subcontinent since the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in the spring of 1998. Considerable attention also
has been given to the upheaval in the disputed region
of Jammu and Kashmir, the turbulence in neighboring
Afghanistan, and Nepal’s ongoing political crisis
and protracted insurgency.27 But the most dramatic
events have unfolded in Afghanistan in late 2001 and
early 2002 with the U.S.-led intervention in Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM (in which Australian forces
played a key role). This operation triggered in quick
succession the overthrow of the Taliban regime and
expulsion of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qai’da.
While trends in Afghanistan appear generally
positive, numerous challenges continue to confront
the administration of President Hamid Karzai and
NATO forces assisting the Kabul government. Recent
increases in the size of both Australian and British force
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commitments testify to the always delicate balance
between building stability and contesting anarchy in
this beleaguered country.
Afghanistan’s continued travails reflect conditions
throughout the entire Central/South Asian subregions.
The prime threats to the stability of these areas are
major interstate war, WMD, terrorism, and persistent
ethnic conflict and insurgency.
The most plausible scenario is a war between India
and Pakistan over Kashmir. The historical record is
sobering: to date, the two countries have fought serial
conflicts. There have been three major wars, in 1947,
1965, and 1971, and most recently a smaller war in the
remote Kargil region in 1999 and the threat of war in
several other crises.28 Given the level of distrust and
animosity between Islamabad and New Delhi as well
as the roller coaster experience of bilateral relations
in recent years, the situation must be considered
volatile. In the past 2 years, there has been a modest
but significant rapprochement between Islamabad
and New Delhi, including summitry and cricket
diplomacy. Yet, the status of Kashmir remains a major
point of contention between the two countries, with no
potential resolution in sight.29
Moreover, if Pakistan appeared on the verge
of disintegrating or exploding into civil war, India
would be tempted to intervene.30 Such a chain of
events could escalate the conflict dramatically. There
also is the potential for a conflict between India and
China, although this is far less likely than another
Indo-Pakistani war.31 An outcome along any of these
lines would confront ANZUS strategic planners
with immense problems: How could the alliance
stay strategically neutral in such a conflict involving
a primary ally in the war against terror (Pakistan), a
major and democratic Commonwealth power (India),
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and the region’s rising hegemon (China)? How would
it ensure continued access to regional markets and key
littorals under such conditions?
The threat of WMD also must be taken very seriously by the United States and Australia (spearhead
powers in the Pacific Security Iniative or PSI),
particularly nuclear proliferation or a nuclear conflict
between India and Pakistan.32 The proliferation exploits
of Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan network are now infamous.
Although the full extent of the nuclear materiel and
technology sold to various regimes around the world
remains unclear (along with exact role of the Pakistani
government), these activities highlight the dangers
of poor control over a country’s nuclear facilities and
the absence of proliferation controls. Moreover, in
both India and Pakistan, the command and control
mechanisms are dubious at best. This increases the
potential for mistakes with horrendous strategic
implications.33 But the greatest cause for alarm is
the political instability in Pakistan. This point is
underscored by fact that Pakistan is the only nuclear
power to have experienced a successful military coup
(in October 1999).34 While the current military regime
arguably provides more stability for Pakistan than
did its civilian predecessor, the domestic political
scene is far from settled, particularly in view of the
assassination attempt against President Mushariff.35
Without a doubt, the military is the most important
national institution in the country. If the military were
to fragment, so too would the country. If nuclear devices
or materials were to fall into the hands of extremists,
the outcome could be catastrophic.
India’s nuclear program has come under international scrutiny recently with the signing of the
controversial March 2005 nuclear agreement between
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New Delhi and Washington. The agreement covers
civilian nuclear energy cooperation. But experts
question whether India’s civilian and military programs
can be disentangled readily and express concern about
the implications for nuclear proliferation.36 The nuclear
deal is but one element of the larger rapprochement
between New Delhi and Washington. However, if
the deal flounders or self-destructs, this blooming
partnership could wither swiftly.37
Terrorism. The threat of terrorism from extremists in
Central and South Asia is all too evident, as witnessed
by the recent train bombing in Mumbai.38 The terrorism
problem in this subregion is magnified further by ethnic
and clan conflict. Insurgencies continue to afflict many
countries, including India and, more severely, Nepal.
The threats of major interstate war, use and
proliferation of WMD, terrorism, and ethnic conflict
and insurgency produce chronic turmoil in an arc of
instability running across South and Central Asia.
Australian and U.S. officials have been less focused
jointly on these issues than on those emanating from
further to the northeast (China, Japan, and the Korean
peninsula). As the boundaries separating “global”
challenges from “regional” blur more noticeably, however, the Central/South Asian imbroglios inevitably
will capture a greater level of attention within ANZUS
policy circles. Moreover, these challenges continue
to test whether America’s alliance with Australia is
indeed global in scope as stated in the 2006 U.S. National
Security Strategy.
Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asia subregion,
though it has always been in Australia’s “front yard,”
is very likely to require greater attention from the
United States in the future. Despite experiencing
dynamic economic growth, unprecedented prosperity,
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and significant democratization, it remains at risk.39
While there are significant territorial disputes among
Southeast Asian neighbors, the underlying causes of
the instability are not interstate tensions but intrastate
and transnational threats. Certainly the simmering
disputes over islands, reefs, and territorial waters in
the South China Sea—including claims by China to
virtually the entire area—are worrisome, but these
issues are unlikely to erupt into a major conflict. For the
foreseeable future, none of the disputants, including
even China, has the capability to seize outright direct
control of the area through military force.40 This reality
contributes to the region’s overall stability and saves
ANZUS resources from being stretched even further
than they already are.
Moreover, a basic level of trust and understanding
has been fostered through entities such as the 10-member Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While ASEAN
and the ARF have proved to be disappointments to
many observers, they have endured and provide
useful mechanisms to ensure a basic level of dialogue
and modest regional confidence-building initiatives.41
Of greater concern are the threats emanating from
within Southeast Asian states, which, like their Central/South Asian counterparts, include ethnic and
religious conflicts, terrorism, and insurgency. More
distinct, nonmilitary threats include contagious
diseases, transnational crimes (including piracy),42
narcotics, and environmental pollution, all of which
have spread throughout the subregion without regard
to national borders. These nontraditional security
threats pose the greatest danger to the subregion.
Moreover, lurking in many Southeast Asian countries
is an underlying political instability or fragility.
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The severity of these threats varies from country to
country. In Thailand, for example, major security threats
come from narcotics and the AIDS virus, while a Muslim
insurgency simmers in the southern part of the country.
The forced resignation of Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra in the spring of 2006 following a concerted
campaign to force him from office, raises questions
about the durability of the democratic system, there.43
In countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia,
political turmoil, ethnic conflict, and terrorism are the
major security threats. The Philippines appears to be in
a chronic state of instability. President Gloria Arroyo
survives in the middle of a perpetual political storm
as Manila continues under torment by Islamic ethnosecessionist movements in the south. In Indonesia,
meanwhile, problems persist, but conditions appear
to be slowly improving under democratically elected
President Susilio Bambang Yudhoyono (who assumed
office in 2004). Despite natural disasters such as the
devastating tsunami of December 2004 and successive
natural disasters in Java throughout 2006, the country
continues to thrive. While secessionism remains
serious, with regions throughout the archipelago
seeking independence, the situation appears to be
stabilizing in some locations, such as Aceh. In 2006,
East Timor was racked by violence, apparently pitting
different elements of the security apparatus against
each other. Such turmoil prompted some observers
to label it a “failing state” and triggered intervention
by Australian military forces.44 Terrorism has been
directed against Australians and Americans—tourists,
entrepreneurs, and diplomats—notably the October
2002 Bali bombings and the August 2003 bombing
at the Jakarta Marriott Hotel. On top of such chronic
instability, there is potential for terrorism expanding
to neighboring countries and beyond.
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Key Challenges.
The U.S. Department of Defense and its Australian
counterpart naturally tend to be preoccupied with
military matters, and their thinking inevitably hovers
at the operational level—working to ensure that their
countries’ forces are positioned, postured, trained,
and equipped to undertake core military missions.
Warfighting and other operational challenges, however, involve critical strategic-level issues such as
alliance management and engagement with other states
to deter, prevent, and manage conflict. These matters
require greater attention to alliance grand strategy and
security policy.
In the face of budgetary and resource constraints
and global U.S. commitments, an American grand
strategy for the Asia-Pacific that is focused on pivotal
states makes good sense. A pivotal states strategy
explicitly recognizes the simple truth that some countries are more important than others and directs the
lion’s share of limited resources and attention to these
states. What are pivotal states? These are key countries
that by dint of population size, territorial expanse,
geographic location, political cohesion, and economic
strength (or weakness) play the most influential role
in determining a region’s degree of stability. Thus
they are the critical actors in determining the security
environment of neighboring states.
It is useful to divide pivotal states into two varieties:
those that are linchpin states and those that are powder
keg states. The former are stable countries that ensure
the peace and prosperity of a region or subregion,
while the latter are “volatile countries upon which
the stability . . . of the region or subregion hinges.”45
Significantly, linchpin states tend to be “established
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and staunch democracies” that are “favorably disposed
toward the United States.”46 For each subregion of
the Asia-Pacific, it is relatively easy to find a linchpin
state and a powder keg state. For the entire region, the
country that constitutes its linchpin state is, predictably,
the United States. Similarly, identifying the potential
powder keg state for the entire region is simple: it is
China (see Figure 1).
(Sub)Region

Linchpin

Powder Keg

Northeast Asia
Southeast Asia/South Pacific
South Asia
Asia-Pacific

Japan
Australia
India
United States

North Korea
Indonesia
Pakistan
China

Figure 1. Strategic/Pivotal States.
LINCHPIN STATES: EFFECTIVE
ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT
Linchpin states tend to be staunch allies or at
least close friends of the United States. A top U.S.
priority should be given to the strategic-level matter
of alliance management.47 Cultivating relations with
our allies and friends (i.e., linchpin states) has not
received the priority it deserves.48 Ongoing, dramatic
developments on the Korean Peninsula have resulted
in closer cooperation and coordination between
South Korea, Japan, and the United States through
the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group. As
noted previously, a commensurate Trilateral Strategic
Dialogue between Australia, Japan, and the United
States also has emerged. Yet, alliance management
requires constant attention and adjustment to rapid
changes in the strategic environment. There must
be greater recognition of the importance of public
relations efforts and matters of protocol and culture.
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Such symbolism is important, of course, but following
up substantively is the truly essential part. Moreover,
U.S. relations with its allies and friends in Southeast
Asia and Australasia require sustained and concerted
attention.49
Good chemistry and close ties between leaders
at the highest levels of government can be a huge
asset. The current top political leaders in Canberra
and Washington, Prime Minister John Howard and
President George W. Bush, have had an excellent
personal relationship. Howard happened to be visiting
Washington in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks
and promptly and publicly stressed his country’s
support for U.S. efforts to counter the terrorist threat.
This rhetoric was backed by action. Australia has
demonstrated its commitment by activating ANZUS
and by dispatching troops to serve in Afghanistan and
Iraq. If the successors to Howard and Bush make the
effort to build a good person-to-person relationship,
this asset will keep the alliance vibrant.
SHAPING POWDER KEG STATES
There are at least four powder keg states in the AsiaPacific: China, North Korea, Indonesia, and Pakistan.
Much of ANZUS’s future success will be measured
by how well alliance policy planners deal with these
potentially volatile regional security actors.
China is the key powder keg state for the entire
region—some would say the world—and will
require sustained attention. While a stronger China
could become a revisionist or aggressive state and
disrupt the stability of the region from a position of
strength, perhaps a more likely challenge to regional
stability could come from a weak regime in Beijing
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that is coming unraveled. In any event, U.S. action can
influence China’s future trajectory significantly. Often
overlooked are the notable results of the U.S. policy
of engagement with China, for example, the entry of
China in a strategic dialogue, expansion of China’s
involvement in multilateral forums, and her increasing
transparency. A modest but significant milestone was
the release in December 2004 of China’s latest White
Paper on National Defense, Beijing’s most detailed and
forthcoming to date.50
While the challenge of China in 2006 is probably
best portrayed by picturing the country as a powder
keg state, China is potentially a linchpin state for the
Asia-Pacific region in the longer term. Indeed, Beijing
can be a major force for stability rather than instability,
a confident and mature power with a more viable
political system that is more accountable to the Chinese
people. Washington’s desire to see Beijing assume
this kind of role is exemplified by Deputy Secretary
Zoellick’s aforementioned invitation for China to
become a “responsible stakeholder.”
North Korea, now with tested nuclear and missile
programs and the world’s fourth largest armed forces,
is the powder keg state in Northeast Asia and will
require the most immediate attention. Indonesia, with
the world’s fourth largest population inhabiting an
area about three times the size of Texas, is the powder
keg state in Southeast Asia and one that will require
more American and Australian efforts in coming
decades. The specter of chronic instability in the
Indonesian archipelago threatens to destabilize the
entire subregion. The daunting challenges associated
with Indonesia’s size and economic disparities are
further complicated by significant ethnic and religious
fault lines. Meanwhile, Pakistan, a nuclear state with
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the world’s sixth largest population living in an area
approximately twice the size of California and with the
world’s seventh largest armed forces, is the powder
keg state for South and Central Asia. Addressing such
areas will be politically sensitive since all the states
mentioned have poor human rights records and large
militaries. Three of them (China, North Korea, and
Pakistan) pose serious threats to U.S. proliferation
policy, and three (Indonesia, North Korea, and
Pakistan) have had a history of significant ties to and/
or as breeding grounds for terrorist groups, or a record
of state-sponsored terrorism.
MAINTAINING A U.S. FORWARD PRESENCE
The more specific security challenge for the United
States in the Asia-Pacific over the next 20 years is likely
to be the mere maintenance of our strong alliance
structure and a robust forward presence in coordination
with allied forces.51 In particular, America’s alliances
with Japan, the ROK, and Australia are critical to U.S.
national interests in the region. Political trends on the
Korean Peninsula and in Japan strongly suggest that the
United States might be faced with increasing pressures
to reduce or curtail its military presence. However, a
greatly reduced presence or complete withdrawal from
Northeast Asia would bring into question the extent of
the U.S. commitment to the security of the entire region
and to maintaining its overall balance of power.
U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Baseline U.S. objectives in the Asia-Pacific should
be pursued along several lines. First, the United States
should sustain and nurture relations with its allies and
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friends (linchpin states). American priorities should
be in working with South Korea and Japan to improve
not only cooperation and coordination with the armed
forces of these countries but also relations with their
governments and people.52 Again, the recent roadmap
agreement with Japan is an apt example as is the January 2006 Strategic Implementation Agreement with
South Korea. U.S. alliances with Australia, Thailand,
and the Philippines also need attention.
Second, Washington should move forthrightly
to influence regional powder keg states like China,
North Korea, Pakistan, Indonesia, etc., with particular
attention to military-to-military relations. Military
cooperation—both bilateral and multilateral—can
foster cooperation, develop trust, and provide basic
building blocks for regional stability and security
architecture. The United States should encourage real
reconciliation and rapprochement between North
and South Korea, recognizing that North Korea’s new
semi-nuclear status vastly complicates the problem.
The United States also should promote confidencebuilding measures between India and Pakistan.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the United
States needs to maintain a forward presence in the
region. This is imperative if conflict in the Taiwan Strait
is to be deterred, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula
are to be managed.
After remaining vibrant and functional for over a
half century, the Australian-American relationship
is still a key facilitator of regional stability in the
Asia-Pacific. Remarkably, the alliance has withstood
major challenges during the Cold War and the post9/11 time frame, becoming stronger in the process.
Although a country of modest population, Australia
has emerged in this century as one of the world’s
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formidable economies and vibrant democracies. It has
an impeccable track record as a loyal U.S. ally through
successive crises where it could as easily have avoided
involvement. As an embodiment of western values and
a hallmark for regional development, this alliance is a
testimonial to effective security policy management. It
will need to draw upon all of its substantial attributes,
however, if it is to sustain its successful legacy in the
face of the threats and challenges now emerging in the
region.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ALLIANCE AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:
AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
Robert Ayson
In 1968, political scientist P. J. Boyce from the
University of Tasmania made two summary observations about the Australian-U.S. alliance in the context
of Asia-Pacific security:
Firstly, the Australian commitment in Vietnam has
not alienated Asian governments or Asian pressmen
to anywhere near the extent that was feared (and is
still sometimes easily assumed) by the Asia-oriented
left-wing critics of Australian policy. Secondly, there
seems to be growing conviction among many sensitive
Australians of all political parties, that their government
should occasionally strike a different public posture
from the United States in foreign policy matters—if
only to give the appearance of independent thinking in
Canberra and willingness to seize the initiative.1

The broader arguments underlying this quotation
might just as easily have been made today by an
Australian commentator on the regional implications
of Australia’s close alliance relationship with the
United States. On the one hand, Australia’s active
participation in U.S.-led coalitions of the willing
beginning with the war on terror, including its original
commitment in 2003 to the war in Iraq, have not been
met with stampedes of protest in Asia’s capitals. On
the other hand, analysts in Canberra have still tended
to seek a degree of policy differentiation in the AsiaPacific between Australia and the United States. That
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said, they continue to regard the alliance relationship
as a fundamental contributor to Australia’s strategic
interests in the region. The intimate links it allows
between Australian leaders, officials, and defense
personnel and their U.S. counterparts give it some
unique characteristics in comparison to many other
Australian relationships. But the alliance still needs to
be understood as part of a wider array of relationships,
including those with rising Asian countries, through
which Australia pursues its national interests.
This chapter deals with a number of Australian
perspectives on the role of the alliance in Canberra’s
Asia-Pacific regional engagement. It begins by
examining the importance of Asian strategic issues
in the formation and evolution of ANZUS. Close
cooperation between the two allies outside the region
since the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks
is then considered alongside contemporary challenges
in a changing Asian regional balance. Particular
attention is devoted here to the respective positions
of Washington and Canberra on relations with a reemerging China. Consideration also is given to the
alliance implications of weak state issues in the AsiaPacific, many of which lie in close proximity to
Australia.
The Asia-Pacific Dimension of an Evolving Alliance.
The Asian regional security dimension looms
large in the history of U.S.-Australia alliance relations.
Disagreement may continue over when that relationship really began, but the Asian balance comes
to the forefront for both sides of the debate. For those
who date the alliance from the 1951 ANZUS Treaty,
signed during the Menzies era, attention is drawn
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to Australian and New Zealand participation in the
Korean War, to their concern about the possibility of
a remilitarized Japan, and to American worries about
increasing Soviet and Chinese communist influence
in Asia. For those who date the alliance’s beginning
earlier, from the Australia-U.S. cooperation in World
War II, with Australia under a Labor Prime Minister,
that wartime relationship centered on combined efforts
to halt Japan’s advance in the Asia-Pacific, to win the
Pacific theater of the global contest, and to ensure a
favorable postwar regional balance.2 As with many
debates, the answer probably lies in a mixture of these
two positions, but any combination of them whatsoever
ends up highlighting American and Australian
interests in Asian security. It also reveals, however,
that while these interests overlapped significantly,
they were not identical.
Asian security issues also got top billing in the
subsequent evolution of U.S.-Australian alliance
relations as the competition of the Cold War spread to
Asia. With a strategy of forward defense, Australia (and
New Zealand, the third signatory of ANZUS) positioned
their forces forward in Southeast Asia in a series of
overlapping commitments under American and/or
British leadership.3 These commitments included
standing arrangements such as the Commonwealth
Strategic Reserve and the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO). They also included actual
deployments of forces such as the assistance provided
in the 1960s to Malaysia in the face of the konfrontasi
campaign launched by Indonesia’s President Sukarno,
and to South Vietnam as part of the U.S.-led effort to
prevent a North Vietnamese takeover.
The United States also played a strongly influential
role in Australia’s shift away from forward defense.
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Alongside a declining Britain’s decision to remove its
forces from East of Suez, the Nixon administration’s
Guam Doctrine spelled the end of such a forward
defense philosophy guiding Australia’s regional
security commitments. By the early 1970s, Australia
was moving to a strategy of defense self-reliance which
focused rather more on meeting possible challenges
in its own regional neighborhood, and which was
advanced in a series of important policy documents,
including the 1972 Defence Review, the 1976 Defence
White Paper, and Paul Dibb’s influential report of 1986,4
often regarded as the leading distillation of Australia’s
defense logic.
Rather than emphasizing the contributions that
Australia might make to U.S.-led engagements in
Asia—which seemed far less likely in a post-Vietnam
era—increasing emphasis was placed on Australia’s
need to develop the capacity for independent operations in its nearer neighborhood should these be
required. In this endeavor, there was a rather earlier
period in Australian-U.S. alliance relations regarding
Asian security to draw on. As early as 1959, the
Defence Committee of Cabinet was considering advice
(including that from Arthur Tange, who was to become
Secretary of Defence in 1970) that if Australia found
itself in an armed conflict with Indonesia (including
over what is now called West Papua), it could not
assume that its allies would be there to help. This
advice called for a correspondingly greater emphasis
on the development of Australia’s ability to conduct
operations independently.5
The change in Australia’s regional strategy in the
early 1970s did not usurp the alliance with the United
States, however. ANZUS remained a cornerstone in
Australia’s approach, but from perhaps a somewhat
different angle. The alliance with the United States
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offered the sort of networks, training, intelligence, and
equipment access around which a greater capacity
for defense self-reliance could be erected. Common
approaches to regional affairs continued, including
the blind eye turned by the three ANZUS partners
towards Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975,
reflecting a joint appreciation of the stabilizing power
which a resolutely anticommunist Suharto regime in
Jakarta seemed to offer. There were advantages for
Washington as well—as a southern anchor of the San
Francisco alliance system, Australia could be relied
upon as a security sub-contractor in its own security
neighborhood. This role came to the fore after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the extension of
such Soviet influence as its Southeast Asian presence
in Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay. As a close partner with
a significant role in Pacific security, Australia thereby
contributed to strategic denial in its own neck of the
woods.
There were still difference in the views from
Washington and Canberra. While Australia continued
to host the joint facilities—vital components in the
U.S. network—Labor governments of the 1980s were
unconvinced regarding the value of U.S. MX missile
testing in the Pacific and helped establish the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, which the United States
steadfastly declined to sign. Unlike New Zealand,
however, Australia did not let such antinuclear
sentiment get in the way of its overall relationship with
the United States. Washington’s suspension of New
Zealand from active ANZUS security relations actually
increased the importance of the Australia-U.S. leg of the
alliance, with the annual AUSMIN talks (between the
U.S. Secretary of State and the Australian Minister for
Foreign Affairs) taking the place of formerly trilateral
meetings.
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A close strategic relationship with Washington
remained a high priority for Canberra as it watched
the changing Asian regional balance in the post-Cold
War period. Alongside Japan, Australia encouraged
the emergence of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) as a means of reminding Washington of the
value of its Asian relationships and embedding the
United States in any future regional order. It must be
admitted that Canberra was rather more enthusiastic
than Washington about other emerging multilateral
forums in the region, including the Association of
Southeast Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) Regional Forum
(ARF) which came into being in 1994 to provide
an annual venue for security dialogue. Australian
policymakers nonetheless continued to view these
arrangements as complements to, rather than
replacements for, traditional alliance relationships.
The first foreign policy challenge faced by John
Howard’s government after its defeat of Labor in the
1996 general election confirmed the centrality of the U.S.
alliance in the new leadership’s view of Asian security
affairs. Canberra sided with Washington in the Taiwan
Strait crisis, a position which may have reinforced
suspicions in Beijing that China was being squeezed
between the twin alliance relations the United States
was enjoying with Japan and Australia.
Concerned as he was about being left behind in an
era of dramatic East Asian economic expansion,6 Prime
Minister Howard attached continuing importance
to Australia’s links with the world’s superpower as
a central pillar in his strategy. But developments in
Indonesia which followed in the wake of the 1997
financial crisis taught Mr. Howard another lesson. The
Prime Minister placed a high value on the diplomatic
and logistical support offered by the Clinton
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administration during the crisis over East Timor in
1999—and the positioning offshore of the USS Belleau
Woods was similarly appreciated for its deterrence
value.7 It was left largely to the Australian government,
however, to coordinate and man the main deployment
of forces on the ground. This confirmed the necessity
for Australia to pay attention to its own independent
capacity to manage and lead local operations in a part
of the world some leading analysts were regarding as
an “arc of instability.”8
Such a capacity was also put to the test in Australia’s
next major deployment in its own neighborhood—
the 2003 Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon
Islands (RAMSI) which also featured contributions
by New Zealand and a number of other Pacific Island
Forum countries. Here, the alliance connection was
philosophical rather than material. In justifying this
commitment, Prime Minister Howard portrayed
the Solomon Islands as a failed state in the making.
The absence of effective governance in the Solomon
Islands, it was argued, might allow a base from which
transnational threats including drug running and
terrorism could materialize with potential adverse
implications for Australia’s own security.9 Here there
was a discernible link to the Bush administration’s
argument that “America is now threatened less by
conquering states than we are by failing ones.”10 There
was also a philosophical link to Australia’s combat
participation further afield in U.S.-led missions which
had followed the September 2001 terrorist attacks.
The Alliance Today: Towards West Asia?
At the start of the Australian Prime Minister’s
seventh visit to Washington during the George W. Bush
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incumbency, the President noted that “the American
people know that Australia is a strong ally. . . . Our two
nations are closer than ever, and Americans admire
Australia’s strong leader. Prime Minister John Howard
has affirmed our common values. He’s strengthened
our alliance.”11 In official documentation, the chorus
of approval is, if anything, even stronger. The 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has placed Australia
on a pedestal shared only by one other country—the
United Kingdom. According to the QDR, the unique
relations the United States enjoyed with these two
fellow members of the Anglosphere, were “models for
the breadth and depth of cooperation that the United
States seeks to foster with other allies and partners
around the world.”12
But it is not so much cooperation with Washington
in Asian security affairs that has earned Canberra
its current position in the American sun. Instead,
the Bush administration seems especially to have
valued its antipodean alliance partner’s extraregional
commitment of forces in the post-9/11 period. The first
such commitment was the deployment of Australian
Defense Force (ADF) units to Afghanistan and its
environs, which included a special forces detachment,
maritime patrol and F/A-18 aircraft, and a naval task
force.13 This substantive contribution followed the
first-ever invoking of ANZUS itself: had pundits in the
early 1950s been asked to predict the first-ever such
use of the Treaty, this scenario is most unlikely to have
figured high in their probability rankings.
The second such commitment was Australia’s
agreement to participate in the war against Iraq.
Canberra’s presence in the very select coalition of the
willing which invaded Saddam Hussein’s country in
2003, and its continued active support of the American
116

role there, have warmed the cockles of important
hearts within the Beltway. It is clear that when the
Howard government indicates that it is committed
to Iraq “for the duration,” the actual timetable has a
strong connection with the anticipated length of stay
for U.S. forces. By the middle of 2006, earlier hopes that
the U.S. commitment could be scaled back had been
replaced by a sober resolve to reinforce the Pentagon’s
support for the increasingly at-risk Iraqi capital. For
its part, Australia had transferred (not withdrawn) its
forces based in al Muthanna province (where they had
been providing protection for Japan’s detachment of
engineers) to Dhi Qar province, and retained in theater
other ADF units including transport and maritime
aircraft detachments, a frigate, an army training
team, and a joint task force headquarters.14 Canberra
also increased its force commitment to Afghanistan
in response to the deteriorating provincial security
situation facing the Karzai government.15
Sino-Australian and Sino-U.S. Strategic Relations.
When one turns to Australia’s view of Asia, it is
the reemergence of China rather than the alliance
relationship with United States that occupies center
stage—although, of course, the two concerns can
intersect in very interesting ways. This is an Asia
preoccupied most of all with the maintenance of
economic expansion driven by the impressive
locomotive of China’s demand for goods, capital, and
natural resources. For Australian voters, the Middle
Kingdom’s vast appetite is a key factor in the reduction
of taxes which the Howard government has been able
to deliver.16 This mutually beneficial relationship can
only be expected to continue and will extend into new
areas such as uranium exports.
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Mr. Howard’s campaign of economic engagement
with China has deep roots. As far back as 1997,
senior members of the first coalition ministry under
Howard’s leadership, including the Prime Minister
himself, were speaking of an economic strategic
partnership with China.17 In 2004, the Prime Minister
cited progress towards an Australia-China Free
Trade Agreement in declaring that his “Government
has clearly signalled its interest in forging a strategic
economic partnership with China based on far-reaching
economic complementarities.”18 The annual report of
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade at that
time refers to “Australia's strategic partnership with
China in energy and resources.”19
If we consider this strategic relationship solely in
economic terms, there seems no obvious connection
to, or conflict with, Australia’s security relations with
the United States. But the situation changes if one takes
a wider view: a strategic partnership with China may
imply that Australia will bear in mind that country’s
interests when making significant decisions on issues
in which Beijing has a major stake. In this context, it
is fascinating to consider Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer’s reinterpretation of Australia’s obligations
under ANZUS in the event of a Taiwan conflict, which
he made during a news media interview in Beijing in
August 2004. Mr. Downer said, “The ANZUS Treaty
is invoked in the event of one of our two countries,
Australia or the United States, being attacked. So
some other military activity elsewhere in the world,
be it in Iraq or anywhere else for that matter, does not
automatically invoke the ANZUS Treaty.”20 What is
doubly fascinating about this attempt to gain Australia
some wriggle room in entertaining the prospect of a
China-U.S. crisis, is the fact that Mr. Downer began the
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media conference by stating that he and Premier Wen
Jiabao had “agreed that Australia and China would
build up a bilateral strategic relationship that would
strengthen our economic relationship, and we would
work closely together on Asia-Pacific issues, be they
economic or security issues.” Lending point to his
words is the fact that he was responding specifically to
a question as to how the “strategic partnership” with
China related to Australia’s ANZUS obligations.21
This tale reminds us that Asia, in addition to its role
as a venue of economic dynamism, remains an arena of
significant interstate competition. Traditionally, there
has been a tendency to emphasize what have become
rather standard flashpoints—the Korean peninsula,
Kashmir, the South China Sea, and especially the Taiwan Strait. To the potential relief of the United States
and Australia, there seem to be reasonable prospects
that China and Taiwan will find ways to manage their
family squabble, or at least to avoid a major armed
conflict. But this should not encourage us to relax. Not
far away in the great power game reserve known as
North Asia, the relationship between traditional rivals
Japan and China has been deteriorating significantly.
This is the region’s real hotspot, and its consequences are
potentially very grave. The simultaneous intensification
of U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation only enhances the
prospects that if there is to be a war between China
and the United States, it may well start in a crisis or
exchange of blows involving China and Japan. And
the possibility of such a China-Japan dustup certainly
cannot be ruled out.22
For Australian strategic analysts, such an
eventuality—a U.S.-China clash started over other
issues—is the stuff of nightmares. Should the United
States get into such a difficult situation, it is likely that
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Australian assistance would be expected. And Canberra
would face an awful choice. Saying yes (on balance still
the more likely response) would cause serious harm to
its burgeoning relationship with China. Saying no (for
now perhaps the less likely response) would please
Beijing but could cause irreparable harm to Australia’s
security relationship with the United States.23 In 2001,
responding to questions about his previous comments
on a Taiwan scenario, then Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage (known as one of Australia’s
closest friends in the Bush administration) said that
“if the Australian Government made a decision—in
the terrible event the United States was involved in a
conflict—that it was not in their interest to participate
at some level, then we would have to take a look at
where we are after the dust had settled.”24 In 2005,
having left office, Mr. Armitage added this thought:
“I do believe that if America was ever involved in a
military contingency in the Pacific, that we would hope
and pray that Australians were alongside us.”25
Of course such a choice between the United States
and China may never have to be made. That would
be the good news of the future. But the good news
of today, at least, is that Canberra’s extraregional
commitments in the Middle East and Central Asia are
allowing Australia to pay tribute to Washington in a
part of the world some distance from the main points of
contention between the United States and China. And as
this security relationship with the world’s preeminent
power flourishes outside of Australia’s traditional
Asia-Pacific bailiwick, the smaller ally also is able to
enjoy the fruits of its expanding, mainly economic
relationship with the Middle Kingdom. Hence the
war on terror has not only been good for U.S.-China
relations: the Long War also has been good for two of
Australia’s most important bilateral relationships.
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Australia’s Interests in U.S. Regional Engagement.
The point of this discussion has not been to suggest
that Australia’s alliance relationship with the United
States has been deprived of its Asian dimension
completely. Several elements are important to note
in that regard. First, it remains strongly in Australia’s
interests for the United States to continue to play a
significant balancing role in East Asia in the process of
promoting peace and stability. Securing the ongoing
presence of substantial U.S. forces in North Asia in
particular remains one of the core objectives behind
Australia’s commitment to its own part of the huband-spokes system. The 2005 Defence Update states
that “U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region has
been the foundation of the region’s strategic stability
and security since World War II, and is no less relevant
60 years on.”26 Australia’s close relations with the U.S.
Pacific Command, and that Command’s interest in
Australia’s neck of the regional woods, also remain
highly valued in Canberra, including the regular
Pacific rim exercises which involve the ADF alongside
forces from the U.S. and a number of other regional
countries.27
Second, the Long War has a significant Asian
regional dimension in which Australian and U.S.
interests converge. Both have had significant concerns
about jihadist terrorism in Southeast Asia and are keen
to cooperate with major regional countries in helping
them to address this challenge. Paramount here is
cooperation with Indonesia—although Canberra
may find that its own direct bilateral relationship
with Jakarta is the best way forward here. The initial
and more catastrophic Bali bombing (October 2002)
provided Australia with a very direct stake in the future
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management of the terrorist challenge in Indonesia. In
the successful police-led cooperation with Indonesia
that followed, it also provided Canberra with the
opportunity to further enhance bilateral relations
which had been so strained in 1999, and which will
continue to be challenging to manage. Notwithstanding
the terrorism issue, however, one possible role here
for Australia is to encourage Washington to view
Indonesia’s internal circumstances in all of their
complexity. It also should be noted here that Australia
has increased its counterterrorism cooperation with
the Philippines,28 whose struggles with a southern
insurgency also have been a major concern for the
United States.
Third, Canberra welcomes Washington’s endorsement of Australia’s leading role in addressing state
fragility in its nearer neighborhood. For the United
States and its partners (including Australia), reminders
of the difficulties associated with nation-building
have come not only from Afghanistan and Iraq. They
also have been evident in the disappointing return of
violence in 2006 to the streets of both Dili in East Timor
and Honiara in the Solomon Islands, which precipitated
the reentry of Australian forces in both instances.
These instances raise the question of both countries’
reliance on the military option in their responses to
complex internal political challenges. For some, it also
recalls criticisms after the initial 1999 intervention in
East Timor that Australia tends to act as Washington’s
regional deputy. But this perception probably has less
relevance in the Pacific than in parts of Southeast Asia,
and even there one would have to consider P.J. Boyce’s
valid disclaimer of Asian alienation over Australian
participation in the Vietnam war, which begins this
chapter.29 But the validity of his second point—the
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need for policy differentiation between Australia and
the United States—also needs to be considered.30
Fourth, Australia has played an important role in
U.S.-led efforts to neutralize potential weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) challenges in East Asia. Canberra
has been a prominent supporter and participant in
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)—ostensibly
designed to intercept shipments of WMD-related
materials wherever they occur but in reality designed
principally with North Korea in mind. On this latter
score, Canberra also has been an active supporter of
the Six Party Talks process in which the United States
is a direct participant, and Cranberra has been a vocal
critic of North Korea’s provocative missile tests of
July 2006. The Howard government also has signed a
Memorandum of Understanding with the United States
on missile defense cooperation,31 an issue prefaced
by the 2005 Defense Update containing the significant
clause, “Australia will continue to look for ways to
support the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.”32
Fifth, Canberra continues to be a strong supporter
of Washington’s engagement in East Asian multilateral
and regional forums including APEC, ARF, and more
recent initiatives such as the Shangri-La dialogue hosted
in Singapore by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. There is a challenge here to the extent that the
United States is not involved in this latest talkfest—
the East Asian Summit, whose inaugural meeting was
held in Malaysia in December 2005. It is quite possible
that the inclusion of three non-East Asian countries,
Australia, New Zealand, and India, has persuaded
China that this is not a bus it wants to board. This may
in turn allow Washington and Canberra to relax about
the implications of Washington’s absence. But it was
still a bus Canberra felt it had to ride, and the United
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States and Australia need to consider whether this is
a sign of things to come in terms of opportunities for
Washington’s future regional participation.
Sixth, Australia has welcomed the U.S. discovery (or
rediscovery) of India as an emerging great power with
the potential to be one of Washington’s most valuable
bilateral partners. While its own relations with New
Delhi have never really raced along, especially after
India’s 1998 nuclear tests, Canberra also is keen to see
India play a significant role in wider Asian security
affairs. Moreover, taking the lead somewhat from the
Bush administration’s plans to cooperate on civilian
nuclear technology with India, Mr. Howard has left the
door ajar on the prospect that Australia might one day
sell uranium to Asia’s second most significant rising
power.33 Even so, Canberra might usefully suggest to
Washington that any ideas of India fitting in neatly as
a regional balancer to China will work only so far as
a very independent-minded New Delhi will want to
perform this role.
Seventh, Australia has worked with Japan and
the United States in the development of a growing
trilateral strategic relationship. In early 2006, the
trilateral strategic dialogue between the three countries
was elevated to Foreign Minister level as Secretary
of State Condolezza Rice and Foreign Minister Aso
joined Alexander Downer for talks in Sydney. For
Australia, the results of this meeting were satisfactory.
For reasons already discussed in this chapter, Canberra
would not have wanted a trilateral version of the
early 2005 2+2 meeting between the United States
and Japan in Tokyo where Taiwan was mentioned in
dispatches for the first time, much to China’s dismay.34
Instead, the 2006 Sydney trilateral meeting produced
a reassuringly benign statement which “welcomed
China's constructive engagement in the region.”35
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Managing Regional Perceptions of the Alliance.
Such an approach ties in well with former Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s September 2005
speech in which he suggested that the United States
could help “encourage China to become a responsible
stakeholder in the international system,”36 a sentiment
which goes down well in Canberra. And it was certainly
consistent with Mr. Downer’s repeated and very public
insistence that it would be a mistake to seek to contain
China.37 These comments were also picked up by the
Chinese news media,38 which also noted Secretary
Rice’s rejection of containment as a strategy for
dealing with a modern China.39 But some of the other
reporting reflects mixed messages, which are all too
easily generated on this issue. Observing differences
in the Rice and Downer approaches, The International
Herald Tribune ran the headline “Rice Assails China on
Australia Trip.”40 And a few days before the meeting,
a report from the Sydney Morning Herald’s Washington
correspondent ran under the banner, “Rice and Downer
in Talks on How to Contain China.”41
This colorful variation in reporting illustrates the
potentially complicating impact of diverse news media
responses to any development in alliance relations. But
it also illustrates Canberra’s challenge in generating the
right impression of the message it is busy sending to the
United States, China, and other East Asian countries
on its views and interests in the changing regional
balance. Of course, what a country says can sometimes
be rather less important to attend than what it does.
But even this does not remove the possible dilemma
for Canberra. Despite its repeated commitments to
American-led operations outside of East Asia, can
Canberra signal effectively that its answer to calls for
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help may be more qualified in the case of a North Asian
crisis—especially where the strategic interests of the
rising Asian powers are involved?42 And can Canberra
do this without harming its own interests in a longterm alliance relationship with the United States? How
much wriggle room in turn is Washington prepared to
give its antipodean alliance partner?
Conclusion.
It is tempting to take a triumphal approach to
U.S.-Australian strategic relations at the start of the
21st century. The view from Canberra seems very
heartening—Australia has enjoyed an enviable profile
within the Washington Beltway during the war on
terror. This may encourage the refrain, “all power to
the Long War and the Bush-Howard partnership.”
It also is tempting to downplay the importance
of the Asia-Pacific dimension of the U.S.-Australian
alliance. But the demands of the Asia-Pacific security
environment not only explain the origins of this
alliance, those demands also will be the alliance’s
future testing ground and the venue where its value
may be best realized.
Looking north into the Asia-Pacific region from
Australia, one is struck by two leading security themes.
The first (and, for Australia, the closest) is the range of
countries challenged by problems of weakness—which
face significant problems in maintaining internal
security and stability. The second is the group of Asian
countries (mainly in North Asia) which are growing
stronger and/or more assertive and whose rising
power is potentially a challenge for each other.43
In the longer term, the United States is likely to be
most welcoming of support from its Australian ally
as it deals with the second category—the great power
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relations which will shape the future East Asia. But
for a range of reasons discussed above, Australia’s
cooperation in times of relative peace may not always
translate into an automatic commitment in times
of crisis or war. For its part, there also will be times
when Australia will be preoccupied with the problems
arising from the first category in its own immediate
neighborhood. Experience suggests that it will be wise
to plan for the need to deal with these more or less
independently, but in ways which will still generate
Washington’s seal of approval.
This comparison suggests that there are limits to the
commitment that either country can expect realistically
from the other in particular Asia-Pacific scenarios in
coming years. The challenge may be to accommodate
these limitations in a healthy alliance relationship
based on continuing cooperation, which still serves
their respective interests. This may seem odd in an era
of “you’re either for or against us” dichotomies. But
the bargain of limited commitments may help make
for an especially resilient alliance. This might just be
a model for other alliance relationships in a reshaped
San Francisco system.
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PANEL III
POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS
OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
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CHAPTER 7
PANEL III CHAIRMAN’S INTRODUCTION
Michael Wesley
Surveying the alignments and commitments of the
United States at the height of the Cold War, Arnold
Wolfers observed that “solidarity, even among close
allies, has usually proved to be a perishable asset.”1
Had Wolfers been given the chance to look back on
an Australian-American alliance that has endured for
over half a century, he may have added a footnoted
caveat. The remarkable constancy of the U.S. “other
special relationship” requires the word “solidarity” to
be measured on two distinct levels.
On one level, that of official alliance relations, the
alliance has shown remarkable constancy. In the words
of Charles Krauthammer, one of the most enthusiastic
American supporters of the alliance, “Australia is the
only country that has fought with the United States
in every one of its major conflicts since 1914, the good
and the bad, the winning and the losing.”2 According
to John Higley (Chapter 8), “Military and intelligence
cooperation is close to seamless.” Finally, as another
observer of the alliance argues, both Washington and
Canberra continue to devote substantial bureaucratic
and political resources to maintaining the solidarity of
the relationship:
The American Secretaries of State and Defense . . . plan
their days in 15-minute segments, and literally hundreds
of ambassadors and officials of comparable status in
Washington would sacrifice much for one of those 15minute sessions. To have unrestricted access to both
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Secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for an entire day, as Australians have at regular AUSMIN
talks, is an extraordinary boon.3

However, as John Higley (Chapter 8) and Brendon
O’Connor (Chapter 9) demonstrate, “solidarity” also
should be discussed on the level of political dynamics
and public opinion within each country. At the end of
2006, the political dynamics underlying the AustralianAmerican relationship appeared to have reached a
cyclical high point, which by its nature cannot be
sustained at the current level of intimacy. George W.
Bush and John Howard share very similar approaches
to international relations. The Howard government
had identified Bush as a possible future President and
begun building a relationship with him long before the
2000 Presidential elections in the United States, and
was delighted when Bush scraped home.
Howard and Bush developed a close friendship
based on shared conservative values and a common
contractualist, interest-based approach to international
affairs.4 Most crucial, however, was Australia’s support
for the United States after the September 11, 2001
(9/11), attacks and during the war in Iraq. Canberra’s
solidarity in the face of opposition, especially as the
enunciated prewar case for invasion unravelled, was
a gesture that resonated strongly in Washington. As
Tom Schieffer, the American Ambassador to Australia,
described it, “You had a deepening of the relationship.
Adversity creates a bond. And particularly with George
Bush, he is a person who responds to people who are
friends when it is harder to be a friend, because he
knows there’s more friendship there.”5
The Howard government realized quickly that in
the minds of the Bush administration, 9/11 would
become “a purifier of alliances”6 after which America’s
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defense relationships would no longer be seen as
defensive assets to be maintained and deferred to, but
as potentially perishable arrangements that needed to
be justified according to their usefulness. Australia’s
small but high-profile contributions in Afghanistan and
Iraq, its initiative in leading state-building operations in
what Washington sees as Australia’s patch in Southeast
Asia and the South Pacific, and its early actions
against North Korean vessels in support of the nascent
Proliferation Security Initiative, all earned substantial
political capital in Washington.7 Canberra has lost no
time in locking in the payoffs: the Australia-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement; visa-free entry for Australians to the
United States (remarkable at a time of greater American
sensitivity about the integrity of its borders); and, by
way of a Presidential decree in September 2005, a level
of access to American intelligence matched only by
that of the United Kingdom.8 But as both John Higley
and Brendon O’Connor observe, it is worth asking how
evolutions in political dynamics and public opinion,
respectively, may affect this greater level of official
intimacy between the two allies.
Political Dynamics.
As Higley observes, the second half of the second Bush
term will see the energy and momentum sapped from
the U.S. Government. Preoccupation with seemingly
intractable and worsening conflicts in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and possibly Israel-Palestine will suck the oxygen
of relevance and resources from Washington’s ability
to tend its alliance relationships and attend to other
parts of its global interests. With the superpower
lapsing into ever deeper attention deficit disorder,
its allies such as Australia are likely to be expected
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to an even greater extent to take the lead within their
respective regions and to contribute globally as well.
Higley predicts alarming adverse ripple effects of the
Iraq war on U.S. military prowess and resolve, seeing
even the Vietnam syndrome as too optimistic a parallel
to draw. He argues, convincingly, that in the coming
years the United States and Australia will come to see
their respective nation-building tasks to be Sisyphean
in their endlessness, and that both the drain on the
exchequer and the ever-receding exit benchmarks for
these operations will be deeply corrosive of public
support. The result will be to accept the permanent
presence on the international security stage of “bandits
and anarchists,” and for alliances such as ANZUS to
lapse back into defensive arrangements—but defense
against a new type of transnational threat.
In addition to the foregoing attenuative forces,
political dynamics in the United States also will act to
drain the Bush administration’s energy and resolve.
The loss of control in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate in the mid-term elections, combined
with the resignation of key foreign policy officials such
as Robert Zoellick, will lead, if not to policy paralysis,
at least to slackened initiative. U.S. allies such as
Australia will find it harder to gain traction within a
distracted and deflated Washington bureaucracy. As
Republicans look ahead to the 2008 elections, they will
try to shore up their key “red state” constituencies by
getting tough on agricultural trade, a perennial irritant
in Australian-American relations, even with a newlyminted free trade agreement.
It is within this context that Australian officials
have two pressing tasks. One is to preserve the access
and goodwill built up during the periodic upswing
in Australia-American relations. The new and newly
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strengthened strands of the relationship must be
tended carefully, and every effort should be made
to resist the inevitable attempts by distracted and
time-pressed American officials to downgrade new
forums, such as the U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral
Security Dialogue. The second pressing task lies in not
permitting issues such as agricultural protectionism
to erode the goodwill which is at the core of the
relationship. The United States has too many allies
that come to Washington with demands; Australia
needs to be mindful that it is one of the few American
allies perceived in Washington as a source of fresh and
constructive ideas and perspectives.
Higley also ponders the effect on the alliance of
the return of the Democrats to power in the United
States. It is quite possible that this will lead to a
decline in the political intimacy of the relationship, if
the historical precedent of the less ebullient ClintonHoward relationship is anything to go by. Even if a
future Democratic administration does not punish
the Howard government for its close relationship to
Bush, as Higley suggests it might, the Democrats are
likely to be more Atlanticist and multilateralist, and
wedded to liberal aspirations for the transformation of
international relations through international law and
institutions.
Such an approach will sit uncomfortably with the
Howard government, with its belief that international
relations are too messy and uncertain9 to be contained
in rationalist constructs and with its commitment to
hard-headed pragmatism, bilateralism, and traditional
realist conceptions of world affairs. Perhaps a period
of Democratic ascendancy in Washington will need to
await the return of the Labor Party to power in Canberra
for the next cyclical high point in political relations, akin
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to the Clinton-Keating affiliation. Even here, however,
O’Connor raises the possibility of a leader from left of
the Labor Party seeking to downgrade ties with any
U.S. Government, regardless of the party in power.
Public Opinion.
Brendon O’Connor’s chapter raises a possible
directional, rather than cyclical, change in the politics of
the Australian-American relationship. He argues that
the heavily publicized intimacy between the Howard
government and the internationally unpopular Bush
administration, added to the politics of the AustraliaU.S. Free Trade Agreement, have driven an increasing
and under-reported sense of cultural anxiety among
Australians. His close interrogation of a broad range
of public opinion data in Australia shows that,
on security issues and the alliance with America,
Australian attitudes are close to those of the United
Kingdom or Israel; but on issues of culture and identity,
Australian attitudes are closer to those of the French.
Political opponents of the Howard government have
cleverly exploited these anxieties by accusing Howard
of intending to Americanize Australia’s industrial
relations laws, and then using those accusations in
their seemingly effective campaign against the new
“Work Choices” legislation.
O’Connor’s analysis suggests the possibility that
these two attitudinal trends are linked, that the more
dependent Australians feel on the alliance, the more
it triggers a countervailing anxiety about the effects
of this dependence on their identity and sovereignty.
This tension reflects a long entrenched strand of
critique in Australia, evident on both the left and right
of the political spectrum. Commentators in Australia
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have voiced self-disgust over Australia’s seeming
inability to do without powerful allies, and argued that
America’s influence saps Australia’s ability to develop
an independent identity.10 Others have argued that
the alliance locks Australia into a militarized posture
against a largely benign outside world, mandating
high levels of defense spending that are unjustified
by the level of threats Australia faces.11 As Australia
entered free trade negotiations with the United States,
some commentators portrayed Australia as a guileless
chump about to be eviscerated by corporate America,
that by getting too close to Washington the Howard
government was selling out Australia’s real interests.12
The alleged belligerence of the Bush administration
in the international arena aroused old fears about
Australia being dragged into conflicts to the detriment
of its own well-being. This strain of concern also has
a long history. Commentators from the left during
the Cold War, mirroring New Zealand, had argued
that the alliance implicated Australia in America’s
imperial ambitions, making it a direct target in any
conflict between the superpowers13 and dragging it
into morally compromising covert and enforcement
actions in support of U.S. foreign policy.14
But, as O’Connor observes, we should be careful
about drawing too definite political implications from
such public opinion data and elite opinion. Cultural
attitudes are notoriously difficult to pin down: the
recent outpouring of Australian public grief on the
occasion of the death of Crocodile Hunter Steve Irwin
shows that Australians more eagerly embrace their
own if those Aussie stars also loom large in the eyes of
Americans. And the caricatures of Howard as a giddy
Americophile go too far. There are clearly elements
of the U.S. system he dislikes: its tolerance for gun
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ownership; its social security and health insurance
systems. The case of Mark Latham, who failed in
his attempt to install an Australian Labor Party
government in 2004, apparently illustrates the limits of
how much Australians will tolerate identity anxieties
adversely affecting the substance of the AustraliaU.S. security relationship. The twinning of cultural
anxiety with hard-headed pragmatism on security and
alliance questions places Australia much closer to its
Southeast Asian neighbors than its cousins in Canada
or continental Europe. Arguably, a larger challenge
to the relationship arises not from emotionalism but
from pragmatism: as Australia builds a relationship
with China based on a deepening complementarity of
interests, how will this begin to impinge on its pragmatic security relationship with the United States?
Conclusion.
Both Higley’s and O’Connor’s chapters suggest
that coincidences in electoral politics in both allies
will contribute to cycles of political intimacy and
distance in the Australian-American relationship. The
challenge for officials on both sides is to remember
that the insulation of alliance dynamics from political
pressures or public opinion shifts is not a given. Every
effort should be made, in the process of adapting the
alliance to the demands of 21st century security, to
avoid taking the relationship in directions that corrode
the broad public support for it in both countries.
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CHAPTER 8
THE RELATIONSHIP’S POLITICAL ASPECTS:
AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
John Higley
In May 2006 Prime Minister John Howard again
visited President George W. Bush in Washington, and
again was unnoticed by most Americans. There were
a few TV clips of Howard standing with Bush in the
Rose Garden and at a joint press conference, a handful
of articles in newspapers read by the American political
class, and a 15-minute interview of Howard on CNN’s
Late Edition, which has a small Sunday morning
audience. The scant public attention paid to Howard’s
visit was not a rebuff, however; few foreign leaders
visiting Washington catch American eyes, and on this
occasion the praise Bush lavished on Howard enabled
him to fare better than most. The PM’s visit contrasted,
nonetheless, with the extensive Australian publicity
that attended U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s
appearance in Sydney and Canberra 2 months earlier.
One might infer that the U.S.-Australia relationship has
much greater salience to Australia than to the United
States. But this would be mistaken; the relationship is
of key importance to the United States.
The relationship has been institutionalized and
globalized to an unprecedented degree during
the Bush-Howard years. Military and intelligence
interoperability is close to seamless, and Australia’s
intended purchases of advanced U.S. weapons
systems—Joint Strike Fighters, AWACS aircraft, Aegis
destroyers, M1A1 tanks—promise to integrate the two
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defense establishments as never before. The irritant
that U.S. intelligence and missile detection installations
in Australia long constituted in that country has
dissipated. The recent U.S.-Australia free trade
agreement (FTA) gives the relationship’s economic
side a rules-based permanency, so that 55 percent of
Australia’s direct overseas investment now goes to the
United States, numerous Australian companies are
established profitably in the American market, and
some 70,000 Australians are thereby employed.
The two countries worked closely to reduce
agricultural barriers in the abortive Doha round of
multilateral trade negotiations; they have jointly
initiated an annual dialogue with Japan on Asia-Pacific
economic and security issues; they are active in the PO6 effort to slow global warming; and they cooperate
effectively at the United Nations (UN). In the arc of
instability to Australia’s north, they have a mutual
interest in stabilizing East Timor and other island states,
aiding victims of natural disasters such as the Sumatra
tsunami and Java earthquakes, and providing military
and other assistance to the Yudhoyono government in
Jakarta. Most dramatically, Australia steadfastly has
remained part of the dwindling U.S.-led coalition in
Iraq while also contributing to counterinsurgent and
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
Washington policymakers assume that Australia
cannot play a major world role independent of the
United States, and most policymakers in Canberra see
Australia as having no credible alternative to its alliance
with the United States. By trading loyalty to the Bush
administration for privileged access to U.S. foreign
and defense policy thinking and to the American
market through the FTA, the Howard government
has strengthened this reciprocal view. While there is
146

considerable suspicion of Bush administration policies
among the Australian public, as Brendon O’Connor
documents in Chapter 9, and while the average
American’s ignorance of Australia is nearly total, most
political elites in the two countries hold the relationship
in high regard. The concern of many during the 1970s
and 1980s that the relationship would be weakened by
the passing of the World War II generation is now seen
to have been unfounded.
End of story? Perhaps. But it is possible, as
Michael Wesley (Chapter 7) has speculated, that the
relationship is now at a cyclical high point, and that
some deterioration must follow. A change in top
political leaders, Bush and Howard, is not far off, and
their successors are unlikely to be such close comrades
in arms. The warm personal ties between Bush and
Howard, formed in the crucible of the September 11,
2001 (9/11), attacks on New York and Washington—
which Howard witnessed—will probably not be
duplicated. With Democrats having gained control of
both houses of Congress following mid-term elections
in November 2006, their relations with a continuing
Liberal regime in Canberra are likely to be less robust
than Republican ties have been. Not a few Democrats
will harbor some bitterness toward Canberra for
having aided and abetted what they regard as Bush’s
disastrous war of choice in Iraq. During the run-up to
Australia’s federal elections in 2007, for that matter, the
Liberals may distance themselves from the lame-duck
Bush administration in order to avoid being tarred by
the sorts of criticisms leveled at Bush and his associates
by American critics. Looking further down the road, it is
likely that the United States will experience a post-Iraq
syndrome, in which Bush’s global war on terror will be
scaled back as the result of an aversion in the American
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public to undertakings that risk becoming new Iraqs.
The United States probably, in consequence, will be
quite reluctant to involve itself militarily in Australia’s
region. Related to this, the next U.S. administration,
regardless of its party coloration, will have to undertake
extensive repairs to the American military while
coping with severe fiscal constraints. Add, finally,
the probability of more abrasive U.S.-Australia trade
competitions in foreign markets generated by strong
economic lobbies in each country, and it is not hard
to see that the relationship’s closeness may be peaking
about now.
The relationship has a naturalness that will prevent
it from withering greatly, however. It is rooted in
many cultural, economic, and political affinities; the
mutual security interests that drive it are lasting; and
there is a long experience of adjusting the relationship
to fit changing principals and the governments they
lead. Other contributors to this volume examine the
mutual security and economic interests that underpin
the relationship. My charge is to consider its political
aspects from an American perspective.
The Short-Term Outlook.
Changes in the American political scene during
the next 2 years are likely to perturb the relationship.
President Bush’s public approval ratings hover in
the 35-40 percent range and may well head toward
Vice President Cheney’s 20 percent rating. The Iraq
quagmire and the trajectory of events in Afghanistan
are millstones that hang heavy around the Bush
administration’s neck; evidence of administration
incompetence in several domestic policy domains is
substantial; and assorted scandals mainly involving
Republican leaders and their lobbyist allies multiply.
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With the Democrats in control of both houses of
Congress as a result of the November 2006 mid-term
elections, how will the relationship be affected? The
bilateral security ties at its core will remain unchanged,
as will the U.S. strategic guarantee of Australia’s
security. Australia’s access to high-level U.S. intelligence
and American defense science and technology will not
be reduced in any significant way. To be sure, a whiff
of defense protectionism is in the American air, as
illustrated by reluctance to allow Britain and Australia
sufficient access to Joint Strike Fighter technology to
maintain and upgrade the aircraft autonomously once
the aircraft are purchased. While President Bush has
relaxed U.S. defense disclosure policy to reassure
Australia and Britain on this score, the Democrats,
having reaped political hay from their attacks on the
Bush administration’s plan to have Dubai Ports World
manage American harbor terminals, may be unwilling
to go along with this relaxation.
More concretely and immediately, Democratic
ascendancy in Congress will accelerate greatly the
exodus of top-level figures from the Bush administration.
Donald Rumsfeld has already resigned, and the days
of his lieutenants at the Pentagon, who have worked
closely with Australian counterparts ever since
September 11, 2001 (9/11), are at or near zero. Pressures
to replace senior military leaders associated with
Rumsfeld and his civilian Pentagon team are already
taking effect. The June 2006 resignation of Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, whose knowledge
of Australia was second only to that of his predecessor,
Rich Armitage, offered a foretaste of how Bush officials
accustomed to working closely with Australians
will disappear from high office in Washington. The
Australian government’s easy access to top U.S.
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policymakers will require making new acquaintances,
and the relationship’s overall atmospherics will need
close attention.
Beyond these effects of a Democratic ascendancy,
the relationship will have to operate in a politically
deadlocked Washington. Congressional committees,
newly controlled by Democrats, will unleash a flood
of investigations involving televised public hearings
and subpoenas of administration officials, and even
pay-back impeachment proceedings against President
Bush cannot be ruled out. The Democrats will launch
a concerted assault on Vice President Cheney and
his large and powerful staff, assuming Cheney does
not preempt this by resigning for reasons of health.
Jockeying by both parties’ presidential aspirants in
the long run-up to the 2008 presidential election also
will contribute to deadlock. Mired in difficulties, Bush
administration officials may fail to keep Australia
sufficiently informed about impending U.S. actions.
Canberra’s pique at not being adequately forewarned
about the U.S. nuclear deal with India in early 2006
illustrates this possibility.
Despite highly publicized announcements by
President Bush and the Democratic congressional
leadership that they will work together, indeed that
the President welcomes new ideas for the Iraq war,
sniping by Democrats at administration initiatives, as
well as the Republicans’ own deep divisions over Iraq,
immigration policy, tax policy, renewing the Bush
administration’s trade negotiating authority, the Doha
round’s resumption (if it occurs), etc., dampen prospects
for significant congressional accomplishments. Fiscal
constraints may further limit administration actions,
and Bush’s eroding authority also will crimp them.
The abandonment of Social Security privatization early
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in the administration’s second term and its inability
to gain passage of a new immigration law before the
November 2006 mid-term elections signal what a
continuing but crippled Republican dominance may
entail.
During the Bush administration’s waning time
in office, trade relations between the United States
and Australia are likely to become more strained.
Republicans will be tempted to shore up red state voter
support for the 2008 elections by clamping down on
above-quota imports of Australian beef, lamb, dairy,
and other products. For the same political reason,
American competition with Australia in foreign wheat
and other agricultural markets will sharpen. A straw
in the wind is the suspicion of some Australians that
the American wheat lobby, with Bush administration
connivance, pressured the interim government of Iraq
into suspending purchases of Australian wheat on the
pretext of punishing the Wheat Board’s kickbacks to
Saddam Hussein’s henchmen during the UN sanctions
regime. “So much for the coalition of the willing,” a
Canberran insider was quoted as saying.1
Moreover, renewing egregious subsidies to
U.S. agriculture is almost certain to be the price the
Bush administration will have to pay in order to
gain congressional extension of its fast-track trade
negotiating authority, which is due to expire during
the first half of 2007. Howls of outrage by Australian
agricultural interests and demands for retaliation will
follow.
It is self-evident, however, that developments in
Iraq and Afghanistan will be the main determinant of
American politics during the next 2 years. Plausible
scenarios range from bad to horrible. That Iraq and
Afghanistan could be transformed into liberal—or at
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least more or less stable—democracies, as Bush and
his associates repeatedly promised (echoed by John
Howard), were never serious possibilities. The sine qua
non of a liberal or stable democracy is a well-articulated,
internally accommodative, and relatively secure
political elite.2 No such democracy has ever emerged
without the formation of such an elite, and the odds
that one would form in Iraq and/or Afghanistan—or
that it could be imposed by occupying forces—have
always been negligible. Numerous small and weakly
articulated elite groups vie for the leadership of both
countries’ clashing religious sects, tribes, ethnic groups,
and regions. These discordant and disorganized elites
had radically different experiences of the Baathist and
Taliban regimes, ranging from profitable association
to murderous subjugation to forced emigration
overseas. Elite groups in both countries distrust and
despise each other, and they lack any experience of
cooperating peacefully in political matters. In short,
it always was unrealistic to believe that post-Saddam
and post-Taliban elites in either country could reach
the basic accommodation that is a stable democracy’s
main foundation.
There are, instead, just three realistic scenarios.
One is that the splintered elites will establish separate
political entities after much bloodshed and population
resettlement. Practically speaking, Iraq and Afghanistan
will cease to exist. The second is that a faction or
narrow coalition of factions, backed by militias in Iraq
and warlords in Afghanistan, will create authoritarian
regimes, almost certainly with a hard theocratic edge,
bearing no more resemblance to a liberal or stable
democracy than did the Baathist and Taliban regimes.
The third possibility is that unchecked civil wars will be
fought until the contending sides, waist-deep in blood,
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decide they have had enough. There is, I suppose, a
fourth scenario: all of the above.
As one or a combination of these grim scenarios
unfolds during the next 2 years, how will American
politics and, indirectly, the relationship with Australia
be affected? The Bush administration now admits that
the struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially in
Iraq, will be long and hard, so that hopes for early and
reasonably satisfactory outcomes are unrealistic. But it
insists that the United States must stay the course if
global terrorism is to be stopped before it again reaches
American shores. The political shelf life of this no
doubt sincerely held view is not long-lasting, however.
With Democrats controlling both houses of Congress
beginning in January 2007, their demands, backed by
the power of appropriations, for an early and large
troop withdrawal from Iraq will be irresistible.
The severe military manpower costs of the Iraq and
Afghanistan occupations—amounting to roughly a
battalion each month in dead, wounded, and otherwise
incapacitated personnel—will not be sustainable
beyond the first half of 2007 without recalling National
Guard units to active duty or sending exhausted
regular Army and Marine units back for fourth and
even fifth combat tours. Moreover, Great Britain, Italy,
and Poland have all announced impending Troop
reductions or pull-outs in Iraq.3
In Afghanistan, the planned drawdown of
American troops from 23,000 to 16,000 has had to be
abandoned, and it is an open question how long NATO
governments can tolerate politically the casualties that
are being inflicted on their forces by the resurgent
Taliban. Of relevance here is Australia’s contribution
of a small force to assist the UN reconstruction effort
in Afghanistan, accompanied by a special forces unit.
It is quite conceivable that casualties suffered by these
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units, in combination with demands on the Australian
Defense Force (ADF) in East Timor and elsewhere in
Australia’s neighborhood, will require terminating
this contribution sooner rather than later.
The Outlook After 2008.
However, my crystal ball for how American
politics will affect the relationship after 2008 is as
cloudy as anyone’s. But I can discern no panic button
that will need to be pressed. Despite the divisive Iraq
and Afghanistan imbroglios, American political elites
still hold to a relatively shared view of U.S. interests
and responsibilities, and these include keeping the
relationship with Australia in good order. Although the
bulk of elites have concluded that the Iraq undertaking
was a grievous mistake, few top leaders have broken
decisively with the Bush administration’s insistence
that a precipitous withdrawal would damage U.S.
interests even more.
To be sure, unwillingness to condemn the Iraq
venture root and branch—Senators Kerry and Feingold
have been outspoken exceptions—derives more from
an inability to identify a plausible alternative than
from a belief that it will ultimately succeed. But on
the whole, U.S. political elites recognize that simply
scuttling the Iraq effort entails unacceptable risks. They
comprehend the predicament that the administration
has gotten itself into, and as a result most still pull
their political punches. The deep elite cleavage that
developed over the Vietnam War has not, at least not
yet, been duplicated, however angry most leaders are
at Bush and his entourage for having gotten the United
States into the Iraq pickle.
The Bush administration’s more clearly multilateral
foreign policy thrust during its second term contributes
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to keeping the political elites at least somewhat
subdued. Condoleezza Rice, Robert Zoellick (now
departed), and Undersecretary of State Nicolas Burns—
assisted, one deduces, by Rice ally Stephen Hadley at
the National Security Council—have reclaimed from
the Pentagon much of the State Department’s primacy
in foreign policymaking. One indication was the March
2006 revision of the pugnacious 2002 National Security
Strategy. By detailing U.S. intentions to work closely
with Britain, Canada, the European Union, and other
allies, the revision had a more multilateral tone, and
this tended to reassure political leaders who had been
alarmed by the 2002 Strategy’s brazen unilateralism. In
several policy domains—working with European allies
to impede Iran’s nuclear ambitions and with Asian
countries to check North Korea’s brandishing of nuclear
weapons and missiles; launching and participating in
a series of multilateral aid and human rights initiatives
in Africa; seeking to integrate China as a stakeholder
in the global order—the first Bush administration’s
unilateralism is now a dead letter in practice, if not
yet entirely in rhetoric. Indeed, a striking feature of
the second Bush administration’s early years—and
of continuing political elite circumspection in foreign
policy matters—was Rice’s exemption from trenchant
attacks and criticism. Even here, however, accusations
that she was unduly complacent when warned in July
2001, shortly before 9/11, of an impending al-Qai’da
attack on the United States have recently put her more
squarely in the line of political fire.
Depicting American political elites as being well
aware of the dangers that the United States confronts
in Iraq and the wider Middle East, and therefore
being tacitly united in a search for ways to contain
the dangers, is, of course, debatable. Obviously, as
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the alarm bells set off by Israel’s attack on Hezbollah
in Lebanon during July-August 2006 dramatically
affirmed, the situation throughout the Middle East
is extremely volatile. Sectarian civil war rages in
Iraq, largely unchecked by U.S.-led coalition forces
or by the elected Iraqi government hunkered down
in the fortified Green Zone. It remains quite possible
that an ignominious U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and
perhaps also from Afghanistan, will be unavoidable.
On bad news days, now mostly the rule, images of
the Green Zone becoming an American Dien Bien
Phu, or a Saigon-like redoubt from which there is only
helicopter escape, creep into the mind. Were such an
apocalypse to occur, the recriminations about who bore
responsibility for it—Republican lions or Democratic
foxes—would destroy the political elite’s precarious
unity in foreign policy matters. That such images of
disaster cannot be kept entirely at bay indicates how
searing an experience the Iraq war and associated
debacles can be for the elites who formulate, and the
publics who influence, U.S. foreign policy.
The main question about the U.S.-Australia
relationship’s vibrancy after 2008 is how this searing
experience will shape subsequent U.S. actions. In U.S.
foreign policy circles, the neoconservative camp, divided and enfeebled by setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, will have been routed, and its shibboleths
about using American power to spread democracy
and freedom around the world will be ridiculed.
The Democratic Party’s relatively bellicose wing also
will be cowed, with such a leader as Senator Joseph
Lieberman having survived only by running on
the Independent ticket. Populist nationalists of the
Pat Buchanan ilk will crow, seeking to stymie U.S.
involvements in international organizations and multilateral undertakings.
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Unable to fathom what the expenditure of so
much blood and treasure in Iraq and Afghanistan
accomplished, American public opinion will oppose
further boots-on-the-ground commitments in world
trouble spots. And because the damage done to the
U.S. military by the Iraq and Afghanistan occupations
will take years and hundreds of billions of dollars to
repair, the wherewithal for such commitments will be
in short supply. One disaffected Army general recently
estimated it would take 10-20 years and $60 billion just
to repair the damage done before 2006, while a prizewinning economist estimates the Iraq war’s longterm cost at well in excess of a trillion dollars.4 Caspar
Weinberger’s and Colin Powell’s earlier doctrines of
employing overwhelming force with a well thoughtout exit strategy in any military expedition will be
renascent, although the manpower and materiel for
their implementation may be unavailable.
These forecasts appear to equate the Iraq and
Afghanistan aftermaths with that of the Vietnam War
in the 1970s and early 1980s. But the post-Iraq and postAfghanistan world will differ from the world of that
time in important ways. After the Vietnam War, the
bipolar Cold War confrontation between the U.S.-led
West and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
and its satellites continued to ensure a significant
measure of world order for at least a decade. After Iraq
and Afghanistan, by contrast, there will be no such
order-maintaining camps.
Another difference is that there will be many
more failed and failing states in the world than there
were 3 decades ago. This is because developments in
technologies of production and communication have
reduced the capacity of many states to absorb swollen
and exceedingly youthful populations in gainful and
157

needed employment. Collapsing or dangerously weak
states are the result, and they are proliferating in
much of Africa and Oceania, as well as in some of the
Caribbean, the Middle East, and South and Southeast
Asia. In these areas, as John Keegan has observed, “War
is escaping from state control, into the hands of bandits
and anarchists.”5 This trend confronts the United States,
Australia, and all other Western countries with a host
of dangers that range from a tidal wave of migrants
desperately seeking Western shelter to a globalization
of martyrdom in the form of suicidal but lethal attacks
on hated Western bastions of wealth and sacrilege.
How will the U.S.-Australia relationship fare in
this ominous world situation? My guess is that it will
become less global in pretension and reach. After Iraq
and Afghanistan, the United States will be extremely
reluctant to risk venturing into new quagmires, as its
refusal to answer Liberia’s pleas for military help in 2004
and its refusal to deploy even a small force to Darfur in
2006 intimate. Phone calls to Canberra asking Australia
to augment U.S. forces in distant lands will no longer
occur. Speculation about the eventual emergence of
a U.S.- and Europe-led NATO-like force that would
police large parts of the globe, and to which Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan would make important
contributions, strikes me as far-fetched.6
The main lesson learned in Iraq and Afghanistan is
that, short of recolonization over a long period, for which
there is absolutely no U.S. or other Western political
and economic support or wherewithal, states that have
fallen into the hands of bandits and anarchists cannot be
salvaged. As John Mueller concludes in his important
book, The Remnants of War (2004), “[E]xercises in nationbuilding that are productive of peace and order—and
that ultimately will produce results most likely to be
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lasting—will have to be primarily accomplished by
domestic forces” in the failing states themselves.7 This
view resembles the conclusion that some Australian
observers of East Timor’s relapse into civil strife and
breakdown during 2006 began to reach.
My guess, then, is that the relationship will be
altered by disillusionment in both countries with
nation-building efforts and by considerable internal
political opposition to such efforts. The time when the
United States and Australia can act jointly and forcibly
to contain or eradicate distant evils is ending. In its
thrust, the relationship will again be self-consciously
defensive and not significantly proactive. Its military
and intelligence sinews will be kept strong, but more
as a deterrent than as a solvent of troubles far from
American and Australian shores. Meanwhile, the many
cultural, economic, and political affinities on which the
relationship rests will continue to flourish.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8
1. Financial Times, February 14, 2006.
2. John Higley and Michael Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal
Democracies, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
3. Michelle Tan, “Britain reduces troop numbers in Iraq: Italy,
Poland pull out forces,” Army Times, December 11, 2006, p. 11.
4. Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The High Cost of the Iraq War,” Economists’
Voice, The Berkeley Electronic Press, March 2006.
5. John Keegan. “The Threat from Europe.” Spectator, March
24, 2001, p. 39.
6. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Christopher J. Makins Lecture to
The Atlantic Council of the United States, May 31, 2006, p. 9.
7. John Mueller, The Remnants of War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2004, pp. 180-81.

159

CHAPTER 9
AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC OPINION
AND THE AUSTRALIA-U.S. ALLIANCE
Brendon O’Connor
Does America have no better friend than Australia,
as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has proclaimed?1
Should Australia’s relationship with the United States
sensibly be called the “other special relationship,”
implying that Australia, along with the United
Kingdom, is one of America’s two most favored allies?
Or into the future, will “the mission define the coalition,”
with Australia’s favor depending on its commitment
of troops to American-led operations? Reporting on
how the Australian people feel about these questions
is the central quest of this chapter. It examines the
best public opinion data available on the alliance and
more broadly on U.S.-Australia relations to gauge the
current perceptions and opinions of Australians. I
will argue that the data reveal anti-Americanism as a
political undercurrent in Australia, but not one that can
be utilized yet at the political level. I will illustrate this
by examining the anti-American rhetoric vis-à-vis the
lack of success of the prominent Australian politician
Mark Latham.
In many ways the U.S.-Australia alliance is currently
at a high point in its history; and at the broadest security
level, this intimacy enjoys strong public support.
However, on a number of issues, Australians are clearly
uneasy about Australia’s closeness to the current Bush
administration. Public opinion provides comfort to
both pro- and anti-American positions. Although
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Australians are unlikely to support a downgrading of
the alliance and are just as likely to continue consuming
vast quantities of American entertainment, the survey
data suggest anxiety about where America’s global
battles might lead Australia, and what will remain in
the future of a genuinely unique Australian culture
beyond Australian Rules Football and Dame Edna
Everage. It is tempting to see these collective opinions
as inchoate and dismiss them as ultimately marginal
in the world of foreign and military affairs, which
generally has been the preserve of elites. However, there
is emerging evidence that public opinion increasingly
matters in international affairs.2 Lastly, public opinion
consciously and subconsciously shapes the rhetoric
of politicians as they try to connect their actions and
intentions with the various currents and undercurrents
of their societies.
What do the opinion polls tell us? Before looking at
the data in detail, it may be useful to dwell briefly on the
manner in which surveys frame their questions. After
all, how an opinion poll asks a question has a substantial
impact on the answer given. A good example of this
is the Lowy Institute Survey titled Australians Speak
2005, which asked Australians two questions. The first
asked: “How important is our alliance with the United
States for Australia’s security,” to which 45 percent
of respondents said “very important” and 27 percent
said “fairly important.” At the same time, respondents
were asked: “Thinking of how much notice Australia
takes of the views of the United States in our foreign
policy, on the whole do you think we take too much,
too little, or the right amount of notice?” to which 68
percent answered “too much” and only 2 percent said
“too little.”
From this data, it seems fair to claim that most
Australians think Australia’s alliance with the United
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States is important for securing Australia against
potential threats, but at the same time most Australians
want a foreign policy more independent from the
United States. This might be described as wanting
your cake and eating it too, and the contradictions in
this view are only further muddied by the wording
in the question on the importance of the alliance.
For example, with the question “How important is
our alliance with the United States for Australia’s
security?” a respondent who answers “important” may
not be expressing a preference for a strong alliance in
the future, but simply answering that the alliance is
important at the present time. Also, the question does
not allow the respondent to express a preference for a
different type of alliance. This may account for why a
majority can say the alliance is important, but that they
also want a foreign policy more independent from the
United States.
Supporters of the U.S.-Australia alliance allege that
a large percentage of Australians endorse Australia’s
security alliance with the United States and say their
claim is supported by opinion polls. This is true in
a broad sense, with up to 85 percent of Australians
agreeing that the alliance is important for Australia’s
security.3 Possibly the best polling data we have on
Australian attitudes regarding security is the Australian
Electoral Survey (AES), which since its inception in 1993
has questioned voters on the U.S.-Australia alliance.
See Figure 1 for election poll responses to the question,
“How important do you think the Australian alliance
with the United States under the ANZUS [AustralianNew Zealand-U.S.] treaty is for protecting Australia’s
security?”4
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Percent
1 Very important

45.3

2 Fairly important

39.2

3 Not very important

12.2

4 Not at all important
Total

3.3
100.0

Figure 1. AES 2004 Election Poll.
The AES question on the alliance’s importance
is framed in the same leading manner as the Lowy
Institute question on the alliance. It seems fair to say,
then, that while the alliance is supported by a majority
of Australians, ongoing support is probably less than
the 84.5 percent shown in Figure 1. For a longitudinal
view of Australian public support of the ANZUS
alliance, see Figure 2. The AES has expanded its
polling more recently to include a separate survey of
political candidates. This data, represented in Figures
3 and 4, shows that candidates from the Coalition and
the Labor party are strongly supportive of the alliance
in a largely bipartisan manner. See Figure 3 for survey
results on the question, “How important do you think
the Australian alliance with the United States under the
ANZUS treaty is for protecting Australia’s security?”
See Figure 4 for survey results on the question, “If
Australia’s security were threatened by some other
country, how much trust do you feel Australia can have
in the United States to come Australia’s defence?”
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Figure 2. AES Data Showing Importance
of the ANZUS alliance, 1993-2004
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Figure 4. AES Data 1993-2004, Trust in United States
Coming to Australia’s Defense.
(Percent Who Say “Great Deal”)

Interestingly, in 2001 voters showed marginally
stronger support for the alliance than candidates, and
they also had greater trust in the United States coming
to Australia’s aid in a military crisis. However, by 2004
there was a reversal, along with a greater divergence
between candidate and voter opinion. This was largely
due to 89 percent of Coalition candidates stating that
the alliance was very important. This hardening of
support for the alliance among Coalition candidates
reflected the agreement by their political parties to
commit troops to the war in Iraq.
Polls on broader topics relating to how America and
Americans are perceived in Australia have produced
much more mixed results than the generally very
positive attitude to the specific issue of U.S.-Australia
security relations discussed thus far. Possibly the
contradictory nature of some of this opinion allows it
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largely to be ignored by Australian politicians. However, results from a survey such as the aforementioned
Lowy Institute’s Australians Speak 2005 occasionally
ring alarm bells. The survey found that Australians had
more negative attitudes toward America than they did
toward China, France, Malaysia, or Japan. See Figure 5
for survey responses to the question, “When you think
about the following countries, groups or regions of the
world, do you have positive or negative feelings about
them?”5
New Zealand
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86
85
84
83

Europe
Japan
Singapore
China
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60
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100

Positive feelings

Figure 5. Data From Lowy Institute’s
Australians Speak 2005,
Positive Feelings for Various Nations
(Percent Holding Positive Feelings).
These results seem at first quite amazing, with
Australians choosing to view nations such as China
and Malaysia more positively than their strongest ally
of the last 50 years. At the time, some commentators
complained about the methodology of the Lowy
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Survey, saying that the results were aberrant.6
However, other surveys, including a 2005 British
Broadcasting Company (BBC) poll that included
Australians, show similarly negative feelings toward
the United States. When Australians were asked in
the BBC survey whether U.S. influence in the world
was “mainly negative or mainly positive,” 60 percent
answered “mainly negative,” a result similar to the
French response. Australians also had responded
in a similarly negative fashion when polled on the
same question in 2003, reflecting the globally negative
attitudes toward the United States following the Bush
administration’s decision to invade Iraq.7
Countervailing evidence can also be found,
however: on the eve of the 2004 U.S. Presidential
elections, Australians took a more positive attitude
toward Bush than did the Canadians, French, Germans,
Italians, Japanese, Russians, Spaniards, or Britons. That
said, this still equates to only 43 percent of Australians
having a somewhat positive or very positive view of
Bush.8 Like most other nations in a 2004 Globescan/
Guardian survey, Australians said they preferred Kerry
over Bush in the 2004 election.
For those looking for further comparative data, the
2003 11-nation BBC/ABC/CBS survey titled “What the
World Thinks of America” offers the best sampling on
a wide range of topics. The results show Australians to
have attitudes on U.S. foreign policy similar to those
of the Canadians and Britons. Opinions, although
generally critical, are less dismissive than those of
the French, Indonesians, or Jordanians. However,
when it comes to the influence of Americanization, of
American television culture, and of American food on
their society, Australians are more critical than Britons
and Canadians. In fact, on these issues the Australian
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numbers are as critical as those of the French; however,
it seems fair to assume that the tone and nature of
the concerns in Australia is likely to be somewhat
different.
The general turn against American foreign policy
across the globe, consistently documented by the Pew
surveys in recent years, also was reflected in a 2003 BBC
survey in which the majority of Australians said they
disagreed rather than agreed with American policies
on global warming, nuclear proliferation, world
poverty, and Israel and Palestine. This may reflect a
growing global trend of instinctively not trusting
American motives abroad.9 However, it is significant
that in all of these policy arenas, a significant minority
of Australians said they “don’t know” whether they
agree or disagree with American policies. The only
area where a majority of Australians agreed with the
U.S. response was on “terrorism,” support shared by
most of the nations surveyed.
On cultural issues and Americanization, the
Australian responses make curious reading, seeming to
mirror the guilt of habitual cigarette smokers—unlikely
to change their behavior any time soon but nevertheless
in the dark of the night worrying about its long-term
consequences. When asked, “Do you think over time
this country is becoming more like America or less like
America,” 81 percent of Australians answered “more,”
whereas only 52 percent of Canadians answered
“more.” When asked, “Do you think that the influence
of American consumer products and entertainment in
your country is too great,” 68 percent of Australians
as opposed to 44 percent of Canadians and Britons
answered “too great.”
It would appear that Australians are becoming
increasingly Americanized, though 42 percent of
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Australians profess to “dislike” American television
(a perusal of primetime television in Australia any
given night thus would suggest that a large number
of Australian viewers are masochists). Only 21 percent
of Canadians said they “dislike” American television.
Adding insult to injury, 51 percent of Australians said
they “dislike” American food, as opposed to 32 percent
of Canadians and 36 percent of Britons. Any American
who has witnessed question time in the Australian
federal parliament might also find it curious that 63
percent of Australians considered Australia “more
cultured than America.” Americans also might find
it hard to believe that only 1 percent of Australians
thought that overall America is a better place to live
than their own country. This was the lowest response
in the 11-nation survey, with even 7 percent of the
French and 15 percent of the Britons believing America
to be a better place to live than their own homelands.
These survey results reflect tensions within the
Australian identity: Australians consume American
culture voraciously, but still seem to have an underlying
sense that Australia is ultimately the better place of the
two. Like the people of many other nations, Australians
see themselves as at least the cultural equal of America
and are therefore perplexed by how it is that the United
States and its culture have come to hold such attraction
around the world.
Nonetheless, while most Australians still want
America’s protection from security threats abroad, on
a more specific level they find it hard to agree with
many of the Bush administration’s foreign policies,
particularly in regard to Iraq. They are not alone in
their opinions as even the American public increasingly
shares their anxieties about these policies.
As the work of John Zaller10 and others reminds
us, public opinion is fickle, and politicians realize this.
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Making voting predictions or policy prescriptions based
on the statistics reviewed above would be fraught with
risk. The opinions declared are contradictory of some
of the other views firmly expressed, suggesting that
positions in certain cases may be transitory. In general,
Australian opinion reflects the global trend of concern
about the direction of recent U.S. foreign policy.
However, the cultural anxieties presented here are
complex and not easily linked to foreign policymaking.
Furthermore, these anxieties may coexist with positive
views of the American war on terror and of Australia’s
military alliance with the United States.
This facility for holding negative views toward the
United States while at the same time supporting the
alliance is evidenced in the Lowy survey, where a slim
majority of those who have a negative opinion of the
United States also think Australia’s security alliance
with the United States is important. However, there
are indications from the Lowy survey that Australians
already have some tipping point issues that could cause
them to rethink support for the alliance. For example,
72 percent of respondents in the survey disagreed with
the proposition that “Australia should act in accordance
with our security alliance with the United States even
if it means following them to war with China over the
independence of Taiwan.”
The opinions discussed above present challenges
for those who want to see a continuing strong political
relationship between the United States and Australia.
The Australians Speak 2005 survey is rumored to have
worried prominent Australians living in the United
States, prompting them to want to see more done
about educating Australians about the United States.
The recent announcement that the American Australia
Association and the Australian government will fund a
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new American studies center in Australia to the tune of
25 million Australian dollars is an obvious response to
these concerns. Whether this center will be successful is
hard to tell; some have argued that anti-Americanism
is one of the few prejudices that intensifies as the
level of one’s university education rises. Furthermore,
such a venture failed in the 1990s at the University of
Sydney.
The Anti-American Challenge.
Could anti-Americanism, or more specifically the
alliance, be a significant issue in an Australian federal
election? With the two current leaders of the Liberal
Party and Australian Labor Party (ALP) at the helm,
this seems unlikely: both are strong alliance supporters.
However, many ALP branch members and certain
individuals and factions within the ALP are skeptical
of the alliance generally and deeply concerned at the
close relationship Howard has forged with the Bush
administration. These critics generally have greater
faith in the United Nations and multilateral agreements
than the current government, and admire the position
taken by the Germans, French, and New Zealanders
toward the Bush administration. Open political debate
on these questions is much more limited in Australia
than in most other western nations, in part because of
the overwhelming support the U.S.-Australia alliance
enjoys with the leadership of the two major political
parties.
However, if a Mark Latham-led ALP government
had succeeded in 2004, we may have had a very
different relationship between the governments of
Australia and America. For a good deal of 2004, the
ALP led the Coalition government in opinion polling,
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with ALP leader Latham’s own personal ratings in
polls generally very strong. Before becoming leader of
the ALP, Latham, in a parliamentary attack on a U.S.led war in Iraq in February 2003, had described Bush
as the “most incompetent and dangerous president in
living memory.” Latham stated that “President Bush’s
foreign policy looks more like American imperialism
than a well thought-through and resourced strategy to
eliminate terrorists.” He dismissed Howard as a “yesman to a flaky and dangerous American president.”11
These remarks and others by ALP politicians
prompted U.S. Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer
to briefly enter the political fray and express his
disapproval of the ALP rhetoric.12 This entry into
domestic Australian politics by a foreign diplomat was
unfortunate; Schieffer temporarily retreated, but later
publicly criticized Latham’s 2004 pledge that Australian
troops in Iraq would be home by Christmas if Labor
won that year’s federal election. For his part, Latham,
on becoming the leader of the ALP, was quick to praise
the U.S.-Australia alliance publicly.13 However, as his
published diaries later revealed, in private he held an
extremely negative view of the alliance. Arguably, his
decision to withhold his real views from the public
reflects the power the alliance ultimately holds in
Australian elite politics.
Latham’s career is not always easy to make sense
of, particularly given his personal style and the
resentments he harbored as displayed in their full
glory in the Latham Diaries published in 2005 after
he had quit the federal parliament. Describing Mark
Latham to Americans is always interesting, given how
critical he was of the Bush administration. On one hand
he had much in common with the outsider style of
Howard Dean. Latham’s temperament also has obvious
173

similarities to Dean’s, with Latham having regular “I
had a scream”14 moments. On the other hand, Latham
was a great admirer of Richard Nixon, whose portrait
hung on his parliamentary office wall and whom he
regularly identifies with in the Latham Diaries. In sum,
Latham was a maverick, but one who deep down
identified with what could be called an anti-American
position on Australian alliance relations.
To be fair, Latham did not make Iraq or the alliance
with the United States a central issue in the ALP’s 2004
election campaign; his pledge to have troops home
by Christmas was made in April 2004, well before the
federal election. This early announcement possibly was
timed precisely so it would not be a central issue in
the federal election scheduled for later that year. Most
of Latham’s more inflammatory public remarks about
the Bush administration were made before he became
leader of the ALP on December 2, 2003.
In 2004, Latham tended to play his political cards
more cautiously. After his troop-withdrawal pledge
was publicly condemned by President Bush in a joint
press conference with John Howard on the White House
lawn in June 2004, Latham might have been tempted to
adopt a more critical position on the Bush administration and its interference in Australian domestic politics.
The risks would have been high, however, in terms of
public opinion and how the conservative-dominated
Australian print media would have reacted to such a
decision. Latham also was criticized by Colin Powell
and Richard Armitage, with the latter going so far as to
claim that Latham’s position on the Iraq war threatened
the free trade agreement between the two countries.
Armitage also pointedly asked Australians to consider
life without the defense shield America provides.15
However, as Latham biographer Bernard Lagan
contends, ALP polling showed that threatening
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Australia’s defense alliance with America “would
be electoral poison for Latham.”16 It seems that such
polls and the counsel of his foreign affairs spokesman
dissuaded Latham as opposition leader from criticizing
the alliance. However, as Prime Minister, Latham’s
confessed negativity about the alliance could well have
come to the fore.
The public reaction to such negativity, and Latham’s
general direction as a Prime Minister had he been
elected, are both difficult to divine. It is hard to know
how much store to place in the Latham Diaries because
they were written, and probably reconstructed, by
a frustrated individual who completely cut his ties
with the ALP in 2005 and dramatically abandoned
parliament. In his diaries, Latham is extremely critical
of his former colleagues, particularly Kim Beazley
and Kevin Rudd. Of Rudd, he all but calls him the
Maryland candidate with “some missing periods in his
[curriculum vitae].”17 On the alliance more specifically,
he is also dismissive. He calls it “the last manifestation
of the White Australia mentality. Sacrificing Australian
pride and independence. . . .”18 Without any justification
offered, he calculates that “the Americans need us
more than we need them” and that New Zealand has
the right policy on the United States.19 These comments
would have their supporters within the academy and
within segments of the ALP and the electorate in
general; however, they are far from being mainstream
views, as the polls suggest. At present, such views are
voiced in the Australian federal parliament only by
the Greens (and maybe a few of the Democrats), but
certainly not the current ALP leadership.
However, could they become part of the postHoward policy response to the U.S.-Australia alliance?
This seems possible although not likely. The public
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seems comfortable enough to hear politicians criticize
the Bush administration and the Americanization
of Australian public policy and culture, but the data
suggest that Australians would be uncomfortable with
a politician who seriously jeopardized the alliance.
In summary, Latham’s views on the alliance
are politically aberrant within elite circles, despite
representing the attitudes of a sizable minority of
the Australian populace. Concerns about the alliance
more generally play into a band of Australian
nationalism that is agitating for Australia to find a
more independent voice or less pro-American voice.
This nationalism is a work in progress, with public
discourse and the politicians at the helm making
quite significant rhetorical shifts during the evolution
from the Keating government to that of Howard.
This volatility makes the future shape of Australian
nationalism and the role of the alliance within it difficult
to predict with confidence. What does seem reasonable
to predict, in the short term at least, is that unless Kim
Beazley and Kevin Rudd depart from their respective
positions as ALP leader and foreign affairs spokesman,
skepticism or outright antipathy toward the AustraliaAmerican alliance will remain a largely marginalized
undercurrent of Australian political life.
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PANEL IV
ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS ASPECTS
OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
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CHAPTER 10
PANEL IV CHAIRMAN’S INTRODUCTION
Brendan Taylor
Economic and business factors relate to alliance
politics in a number of ways. On the one hand, they
often can act as the glue that helps to hold alliance
relationships together. A number of studies, for
instance, identify a strong correlation between alliance
structures and trading patterns.1 The United States,
in particular, has in recent years either negotiated or
begun negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with
a number of it close friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific
region—including Australia, Singapore, Thailand (with
much difficulty), and most recently South Korea—
partly as a reward for the support these countries have
provided during the so-called Long War. At the same
time, however, economic and business factors also can
undermine even the closest alliance relationships. There
is perhaps no better example of this than the period of
severe trade tensions between Washington and Tokyo
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which shook that
bilateral security relationship to its very core.2
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the
economic and business aspects of the U.S.-Australia
alliance traditionally have been among the least studied
and understood dimensions of that relationship. With
few exceptions,3 the Australia-United States Free
Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) is the only economic and
business-related aspect of the special relationship to
have been subjected to serious analytical attention in
recent years.4 This is so notwithstanding the obvious
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degree of interconnectedness—one might even go
so far as to describe it as interdependence—between
the economic and business aspects of the special
relationship and the range of other political, legal, and
strategic dimensions of that relationship considered in
this volume. For this reason alone, Leif Rosenberger’s
and Don Russell’s chapters (Chapters 11 and 12,
respectively) mark important contributions to the
already substantial and still expanding body of work
on the U.S.-Australia alliance.
If one accepts the proposition that economic
and business factors can impact alliance cohesion
negatively, then at least four issues emerge from
Rosenberger’s and Russell’s analyses. First and
foremost is the increasing divergence in American
and Australian approaches to China’s economic
rise—a divergence which, interestingly, is evident
in Rosenberger’s and Russell’s contributions to
this volume. Although this noticeable gap between
Australian optimism and American ambivalence is
unlikely to fracture the alliance completely, at least over
the short-to-medium term, it can on occasion create
disharmony and misunderstanding between Canberra
and Washington. During a joint press conference in
June 2005, for example, President George W. Bush
alluded to differences between the United States and
China over issues of values, particularly in relation to
freedom of worship, which prompted an immediate
reply from Prime Minister John Howard that the SinoAustralian relationship was mature enough to ride
through temporary arguments over human rights,
and that he remained “unashamed” in developing
Australia’s economic relations with China.5 Likewise,
Foreign Minister Hon. Alexander Downer’s August
2004 comments on the questionable applicability of
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the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) treaty to
a Taiwan Straits contingency may be seen as a direct
manifestation of Canberra’s differing perceptions
regarding the nature and level of importance assigned
to its economic relationship with China.6
Second, concerns are beginning to mount in
Washington regarding the political and strategic
implications of the new commercial relationships
that China is forging with traditionally close friends
of the United States, including Australia. Washington
certainly is attuned to the symbolism of having one of
its nearest and dearest allies seduced into the Chinese
embrace and to the message this potentially could
send to America’s other Asia-Pacific security partners.
Beyond this symbolic aspect, however, U.S. concerns
also pertain to the broader geopolitical ramifications of
China’s growing energy ties with Australia. Referring
specifically to the Sino-Australian relationship, for
instance, a widely-cited National Intelligence Council
report forecasts that “the relationship between gas
suppliers and consumers is likely to be particularly
strong because of the restrictions on delivery
mechanisms,” and that this will have the effect of
“reinforc[ing] regional alliances.”7 Because of China’s
poor proliferation record—and despite assurances
to the contrary from the Howard government—
Washington is also somewhat uneasy with the recent
signing of a nuclear safeguards treaty between Canberra and Beijing, which has paved the way for the
export of Australian uranium to China for peaceful
purposes.
Third is the sustainability of increased defense
expenditures made possible by trade with China. One
of the great ironies of this burgeoning Sino-Australian
engagement, of course, is the indirect financial
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contribution it is making toward enabling the most
significant upgrading of Australia’s defense forces in
at least 4 decades. As Rosenberger observes, however,
serious questions remain as to the longer-term life
expectancy of the associated rise in Australian defense
outlays. In addition to this concern, Australia’s growing
technological dependence upon the United States also
promises to have significant financial implications—
as the escalating cost of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
project already demonstrates.8
To be sure, in the absence of its special relationship
with the United States, Australia almost certainly would
have to spend significantly more than the 1.9 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) that it currently spends
for defense. That said, whether Canberra can afford to
conceive of its defense requirements indefinitely in the
comprehensive manner it presently does—partly in
response to the expectations of its American ally—or
whether some of those requirements ultimately will
have to be underwritten at the expense of others, will
become an issue of growing importance in the future
of the special relationship.
Fourth, public perceptions of the economic and
business aspects of the special relationship do not
augur well, particularly on the Australian side. After
much initial hype, for instance, Australian news media
coverage of the AUSFTA has been predominantly
critical.9 While, as earlier chapters of this volume have
shown, rising anti-American sentiment is a complex
phenomenon that generally is not attributable to any
single causal factor, the negative press coverage of
the AUSFTA certainly has done little to assuage the
popular perception that Australia has received little in
return for its loyalty as shown in the Long War. The
simmering political debate in Canberra over whether
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Australia should commit to purchasing the JSF in light
of unit cost increases and delivery delays likely will
add fuel to this fire, particularly in the lead-up to the
2008 deadline by which Canberra is required to reach
a final decision.10
While it is certainly true that governments during
the post-Cold War era have had greater latitude to
pursue commercial interests free from the shackles of
strategic allegiance, it is still worth recalling here that
America’s surprisingly resilient network of bilateral
alliances in the Asia-Pacific was forged initially through
an unusual political bargain wherein Washington
offered its junior partners substantial economic benefits
in return for asymmetrical security concessions.11 As
Kent Calder concludes, however, a key variable in the
continued persistence of this system in general—and for
the U.S.-Australia special relationship in particular—is
whether there will be “leaders with the vision . . . to
look beyond the immediate future to forge a renewed
strategic bargain, as their forebears did so ably more
than half a century ago.”12
On the road to that renewed strategic bargain, what
steps might usefully be taken to strengthen and sustain
the special relationship? Three recommendations
of direct relevance to the economic and business
dimensions of that relationship are offered:
• Greater time, energy, and resources need to
be devoted to studying the economic and
business aspects of the special relationship.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter,
economic and business factors relate to alliance
politics in multiple ways. Yet insufficient
analytical attention has thus far been given to
understanding and explaining the dynamics of
these numerous economics-security linkages as
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they are manifested in the context of the special
relationship. If the proposition that economic
and business factors can impact negatively upon
alliance cohesion is to be taken seriously, then
this deficiency requires urgent rectification.
• The precise nature and potential strategic
implications of growing Sino-Australian interdependence also needs to be studied much
more assiduously. Apparently seduced by
the attractive commercial and political opportunities presented by China’s economic rise, the
Howard Government has spent little time
(publicly at least) dwelling upon the potentially
negative geopolitical implications of China’s
growing energy ties with Australia. Interestingly,
however, Russell’s chapter suggests that deepening Sino-Australian interdependence is by
no means a one-way street, and that China’s
growing resource dependence actually might
constitute a potential source of leverage for
Australia. This novel observation certainly
warrants further exploration, if only to address
Washington’s growing concerns regarding
China’s deepening commercial ties with close
American friends and allies such as Australia.
• Greater sensitivity needs to be shown towards
public perceptions of the economic and
business aspects of the special relationship,
particularly from the American side. The
ongoing implementation of the AUSFTA and
the progress of the JSF project each threaten
to have a corrosive effect on Australian public
perceptions of the United States if not handled
carefully. As Russell suggests, however, greater
efforts also are needed on Australia’s part to
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better understand America’s distinctive trade
negotiation techniques and to exploit the existing
provisions of the AUSFTA in the interests of
maximizing its potential benefit to Australia.
While, in the final analysis, the pending
establishment of a dedicated U.S. Studies Center
in Australia certainly will go some way toward
realizing greater American sensitivity to the
feelings of its ally down under,13 achievement
of greater understanding by Australia will
necessitate a shift in its bureaucratic culture
which appears—for reasons articulated by
Russell—rather unlikely.
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CHAPTER 11
THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA:
COMPETING ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
Leif Rosenberger
INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the U.S.-Australian alliance has
never been stronger.1 Australia demonstrated its
unwavering commitment to the United States
immediately after the terrorist attack on September
11, 2001 (9/11), on the World Trade Center in New
York City. Australian soldiers are fighting shoulder
to shoulder with U.S. military forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In fact, Australia remains America’s most
steadfast Asian ally in support of U.S.-led operations
in Iraq. U.S. President George W. Bush and Australian
Prime Minister John Howard are known to be close
personally.2 On the commercial front, the United States
and Australia recently celebrated the first anniversary
of the U.S.-Australian free trade agreement (AUSFTA).
In addition, American and Australian businessmen
have close and extensive ties.3
Nevertheless, the United States and Australia
are facing some immediate economic challenges and
several potentially difficult ones over the horizon that
will test the resiliency of the relationship. This chapter
explores the nature and extent of these economic
and financial challenges. It begins with a look at the
contrasting ways the United States and Australia view
the economic rise of China. On balance, Washington
today views China as more of a commercial threat. In
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contrast, most Australians view China as a commercial
blessing critical to a booming Australian economic
performance.
In terms of U.S.-Australian bilateral trade,
Australians have reason to view the initial phase
of USAFTA as the big buildup for the big letdown.
After a year, U.S. merchandise exports were up,
Australian exports were down. But even if the costs
and benefits could somehow be equalized, I explain
in this chapter why the mishmash of bilateral free
trade agreements elsewhere actually reduces global
free trade, undermines efficient international business
models, and is an expensive throwback to the days
when each product was built 100 percent in one place.
Despite the collapse of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) global trade talks, the world needs a coherent
global FTA more than ever, rather than a hodgepodge
of bilateral FTAs that undercut each other.
While the pervasive Australian view of trade with
China is overwhelmingly positive, a few Australians
see limits to shared prosperity with China even in the
robust energy sector. In addition, a few Australians
see China as a commercial threat to at least some of
its industries. In this sense, there may be some small
convergence among a small segment of Australian
businessmen and a larger group of Americans about a
perceived Chinese commercial threat.
Interestingly enough, U.S. and Australian responses
to China’s commercial challenges are strikingly
different. Australia, possessing a relatively small
economy, chooses to compete with rather than retreat
from Chinese commercial products. In contrast, the
U.S. superpower is quick to blame China for its huge
trade deficit, looks for ways to retaliate, and if need be
retreats into protectionism rather than competes with
China.
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The chapter then looks at the different ways the
United States and Australia deal with China in the
closely related energy sector. In general, the pervasive
Aussie view is that Australia benefits from the shared
prosperity generated by trade in China’s energy
sector, while the United States is more nationalistic
and feels threatened by it. But again, a few Australians
are discovering there are limits to what Australia can
expect to receive from the Chinese market even in the
booming resource area, especially when it comes to
liquid natural gas (LNG).
Finally, the chapter looks at two potentially difficult
issues that could challenge the U.S.-Australian special
relationship on down the road. Regarding the first
issue, the chapter explores the economic and financial
components of Australia’s response to the rise of violent
extremism. As such extremism erupts in Australia’s
back yard, Canberra may no longer have the luxury
of satisfying rising U.S. expectations for steadfast
Australian support in far-flung areas of the world. In
addition to where Australia chooses to address violent
extremism Canberra needs to decide how it will deal
with the problem. Will Prime Minster Howard keep
taking his cue from President Bush, who basically sees
the world divided between good and evil? What’s the
best way to deal with terrorists in Iraq, Afghanistan, or
anywhere else?
The Bush administration says the forces of freedom
and democracy need to confront terrorism with
counterviolence, and they will back down. Many
Asian leaders argue that this is the wrong way to deal
with violent extremism. They ask different questions:
Why are these people so frustrated that they need to
resort to violence to change the status quo? What are
their grievances? How can we address the social and
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economic conditions that foster violent extremism and
reduce their demand for violence? Australia’s view is
not the same as America’s view. But as to the particular
issues on which Australia will take a stand, it remains
to be seen.
With regard to the second issue, the chapter looks at
the ongoing economic and financial instability in New
Zealand. Canberra cares deeply about New Zealand’s
fate. New Zealand’s economic and financial problems
could threaten Australia if not handled properly.
Frankly, the United States has its hands full trying
to dig out of extraordinarily expensive black holes in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Lebanon. In this sense,
the United States and Australia have totally different
national interests when it comes to New Zealand.
What’s arguably vital to Australia’s prosperity is
tertiary at best to the increasingly embattled and
overextended U.S. superpower.
ECONOMIC RISE OF CHINA
In an interview marking his 10th anniversary in
office, Prime Minister John Howard highlighted the
rising Sino-Australian economic relationship.4 He said
Australia “would be crazy” not to cultivate its economic
relationship with China. He added that China was
a “huge and valuable market” for Australia. In that
same interview, Howard brushed aside American
concerns over Sino-Australian ties. He underscored
that Australia would “not go overboard” with China.
That said, Howard rolled out the red carpet for Chinese
officials in Australia. And Beijing did much the same
when Howard visited China in late June and early July
2006.
Of course, President Bush also knows how to roll
out the red carpet, which he did for Japanese Prime
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Minister Koizumi in June 2006. In contrast, Bush’s
treatment of Chinese President Hu was distinctly
muted during his visit in April 2006. Moreover,
Michael Green, former NSC Director for Asia, and
China expert Bates Gill criticized the Bush-Hu meeting
as being form over substance at a time when a serious
summit was desperately needed to reconcile divisive
U.S.-Chinese issues.5 Even the form of the meeting was
troubled. The Bush administration refused to classify it
as a “state” visit, instead calling it a “working lunch.”
Beijing was justifiably offended, feeling it deserved
the kind of political treatment commensurate with its
status as a major global economy.
China now has almost $1 trillion in foreign reserves.
Most of these Chinese reserves are denominated in
U.S. dollar obligations that allow the United States, on
such borrowed money, to pursue the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the war on terrorists without raising
taxes and without any sacrifice for the American
consumer. China also is a major trading partner of the
United States. Chinese political leaders have every right
to ask: Where is the gratitude? And in an administration
that carefully choreographs every detail and every
person invited to the White House, Hu was subjected
to prolonged heckling by a Falun Gong protester at the
opening ceremony. Even worse was the introduction
of the Chinese national anthem as that of the “Republic
of China,” the formal name for Taiwan. In short, Hu
did not receive the consideration he deserved.
To be fair, Hu did get to meet Bill Gates, Chairman
and founder of Microsoft and the richest man in the
world. In fact, Hu spent much time with members of
the U.S. business community, reflecting China’s interest
in advancing the already huge U.S.-China commercial
relationship. Go into any Wal-Mart, and you will see
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that the store is flooded with products made in China,
a fact now much discussed among U.S. shoppers. In
this regard, China will soon overtake Japan as the
America’s third-biggest export market. U.S. exports
to China rose nearly 37 percent in the first 5 months
of 2006 from a year earlier.6 Furthermore, American
companies operating in China had another year of
strong profits in 2005, with U.S.-affiliated companies
enjoying record earnings of $3.2 billion.
That said, corporate America goes out of its way to
hide its successes in China. Why hide a U.S. corporate
success story? U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce for
International Trade Franklin Lavin says the U.S. export
strength tends to get “washed out of people’s minds”
because imports from China are so much larger.7 The
United States reported an $82 billion trade deficit with
China for the first 5 months of 2006. The news media
are quick to bash China for this imbalance. CNN’s Lou
Dobbs frequently criticizes U.S. corporations that are
allegedly exporting U.S. jobs to China. Given all this
negative publicity in the United States about the China
link to outsourcing and manufacturing job losses, it
makes U.S. corporations unpopular if they talk about
doing well in China. Such economic nationalism has
taken its toll on U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in
China, which dropped 22.3 percent in 2005 from $3.9
billion in 2004 to $3 billion in 2005.
In contrast, Australian exports of raw materials to
China create jobs in Australia and is thus a political
winner. U.S. commercial relations with China, however,
is, as we saw above, a political loser. Lou Dobbs would
argue that Chinese exports to the United States kill U.S.
jobs. While Bill Gates and Microsoft are big enough to
ignore Lou Dobbs, most U.S. corporations want to fly
under the radar screen and hide their hand in dealing
194

with China. Similarly, Under Secretary Lavin says,
“Politically, strong U.S. exports to China are less salient
since imports [from China] are so high.”8
In this regard, the U.S. trade deficit with China is
never properly understood in the United States. If we
take a broader view, the U.S. trade deficit with all of
Asia has not changed much in the past 10 years. The
United States used to have large trade deficits with
countries like Japan and South Korea. But then China
actually did what the U.S. Government asked it to do.
China opened its economy up to FDI. Now, the final
assembly of products that used to occur in Japan and
South Korea is happening in China. It thus stands to
reason that the so-called Chinese trade surplus has
risen in partial response to this change in final assembly
of foreign products in China. Two-thirds of Chinese
exports are from foreign-funded or wholly-owned
foreign companies based in China. Ninety percent
of Chinese high-tech exports are from these foreign
companies based in China.9
The United States, however, blames the Chinese
trade surplus on China pegging its weak currency to
the U.S. dollar in order to underprice its exports. The
United States argues that the 2.1 percent revaluation
of Chinese currency in July 2005 was a drop in the
bucket. Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsey
Graham threatened to impose a 20-30 percent tariff
on all Chinese goods coming into the United States
unless China revalues by a similar percentage. The
United States threatens to make formal charges of
currency manipulation against China if it refuses to
enact a bigger revaluation. In contrast, Australia is not
about to bite the Chinese hand that buys its exports.
Thus, while the Sino-Australian political economy is
relatively warm and fuzzy, the U.S.-Chinese political
economy is ice cold.
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Sino-Australian Shared Prosperity.
Now let’s carry further the comparison between
the Sino-Australia economic relationship and that of
China and the United States. Australia’s commodity
and service exports to China are booming. In contrast,
the United States is losing the economic high ground
as a principal trader with Australia. Sino-Australian
merchandise trade has skyrocketed 248 percent
between 2000 and 2005. In contrast, U.S.-Australian
trade has been virtually flat—growing only 13 percent
between 2000 and 2005. Five years ago Australia traded
with the United States at double the rate with China.
Today the situation has precisely reversed itself.10 From
a trade perspective, therefore, China is more important
to Australia than is the United States.
China’s emergence as the world’s manufacturing
center largely has been abetted by its trading partner
to the south. Australia is supplying much of the iron
ore, nonferrous metals, coal, and higher education
that fuel China’s industrial revolution. In this regard,
the economic growth of China and its impact on the
world’s demand for resources is the single most
important factor driving Australia’s outstanding export
performance. Aussie exports of natural resources to
China alone surged by 87 percent to $8.3 billion in
2005, with iron ore a good case in point. The tonnage
of Australian exports to China tripled between 2002
and 2005 to 112 million tons. And thanks to China’s
enormous demand, global prices have surged as well.
Prices of Australia’s iron ore increased 71 percent in
2005 with a further 19 percent hike in 2006.11
Thus the continued economic growth in China
provides a vital underpinning for Australia’s trade
performance and economy. Australia’s Reserve Bank
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Governor Ian MacFarlane recently stated that in the
past 3 years, the value of Australia’s trade has increased
by around 30 percent. He pinpointed global demand
for resources and the rise of China as being the driving
factors.12 The economic effects include strong growth
in business investment, rising corporate profits, and an
increase in stock prices. The strong demand from China
has continued in 2006. In the 10 months prior to April
2006, Australian exports to China soared to a value of
14.5 billion in U.S. dollar equivalents, a 42 percent rise
compared to the same period last year.13 The result
is a dilemma for Canberra. It must somehow strike a
balance between its increasingly important commercial
relationship with China and its long-standing security
ties to the United States.
U.S.-Australian Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
To make matters worse for the United States, the
Aussies view the greatly ballyhooed USFTA (that went
into effect on January 1, 2005) as a big dissappointment.14
In 2005, Aussie exports to the United States fell by
4.7 percent while U.S. exports to Australia rose by
5.7 percent.15 But even if the costs and benefits could
somehow be evened out, the FTA must be seen in
the broader context of the bewildering mishmash of
bilateral trade accords that threaten global free trade
and efficient international business models. The “Asian
noodle bowl” of competing, overlapping bilateral and
multilateral trade deals generally hampers rather than
facilitates free trade. The Asian Development Bank
calculates there are 15 trade and investment initiatives
in Asia, all signed since 1998, with a further 20 under
negotiation, and at least 16 more proposed.16 These
trade deals divert trade from one country or region to
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another. Complex clauses, especially those governing
rules of origin, create a bureaucratic tangle that
sometimes zeros out trade altogether.
Bilateral free trade agreements—like the one between the United States and Australia—are inappropriate and obsolete throwbacks to the old days
when a product was built in one factory, under one
roof, and in one country, before it was exported and
sold in another country. Times have changed, and
manufacturing is different these days. Production is
now dispersed across different factories in different
countries. At each stage of production, parts and
materials come from optimized but highly variable
locations. Multiple factories in several different countries are used to keep costs down. This process enables
more locations worldwide to contribute. Countries get
into the game by providing just one or two pieces of the
production value chain. Unfortunately, bilateral trade
agreements like the AUSFTA tend to be discriminatory,
thus distorting and degrading this highly efficient and
democratic global business model.
COMPETING THREAT PERCEPTIONS
In contrast to Australia, the realists who dominate
China policy in Washington tend to perceive China
as both a commercial as well as a military threat. In
their eyes, the economic rise of China drives the rise
of Chinese military power. They see China’s charm
offensive and shared prosperity with U.S. allies and
friends in Asia as part of an overall Chinese military
strategy.17 At the strategic level, however, this shared
prosperity between Australia and other countries in
Asia arguably gives Beijing a stake in stability and
makes war less likely than when China was not a main
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actor on the world’s trade and economic stage. But if
war breaks out between China and Taiwan, China’s
shared prosperity in the region increases the risk for
the United States due to possible denial of access to
U.S. bases, transit routes, markets, etc. In August 2004,
Australian Foreign Minister Downer publicly told
the Chinese in Beijing that Australia was not bound
to help the United States defend Taiwan in a ChinaTaiwan war. Today, 2 years after Downer’s comment,
Australia’s trade with China dwarfs its trade with
the United States. Australia will try hard to appease
the United States, while bending over backwards not
to antagonize China and jeopardize its highly prized
economic relationship with that country.
The United States, more than ever, needs access to
bases and friendly shores in Australia and other sites
in the Asia-Pacific area in the event of a China-Taiwan
war because of the widening gap between a rising
Chinese defense economy and a falling Taiwan defense
economy. China’s economy starts by being four to five
times larger than Taiwan’s economy, and for the past
10 years China’s economy has been growing twice
as fast as that of Taiwan. According to the Pentagon,
China’s much larger and faster growing economy has
been spending more on defense as a percentage of GDP
than Taiwan.
As if that were not bad enough, in January 2006
Taiwan’s legislature made its biggest budget cuts
in a decade, with the defense budget, which had
been growing at only 2.3 percent of GDP, taking the
biggest hit. Instead of boosting defense spending to 3
percent of GDP to keep pace with the Chinese military
buildup, Taiwan’s legislature actually slashed funds
for planned arms acquisitions, which already had
been delayed for more than a year. At a time when the
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China-Taiwan military balance keeps getting worse
from a U.S. perspective, Australia and other countries
in the region will think twice before they throw away
vital commercial ties to a China that is over-matching
Taiwan so rapidly.
COMPETING U.S.-AUSTRALIAN
ENERGY PERSPECTIVES
Washington also sees China as a threat on the energy
front. Such U.S. economic nationalism was visible in
2005 when China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC), a 70 percent Chinese government-owned
company, made a $19.6 billion offer to buy Union Oil
Company of California (or UNOCAL), of the U.S. oil
and gas group.18 It was the biggest overseas bid at
that time by a Chinese company, the first to trigger a
contested takeover battle with Chevron and the first to
be made in a politically sensitive strategic sector in the
United States.
Most U.S. lawmakers argued that in deciding
whether to approve or disapprove, the U.S. Government
should evaluate the CNOOC bid on traditional national
security grounds. Harboring mental images of CNOOC
somehow hoarding Unocal energy for Chinese
consumers, they argued that CNOOC threatened U.S.
energy security. In the end, the U.S. Congress effectively
blocked any Chinese takeover of Unocal.
U.S. lawmakers were ill-advised. Their fears are
at odds with how the global energy market actually
works. For starters, oil is a fungible commodity. For
every barrel of oil China might divert for its exclusive
use, China would import one less barrel of oil from
other sources. Global prices and availability of oil to the
United States would remain exactly as before. While
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denial of access to oil can be used as a military tool in
wartime, access depends not on ownership, but on the
ability to secure petroleum installations and blockade
oil lanes. China is vastly more vulnerable to an oil
squeeze than the United States, with the unchallenged
U.S. Seventh Fleet commanding the Pacific. A national
security issue does exist here, but China would be
the one at risk. CNOOC was taking a big commercial
risk as well as a strategic risk: If Sino-U.S. hostilities
erupted, its proposed U.S. investment would be an
early casualty.
U.S. efforts to block PRC takeovers of U.S.
companies play into the hands of PRC communist
hardliners. They argue that China must prepare for an
inevitable confrontation with the United States because
it will never permit China to enjoy a peaceful economic
flowering. The U.S. needs to undercut that the PRC
hardliners’ position with evidence to the contrary.
For years the United States criticized Indonesia for
its nationalistically-operated oil industry when Jakarta
blocked EXXON-Mobil’s efforts to buy Indonesian
energy assets. Just recently, however, the United States
was successful in persuading Indonesia to open its
oil reserves to Exxon-Mobil. The United States has a
strong interest in persuading countries like Indonesia
to open their oil reserves to U.S. investors. It is,
therefore, inconsistent for the United States to criticize
the Indonesians for nationalism in its oil industry if
the United States is similarly nationalistic in blocking
foreign investment in the U.S. oil industry. This is the
U.S. double standard and hypocrisy at its worst. The
United States not only expects to make the rules but
also expects to make the exceptions to the rules—China
must open its markets to U.S. and foreign investment,
but the United States has the right to keep its markets
closed to China.
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Sino-Australian Energy Ties.
Now let’s contrast the U.S.-China tension on the
energy front with Sino-Australia energy relations,
looking first at nuclear energy. In early April 2006,
China and Australia signed a nuclear safeguards
treaty, which punctuates an increasingly important
economic relationship. The treaty could pave the way
for exports of uranium to China for peaceful uses.
China is searching for new supplies of uranium as
part of its strategy to diversify energy sources, placing
less reliance on coal-fired power stations. As part of
its New Year economic blueprint, China is committed
to reducing air pollution and dependence on coal. By
2020 China hopes to increase by four-fold the amount of
nuclear energy it produces. Australian Prime Minister
Howard has said that Washington’s efforts to curb
nuclear enrichment worldwide may even be at odds
with the energy requirements of Australia.19
In late June 2006, the Prime Ministers of China and
Australia, Wen Jiabao and Howard, proudly presided
over the arrival in China of the first commercial
shipment of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Mr. Howard
called the LNG shipment, part of an $18 billion contract
guaranteeing supplies for 25 years, the largest single
trade deal ever for Australia and “hugely significant”
for its resource-dependent export industries. He said it
could be the beginning of an enormous additional part
of Australia’s trade with China.
Limits to Sino-Australian Energy Cooperation.
While Australia’s pervasive perception of China
as a golden commercial opportunity will no doubt
continue, Australia also is learning that there are limits
to what it can expect from China, even in the booming
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resource trade. For example, the red-carpet reception
of the LNG tanker in late June 2006 only momentarily
masked the disappointment in both China and
Australia over how the gas market has stalled in China
since the 2002 signing of two contracts with suppliers
in Australia such as Australian Woodside Petroleum.
China has failed to negotiate any further LNG deals,
balking at paying a price higher than that paid in
the initial deal. Beijing has pressed Australian for a
discounted price on the grounds that China would be
an excellent long-term market. Such pressure tactics
have been mirrored in other commodity sectors such as
iron ore. China wanted to emulate the 2002 deal with
Australian Woodside Petroleum for good reason. That
contract locked in LNG against an oil price capped at
$20-$25 a barrel. Gas exporters, frustrated and annoyed
by the Chinese stance, resisted, instead selling most of
their available resources to Japan and South Korea,
with other supplies earmarked for the United States.
Australia: Beyond Shared Prosperity with China.
While Australia’s political culture is enthusiastically accommodative of the shared prosperity with
China, the U.S. political culture dwells on China as
a commercial threat. But Australia also is becoming
aware that China poses a commercial threat to at least
some industries. In fact, Canberra finally is developing
a plan for responding to the Chinese commercial threat
rather than simply basking in an aura of Sino-Australian
shared prosperity. Mr. Howard is reviewing policy and
developing a new plan to reposition existing industries
and bolster support for new sectors. Canberra also
is studying how the rise of China now requires an
Australian economic strategy that extends beyond the
resources boom.20
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Australian official Ian MacFarlane is soliciting
input from Aussie business leaders, a key part of which
will come in early 2007 when Australia’s business
community releases its industry statement. This will
be the first such Australian industry projection since
“Investing for Growth” (1997), which foreshadowed a
$1 billion increase in industry policy funding, including
expanded funding for research and development.
Since the last industry statement, Canberra has
approached policy issues on a problem-specific basis.
As a result, the business community increasingly senses
what it views as government drift on policy direction.
Businesses claim Canberra is content to just ride the
resources boom instead of using its new revenue
windfall to strengthen and diversify the economy
while preparing a post-boom economic policy.
Canberra’s new plan addresses some of these
criticisms from the business community, e.g., by
seeking to boost productivity in workplaces. Canberra’s
initiative comes only after the release of a report by
the Australian Industry Group stating that up to
30,000 manufacturing jobs could be lost in 2007 due
to competitive pressures created by the rise of China.
The Industry Group seeks a range of initiatives from
Canberra to include tax cuts and export incentives.
While Canberra is starting to see China in a more
mixed light, that is, as a commercial threat as well as
a commercial opportunity, its response differs from
that of the United States. The United States sees a
larger and more serious commercial threat, openly
blames China and seeks economic sanctions to protect
against what it sees as unfair competition. In contrast,
Australians are more sanguine and seek ways to boost
their competitiveness rather than retreat from China’s
commercial challenge.
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FIGHTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
AND TERRORISM: WHERE AND HOW?
Another critical issue is Australia’s approach to
terrorism and violent extremism and the degree to
which it meshes with the U.S. approach.21 As stated
earlier, this issue has two economic components. First
is the issue of affordability. Australia finds it difficult
to underwrite its obligations under the U.S. alliance,
making the outlays necessary to meet the rising
challenges in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia.22
This may seem odd because at first glance. In the
first quarter of 2003, Australia’s economy grew at its
fastest pace in 18 months, and that pace has continued.
Strong growth is good news for the defense budget.
Australia’s defense budget is set to rise 11 percent to
$19 million in 2007. Canberra also is committing itself
to increases of 3 percent a year from 2008 to 2016.
Sustaining such defense spending is financially feasible
for Canberra if growth remains strong, tax revenues
stay high, and defense budget targets are realistic.
However, Canberra is already concerned about
the rising costs of helping regional states in difficulty.
Current defense budget projections may not be enough
for multiple overseas deployments. With 1,000 troops
now deployed in East Timor, the Aussie military/
police presence in South Pacific is now at its highest
level since World War II. Aussie involvement in the
Solomon Islands alone is costing about $ 150 million a
year, a relatively large sum to spend on a small nation
of just 600,000 people. Australia is in danger of being
pulled into regional hotspots for years to come.23 Violent
extremism in weak, failing states in its backyard is on
the rise. Aussie stabilization missions in the region are
expensive and potentially open-ended.
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Can rising U.S. expectations be satisfied while
Australia simultaneously is being stretched thin in
its own backyard? Can Australia remain shoulder
to shoulder with the United States in Iraq and
Afghanistan—and perhaps elsewhere—if it cannot
afford its primary mission of being a regional sheriff
in the South Pacific? Critics in Australia already are
questioning procurement of “nonessential equipment
to fight nonessential wars” that lack manifest links to
Australia’s core interests.
Closely related to where Australia can afford to
confront violent extremism is the question of how
Australia will choose to respond to violent extremism
in the future. Will Australia have situational awareness
of the underlying social and economic conditions that
foster violent extremism? If so, will Australia have
a strong social and economic program to counter
such extremism? On July 5, 2006, Australian General
Duncan Lewis, Special Advisor on Terrorism to Prime
Minister Howard, candidly stated that Australia’s
approach to terrorism was not in accord with that of the
United States. Australian military officer Clay Sutton,
assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command, echoes these
same sentiments. He adds that differences between the
United States and Australia are even more pronounced
when it comes to counterinsurgency doctrine and
strategy.
These are not academic issues. At the Shangri-La
Dialogue of Defense Ministers in Singapore in June
2004, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
blasted Asian leaders for being soft on terrorism. These
Asian leaders pushed back, accusing the United States
of fighting the war on terrorism the wrong way.24 They
argued that the United States was insensitive to the
underlying social and economic conditions that give
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rise to terrorism. Southeast Asian leaders said the U.S.
approach was radicalizing Asia’s Muslims. A few
days earlier, Malaysia’s new Prime Minister Abdullah
Badawi, a former moderate Islamic teacher, said the
United States was breeding a new generation of violent
extremists by refusing to acknowledge some of the root
causes of terrorism. Abdullah spoke from experience,
having successfully used a subtle approach to defeat
terrorist disturbances in two states of Malaysia by
addressing grievances (such as corruption in the ruling
party) and trying to calm rising passions. Armed
terrorists were captured without deaths on either side.
Similarly, former Singapore Prime Minister Goh called
for a more balanced and nuanced U.S. approach. Two
years later, following the 2006 Shangri-La Dialogue,
Indonesia’s Defense Minister also criticized Mr.
Rumsfeld for much the same reasons.
As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has
demonstrated, it is both possible and advisable to avoid
the false dichotomy between hard line and soft line
approaches to countering terrorism. Prime Minister
Singh’s counterinsurgency strategy combines zero
tolerance of terrorism with a robust socio-economic
strategy that reduces the tendency toward violence.
Singh now identifies Maoists as the single greatest
threat to Indian national security, but he admits that the
rising Maoist insurgency in India is “directly related
to underdevelopment.” The aim is to curb pervasive
perceptions of social and economic injustice and
address legitimate grievances which violent Maoists
exploit. Similarly, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage says: “Americans have been
exporting our fears and our anger, not our vision of
opportunity and hope.” 25 Similarly, the official 9/11
Commission Report persuasively argues that:
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When people lose hope, when societies break down, when
countries fragment, the breeding grounds for violent
extremism are created. Backward economic policies
and repressive political regimes slip into societies that
are without hope, where ambition and passions have no
constructive outlet.26

NEW ZEALAND:
COMPETING ECONOMIC PRIORITIES
The United States and Australia have different
regional economic and financial priorities. Nowhere
is this more apparent than in their attitudes and
policies toward New Zealand (NZ). Canberra sees an
NZ economy that is closely connected to the vitality
of Australia’s economy. In this regard, Canberra sees
the current NZ economic and financial problems
as important to Australia’s national interests.27 In
contrast, NZ in U.S. eyes is a small economy of little
consequence to the United States or the global economy.
It’s doubtful that Alan Bollard, the NZ Central Bank
chief, gets mentioned much in Washington. After all,
he oversees an economy small enough to seem like a
rounding error to officials at the U.S. Federal Reserve.
Nevertheless, America’s new U.S. Federal Reserve
Chief Ben Bernanke, who replaced Alan Greenspan,
could learn a lot from the economic and financial
instability in NZ.28
For the past year or so, the NZ Central Bank’s
overzealous war against inflation has destabilized the
economy. Interest rates have remained at 7.25 percent
since December 2006, by far the highest in the developed
world. Money traders poured hot money into NZ as
part of a speculative scheme to profiteer from interest
rate differentials. These traders borrowed in lowyielding currencies (like the YEN) and “invested” in
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high-yielding currencies like the NZ dollar, or KIWI. A
huge capital inflow in 2005 helped propel the KIWI to
a 23-year high against the U.S. dollar in the process.
This painfully strong NZ dollar over-priced NZ’s
dairy, meat, and timber exports. By the end of 2005,
the deficit in current account (trade deficit in goods
and services) ballooned to an alarming 8.9 percent of
GDP, the highest NZ ratio in 20 years and double NZ’s
long-term average. Weak exports also raised the risk of
recession in 2006-07. A survey of NZ business leaders
showed that the business community was the most
pessimistic in 20 years.
Jittery foreign investors faced the prospect of large
capital losses if the NZ KIWI sharply fell against the YEN
and other currencies before the bonds denominated
in KIWIs matured. Due to significant leverage in the
positions of foreign exchange traders, currencies could
adjust dramatically. The joy ride for investors would
end with a financial crisis and capital losses if NZ was
unable to cover its huge deficit in the current account of
its balance of payments with footloose hot money. That
would trigger a run on the KIWI and a free fall in NZ’s
foreign exchange rate. That grim scenario happened
with the fall of Mexico’s PESO and Thailand’s BAHT
in the 1990s. In any event, the yield spread of KIWI
bonds over U.S. bonds was likely to narrow as the U.S.
Federal Reserve continued to raise interest rates in 2006.
Higher U.S. interest rates potentially undermined the
appeal of some money trades to currency speculators.
At one point, the NZ Central Bank took the unusual
step of warning foreign investors of the high risks of
holding KIWI-denominated bonds. Central Bank chief
Alan Bollard warned investors about two scenarios. In
a soft landing, a decline in NZ’s exchange rate could
be gradual if domestic spending pressures eased.
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But in a hard landing, the KIWI’s value could go into
an abrupt free fall if global investors reassessed the
country’s attractiveness as an investment destination
and triggered a run on a fundamentally overvalued
currency that was killing exports.
Investors are aware that GDP growth slowed
from 4.3 percent in 2004 to 2.2 percent in 2005, with
the downward momentum moving toward a possible
recession in 2006-07. NZ’s GDP actually fell 0.1 percent
each quarter in the final 3 months of 2005, the worst
quarterly economic performance in 5 years. Now the
concern was a possible run on the KIWI. The NZ dollar
slumped to a new 22-month low amid fears of recession.
Australians got jittery as the NZ currency started to drag
down the Australian dollar. It was not clear was how
much lower the two currencies would fall. The joy ride
that traders had enjoyed by borrowing lower-yielding
currencies and buying high-yielding NZ dollars was
running out of steam. This once financially attractive
interest rate differential was getting less attractive as
interest rates rose in both the United States and Europe.
The interest rate advantage was now offset by the
falling value of the KIWI. On March 26, 2006, Lehman
Brothers lowered the boom, recommending selling
both the NZ and the Australian currencies. Clearly
the financial instability that was hammering NZ also
was taking its toll on Australia, which recognized a
vital interest in stabilizing this economic and financial
turmoil. In contrast, Washington was silent.
The upside of these developments could be an
orderly decline in the NZ and Australian currencies,
which eventually would boost exports by both
countries and require less capital inflow in their
balance of payments. But there also is a downside risk
of a possible run on NZ currency, with a hard landing
210

and recession possible in NZ. The Wall Street herd
mentality also could hurt the Australian economy,
which was vulnerable due to a similar high current
account deficit.
By June 23, 2006, NZ’s deficit in the current account
(goods and services) of its balance of payments was
the worst in 30 years. Soaring oil prices and consumer
demand had driven up the value of imports, and
corporations were opting for capital flight to protect
financial assets. The current account deficit (9.3 percent
of GDP) was the highest since the 1975 oil shock. NZ’s
current account deficit of 9.3 percent of GDP was now
far worse than that seen in Thailand and Mexico,
which were both running current account deficits of 8
percent of GDP before their financial crises. Standard
and Poors warned that NZ’s credit rating could be
downgraded due to a high and unsustainable current
account deficit. The NZ dollar is now one of worstperforming currencies in the world. It lost more than
10 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar in the first
quarter of 2006 alone.
In June 2006, NZ companies anticipated more
gloomy reports, with a particularly pessimistic outlook
for the third quarter of 2006. That added to signs that
NZ’s economic growth would be the weakest in 7
years, a consequence of record-high interest rates
that were curbing spending. About 39 percent of 559
businesses surveyed in June 2006 expected profits
to decline over the following 3 months.29 Finally, the
Central Bank expected that economic growth would
slow to 1.4 percent in the year ending on September
30, the weakest pace since June 1999.30
In July 1997, the United States turned a blind eye
to a faltering Thai economy, arguing that it was a
small economy of no consequence to the United States
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or the global economy. Needless to say, Washington
was short-sighted, being caught off-guard by the
Asian financial crisis. While it now looks more likely
that NZ could fall into a recession rather than a fullblown financial crisis, such a crisis cannot be ruled out.
Wellington needs a lot of skill and luck to navigate
these troubled waters.
Canberra is deeply concerned about the economic
and financial instability in NZ. In contrast, a shortsighted U.S. Government is turning it back on this
financial and economic turmoil.
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CHAPTER 12
ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS ASPECTS:
AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
Don Russell
INTRODUCTION
Like many countries, Australia has a complex
relationship with the United States. We have the
benefit of many shared cultural values, and there exists
an easy familiarity at a personal level. But we are still
two separate countries with separate national interests
and different histories.
From the time of World War II, when Australia
first set up a diplomatic mission in Washington
separate from the British, security issues have been
very important to the totality of the relationship and,
notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, this continues
today. In part, this is related to the recent focus on the
war on terrorism, but the security issues are of longer
standing than that and broader in scope.
Australia finds herself in a rapidly changing part of
the world where the relationships between countries
are evolving in an unpredictable and potentially
destabilizing way. There are small countries near to
Australia which struggle to function, but there are
also large countries like China and India which are
changing the balances within our region and the rest
of the world because of their size and rapid economic
development.
As has been the case with every economic success
story in our region, Australia has become a natural
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supplier of commodities to the new growth economies
of China and India. As Japan, Korea, and Taiwan found
in the past, in the early stages of export-based economic
development, it is important to obtain raw materials at
the world’s best pricing. This was very much the key to
Japan’s early success, and other countries in the region
have followed its example. Unlike other developed
countries that have had to deal with Asian economies
at an economic disadvantage, Australia has been an
integrated part of Asia’s economic success.
Countries now are interrelated economically in
a way that makes it difficult to view security issues
separate from economic imperatives. Economic
integration coupled with deregulation is now seen as
the recipe for success. As country after country goes
down this path, the old belief that strident nationalism
will wilt under the economic forces of self-interest
should receive critical scrutiny when considering
countries’ foreign policy options.
All of this means that to understand the evolving
nature of the relationship between the United States
and Australia, it is necessary to come to grips with the
economic forces at work. This involves not only the twoway economic relationship between the United States
and Australia but also their economic relationships
with third parties.
THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
Australia’s two-way economic relationship with
the United States can be viewed on two levels—
the traditional export arrangement and the recent
formalization of bilateral free trade. Each will be
discussed in turn.
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The Traditional Export Relationship.
Australia’s traditional export relationship is based
on Australia’s comparative advantage in the production
of agricultural products and natural resources. On the
face of it, this should provide Australian industry with
attractive market opportunities. The U.S. market is
relatively open and attractive to low-cost producers.
However, many key Australian exports are covered
by quotas and other barriers to trade. Unfortunately,
export industries such as wool, sugar, and dairy, where
Australia is a highly efficient producer and where there
is scope to expand production, are the very industries
most heavily protected in the United States.
This keeps Australia’s trade negotiators active, but
over the years such activity has not produced major
gains for Australia. The result has been constant friction
and irritation between the two countries. Australians
often are shocked over the lack of consideration
afforded Australia when it comes to market access for
traditional Australian exports and the U.S. willingness
to protect its industries in such a blatant way.
Figures 1 and 2 set out the history of Australian
exports to the United States broken down by category.
As can be seen, the overall export story is far from
impressive; over the 17 years leading up to 2005, the
average export growth as measured in current prices
is only 6.37 percent per annum. Traditional exports
(such as wool) have dwindled to virtually nothing.
The dominant influence on most of Australia’s rural
exports to the United States has been the quotas and
the fact that the United States tends to manage imports
in a way that safeguards the interests of its own rural
producers. While U.S. producers have been caught up
in rules of the North American Free Trade Asssociation
(NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
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Figure 1. Merchandise Export Trade with the United States (millions of Australian $).

219

Figure 2. Merchandise Export Trade with the United States (percentage of total value).

arrangements, it is rare for Washington to grant a
quota increase to Australia if such an increase would
hurt domestic U.S. producers.
Australia does have privileged access for beef,
and our beef exports are large. However, Australian
beef is grass-fed and intended for the hamburger
market and thus does not compete directly with U.S.
production, which is largely grain-fed. The beef quota
is good negotiating coin for the United States—cheap
for them, valuable to others. Australia has a number
of competitors for access to the U.S. beef quota, with
Argentina the main alternative source of supply.
Australia therefore is vulnerable to changing political
attitudes in Washington when it comes to the allocation
of the beef quota. Australia’s major gain from the
Uruguay Round was an increase in the American beef
quota, but Australia always has had to work hard to
secure access for its beef, and when access has been
secured, Australia has had to work hard to protect it.
Sugar is heavily protected in the United States, and
the sugar lobby is well-entrenched. The United States
does import sugar, but over the years the sugar quota
has been used to further U.S. foreign policy objectives
in the Caribbean and Central America.
Some industries such as ship building have no access
at all. There is a market for Australian-designed fast
ferries, but it is most unlikely that any administration
would seek to amend the Jones Act, which restricts
U.S. coastal shipping to American-built vessels.
The United States also subsidizes the export of a
range of agricultural products, which corrupts international markets and undermines Australia’s capacity
to export to third countries. This has been an ongoing
issue between the two countries, which on occasion
has led to pointed disputes. The U.S. Government
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has some scope to minimize the impact of its subsidy
programs by targeting European-subsidized exports,
but it is not possible to do this in a way that spares
efficient producers like Australia.
Of course, many countries subsidize agricultural
exports and protect their local rural producers.
Compared to others, the United States does have
relatively efficient rural industries. Australia therefore
has a strong interest in harnessing the negotiating
power of the United States when it comes to multilateral
negotiations on agriculture. It is fair to say that without
American support, there would be no progress in
liberalizing world trade in agriculture and that when
the United States wins on agriculture, Australia tends
to win too.
The benefits to Australia of American victories on
agriculture should not be overstated, as the United
States tends to use its negotiating power to support its
own rural interests. However, it often is unavoidable
that Australia benefits as well as the United States
from agricultural trade liberalization, particularly if
the negotiations take place in a multilateral context.
Australia also is an efficient producer of minerals,
metals, and fuels. There is a market for these products
in the United States, although Australia tends to be a
supplier at the margin, and these exports tend to be
volatile. Wine has been a success story (see Figures
1 and 2 under the “Beverages” category), and more
sophisticated manufacturing has done well although it
has fallen away recently.
The net effect of these changes has been a broadening
of the base of Australia’s exports to the United States,
although rural and commodity-based exports remain
important. Figure 3 highlights how trend changes have
altered the composition of our exports to the United
States.
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Figure 3. Merchandise Exports to the United States (Percent Share).

Australia’s exports to the United States tend to be
priced in U.S. dollars. The sharp depreciation of the
Australia dollar ($A) in the earlier part of the decade
boosted exports to the United States in $A, but the
overall trend is for exports to the United States to
decline in relative importance over time. Total exports
in nominal terms peaked in 2001 and have been in a
declining trend since then.
In 2005 exports to the United States made up
only 6.7 percent of total exports, and it is fair to say
that the United States has not been a major growth
market for Australia. Notwithstanding the recently
signed Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement
(AUSFTA), this is not likely to change much in the
future. The next sections of this chapter will look more
closely at the AUSFTA, the growing involvement of
Australian companies in the U.S. economy, and the
relative U.S. position in Australia’s changing trade
relationships.
The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement.
The lack of progress in the current WTO round has
created a vacuum that the United States has sought to
fill by signing a network of Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs) with several countries around the world. The
logic of the American position is based on the notion
that a FTA allows the United States to bring the full
might of its negotiating position to bear on a single
country; it also puts indirect pressure on the European
Union (EU) to make concessions in the Doha round, as
countries steadily make concessions to the United States
which may or may not be extended to all countries in
some future multilateral agreement.
As the network has become broader, countries
have been placed in an invidious position. Either they
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put their faith in the WTO negotiations and stay out of
the U.S.-centric network of agreements or they enter
into a separate agreement with Washington and run
the risk of paying a price for the privilege with little
gain in return. Some countries have responded to this
dilemma by seeking to negotiate bilateral FTAs with
countries other than the United States.
The United States long has adopted the attitude
that countries should be willing to make substantial
concessions if they want to sign a FTA with the United
States, and this has been the normal practice. U.S.
negotiators have become expert at using the intransigence of the American Congress and the importance
of the U.S. market to extract concessions from other
countries while giving up little, if anything.
Australia came to the AUSFTA negotiations with
unusually strong credentials. Australia always has
been a good ally of the United States, but our recent
close support of U.S. policy, particularly in relation
to Iraq, has built up extra credits in Washington.
However, even in this environment, the United States
gave up very little and made significant gains.
This hard-nosed attitude of American trade
negotiators has shocked some Australians, who
anticipated that the United States might be less demanding and more supportive of Australian interests.
In the end, the United States used the AUSFTA negotiations with Australia as just another opportunity to
further its multilateral trade agenda. As has always
been the case, working closely with the United States
on trade is a two-edged sword; it helps Australia with
market access and allows it to influence world policy
on agriculture, but it exposes us to intense pressure to
accede to the U.S. multilateral agenda.
Australia therefore ended up making concessions
on a range of matters that the United States typically
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pursues whenever it enters into trade negotiations. For
example, Australia accepted an extension of copyright
protection to 20 years. In the future, Australian users
of copyright-protected works will continue to be liable
until 70 years after the death of the copyright owner.
As a major net importer of copyright material,
Australia traditionally has opposed extending the
term of copyright protection because it inevitably
will lead to an increased net cost to Australia. It is
difficult to estimate the full cost of term extension for
all copyrighted works. However, for books alone it has
been estimated that the cost to Australia would be on
the order of A$800m to A$1.1b in today’s dollars.
The United States is a strong supporter of its
pharmaceutical industry, and this is reflected in the
negotiating position that Washington takes at the
multilateral level and with individual countries.
By agreeing that the Australian Therapeutic Goods
Administration (TGA) must refuse domestic marketing approval to a generic manufacturer where the
incumbent patent holder covers the product with
a “new use” patent, Australia has made it easier for
foreign pharmaceutical companies to “evergreen”
patents in Australia that are coming to the end of their
lives in the country of origin. The TGA therefore will
be required to act as an enforcer of new patent claims
against generic competitors even before the merits
of the case have been settled in court. This could be
quite expensive to Australia, as there are a number of
significant patents due to expire in the next few years.
Having strengthened the hand of pharmaceutical
companies in Australia relative to generic manufacturers, the United States will find it easier to secure
similar provisions in future FTAs that they negotiate
with other countries. If enough countries are willing
to concede such provisions to the United States on a
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bilateral basis, it increases the chances that Washington
will be able to secure similar provisions at a multilateral
level. In the circumstances, however, it is hard to see
how Australia could have negotiated a better deal.
We have paid a price for the FTA, but there will be
benefits. It is true that the improved market access for
Australian beef and dairy is modest and a long way off,
and there is a real danger that the United States will
renegotiate arrangements if improved market access
for Australia creates major problems with American
farm interests. But assuming that the phase-in of the
quota increases does not create major problems for the
United States, Australian rural industries will have
secured increased access that the United States could
easily have granted to someone else.
The main gain Australia has made with the AUSFTA
is that there is now a process in place with reasonably
detailed rules covering a wide range of situations. The
United States will use these rules and review provisions
to further its interests, but a rules-based structure
does give Australian exporters to the United States a
measure of predictability and a certain freedom from
harassment that they did not have in the past. A rulesbased system also gives Australia the opportunity to
use the same rules to further the interests of Australian
industry, assuming of course that Australia is willing
and able to use such a system.
Expectations do, however, need to be managed,
as some Australians unrealistically expect major
net benefits to flow from the AUSFTA. Moreover,
Australians should not be surprised when the United
States uses every provision of the AUSFTA along with
all the WTO processes to further American interests.
As the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
is fond of saying, “Don’t take it personally, we are only
playing by the rules.”
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Australia also should play by the same rules. By
law, the USTR must represent the interests of American
companies. In Australia, trade policy priorities are
very much in the hands of the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and inevitably foreign
policy and Departmental considerations intrude. In
the United States, companies work up their own WTO
cases, expecting the USTR to work with them to pursue
their interests in Geneva. In Australia, DFAT jealously
protects its prerogative to set priorities; an Australian
company or industry easily can find its interests
traded away for what DFAT views as the broader
public interest, or the Department may not pursue a
case because of resource constraints. If the Department
does take an issue to the WTO, it is uncomfortable with
the active participation of the industry and its legal
advisers. This could not be more different from the
situation in the United States, where American-backed
WTO cases utilize the vast resources of the private
sector as well as the resources of the U.S. Government.
WTO cases in the United States are serious business
and are resourced accordingly.
The United States, Canada, and the EU immediately
understood that with the establishment of the WTO,
the world had changed. There are now effective
mechanisms to resolve disputes. There is a Dispute
Settlement Body comprised of Panels and a permanent
Appeals Body with powers to enforce decisions. The
United States, Canada, and the EU have actively used
the new processes to further their own interests, and
other countries have followed their lead.
DFAT has tended to be less active. The Department
is not well-staffed with trade lawyers and appears
reluctant to work closely with trade advisers hired by
Australian industry.
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In September 2001, a Joint Standing Committee
of the Parliament Chaired by Senator Helen Coonan
recommended the establishment of a separate Trade
Advocate Office that would have responsibility for the
management of Australia’s participation in cases of
WTO disputes. The Committee also recommended that
this new Office have the capacity to use private sector
legal practitioners. A separate Trade Advocate Office
has not been established, although DFAT has used the
Committee’s Report to secure extra resources for the
Department itself and to engage in broader community
consultation. Unfortunately, DFAT has worked hard
to minimize the involvement of private sector legal
practitioners in a deliberate strategy to avoid embracing
the U.S. approach to trade negotiation.
On the basis of past attitudes, there is a danger that
DFAT will be reluctant to use the provisions of the new
FTA with the United States in an aggressive way and
will cede too much to U.S. trade negotiators and
American industries, who doubtless will use every
provision of the Agreement to put pressure on Australia
to further the interests of U.S. business. Over time, this
is likely to compound the sense of disappointment
and frustration that many in Australia feel about the
AUSFTA.
Australian Investment in the United States.
It would be wrong to conclude from the foregoing
that the United States is of diminishing interest
to Australian commercial interests. It is true that
Australia has been a major beneficiary of Asian
growth, Chinese growth in particular, and that the
United States has become of declining importance to
Australia as an export market. However, despite this
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reality, Australian companies have never been more
committed to the U.S. market, and a large number
of highly successful Australian businesses have built
strategies that involve a significant presence in the
United States. This has taken place outside traditional
government-to-government negotiations, but it is
where Australia’s economic links with the United
States are now centered. To the extent that a country’s
political and foreign policy objectives are in the end
driven by economic realities, it is important to keep
this in mind.
Many Australian companies now have extensive
operations in the United States, and it is commonplace
for Australians to work there. Australian companies
explicitly focus on the United States when they develop
their business strategies. For many companies, a
successful American operation is an imperative if the
company wishes to be internationally competitive.
There have been some spectacular disasters, such as
the BHP purchase of Magma Copper in 1996 and the
NAB purchase of HomeSide in 1997, but there have
also been a growing number of successes. The market
is now more wary of Australian companies seeking
to expand into the United States through acquisition,
but there also is a growing willingness to reward
soundly-based business models. There is a realization
that success in Australia does not necessarily translate
well internationally if the company owes its domestic
success to limited competition and protected markets.
This new involvement of Australian business with
the U.S. economy has sprung from the deregulated
Australian economy of the past 2 decades and is
not industry specific. Because it is happening on an
economy-wide basis and is not narrowly centered on
traditional Australian exports, the importance of the
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United States to Australian business arguably is greater
than it has ever been.
The importance of America to Australian companies
is well reflected in the statistics on investment abroad.
Notwithstanding Australia’s growing trade relations
with Asia and its traditional links with the United
Kingdom (UK) and Europe, at the end of 2004, 55
percent of all direct investment abroad was in the
United States. Moreover, the trend is, if anything,
toward the United States rather than other countries;
at the end of 2001 the proportion in the United States
was 50 percent. See Figure 4.

Figure 4. Australian Investment Abroad:
Level as at December 31.
The companies listed in Figure 5 are examples of
Australian businesses that have developed global
business models with successful operations in the
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United States. The list is not meant to be comprehensive
or to suggest that these are attractive stocks.1 However,
the list does provide an indication of the areas where
Australian companies have built global businesses
successfully and how a presence in the United States
has been pivotal to their overall success.
Company

Market Cap
26/6/06

Comment

Aristocrat (ALL)

A$5.9b

World’s second largest slot/
gaming machine manufacturer
and gaming software
developer. Sydney based; 50
percent business in United
States, rest in Japan and
Australia

Billabong (BBG)

A$3.1b

Self branded surf stores; 48
percent of revenue in North
America, 28 percent Australia/
Japan, 24 percent Europe

Fosters (FGL)

A$11.0b

Worldwide alcohol company;
32 percent of revenue from
international wine (Beringer
Blass)

CSL (CSL)

A$9.4b

No 2 in global plasma
products, manufacturing in
United States, Europe, and
Australia

Cochlear (COH)

A$2.9b

World leader in cochlear
implant industry with more
than 60 percent world market
share

Rinker (RIN)

A$15.6b

One of the world’s top 10
heavy building materials
groups, 80 percent of
earnings in United States,
10,000 employees in United
States

Figure 5. Examples of Australian Companies
Operating in the United States.
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AUSTRALIA’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS
WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
It is useful to look at the U.S.-Australia economic
relationship in the context of Australia’s relationships
with other countries. Figures 6 and 7 set out the details
of Australia’s merchandise exports broken down by
country and broad region. As can be seen, Australian
exports are weighted heavily towards Asia, with some
62.3 percent of the total directed to the main Asian
markets in 2005. China has been an important growth
market in the past 5 years. But despite the growth of
China, the overall importance of Asia has changed
little over the past 10 years; in 1995, 62.1 percent of
Australia’s exports went to the main Asian markets.
In fact, China is not the only market for Australian
exports that has been growing rapidly. Japan remains a
very important growth market for Australian exports,
while growth in exports to India overshadows all our
major markets. During the period 2003-05, exports to
China/Hong Kong grew by 57 percent; but over the
same period, exports to Japan, our largest market,
grew by 44 percent, and exports to India grew by a
staggering 109 percent.
Commodities are the driving force for our exports
to Asia, particularly to new markets like China and
India. Both of these countries are growing strongly and
are dependent on low-cost raw materials to make them
internationally competitive. In choosing Australia as a
source for raw materials, China and India are following
a well-tested strategy pioneered by Japan and followed
by Korea and Taiwan. Australia is a highly efficient
supplier of high quality raw materials. Moreover,
because of the shorter distances involved to Asian
destinations, Australia has a cost advantage relative to
competitors from South America and Africa.
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Figure 6. Merchandise Exports by Country (A$m).
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Figure 7. Merchandise Exports by Country (percentages).

Australia has been a major beneficiary of the surge
in commodity prices occurring over recent years, with
iron ore and coal being the two major exports for
Australia. Together, they currently make up 25 percent
of total exports. During 2005, iron ore prices were up 72
percent, hard coking coal 123 percent, soft coking coal
100 percent, and thermal coal 17 percent. The surge in
prices has extended well beyond bulk commodities;
base metals, aluminum ore, gold, and oil prices have
all been dramatically higher.
The rationalization and merger of many commodity
companies in the latter part of the 1990s has been
an important spur to better returns for commodity
companies. However, the major force driving up
commodity prices has been surging demand by
China. The growing importance of China can be seen
in its rising share of Australian exports. In 1995, they
accounted for 8.4 percent of Australia’s exports; in 2005
this had risen to 13.5 percent.
The growing importance of China also can be seen
in the statistics on service credits, which for Australia
are largely driven by in-bound tourism. As can be seen
from Figure 8, China now accounts for 10.4 percent
of total service credits, up from 5.5 percent in 1999.
The service credits statistics also show that both the
United States and Japan have been declining sources of
service credits for Australia. Again, despite the growth
of China, the overall importance of Asia for service
credits has not changed dramatically; in 2005 the main
Asian markets accounted for 39.9 percent of service
credits, while in 1999 the figure was 37.3 percent.
The rising economic importance of China thus
needs to be kept in perspective. China is very much a
price taker when it comes to commodity prices. China
may be responsible for current high prices, but since
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Figure 8. Service Credits by Country (A$m).

the surge in prices, this has not enabled it to use its
economic and political standing to extract special cutrate deals from suppliers like Australia. The recently
completed negotiations between BHP Billiton and
China’s largest steelmaker, Baosteel, are a good
indicator of the underlying balances. After much public
disquiet from the Chinese, Baosteel eventually agreed
to a 19 percent iron ore price increase for 2006-07. This
matched the price increases accepted by European and
Japanese steel producers.
Having to match the price increases accepted by
the Japanese and the Europeans was clearly a shock
to the Chinese. The China Iron and Steel Association,
which has close links to the Chinese Government
and represents the largest Chinese steel producers,
has stated that the negotiations involved a “lack of
respect for the long-term interests of all parties and
showed little interest in fostering a stable, cooperative
relationship to achieve common development and a
win-win result.”2
That China is trying to secure for itself a growing
share of a limited supply of raw materials enhances the
bargaining power of countries like Australia; it certainly
does not make Australia or Australian companies
beholden to China. It has been estimated that Chinese
demand accounted for 40 percent of global demand for
iron ore in 2006, up from 14 percent in 2000 (see Figure
9).3 China has little alternative but to buy raw materials
from Australia and match world prices if it wants to
continue on a rapid growth path.
Australia has been dependent on Asian growth
for almost half a century. Originally that growth was
driven by Japan. If anything, Australia’s room to
maneuver has widened steadily as Taiwan and then
Korea expanded. Strong growth in China and India
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further diversifies Australia’s customer base and puts
increased competitive pressure on individual buyers.
While the recent experience renegotiating iron
ore prices was a sobering one for China, it also is an
important guide as to what strong growth in China
actually means in terms of China’s relations with
other countries. The key conclusion for commentators,
particularly for commentators who are interested
in security issues, is that China’s economic growth
makes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) very
dependent on market forces. It depends on securing
inputs for its economy and on securing access for its
products. Growth is bringing great benefits to the
Chinese people, but it also is changing priorities within
China and constraining the capacity of the Chinese
leadership to behave in ways that are detrimental to
the economy. Every year, strong growth brings higher
incomes and more wealth, but it also increases the cost
of capricious behavior. It is concern about capricious
behavior, rather than a larger Chinese economy, that
people should focus on.
CONCLUSION
Australia and the United States have had a long
and close relationship which dates back to World War
II. The relationship has been grounded heavily on
mutually agreed security objectives. Initially it was
the war in the Pacific, then it was the Cold War, and
now it is the war on terror, or the Long War as some
have taken to calling it. In particular we Australians
currently have a shared interest in maintaining the
stability of our region.
Australia-American trade rarely has been at the
heart of the relationship, although on occasion disputes
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over market access for Australian agricultural products
have intruded. Over the years, the United States has
become of dwindling significance as a market for
Australian exports of goods and services. The recently
signed AUSFTA is unlikely to reverse this trend to
any great extent, although it should bring a useful
measure of predictability as it puts in place a rulesbased structure to handle disputes. Australia could
use the new procedures to its advantage if it is able
to assemble the organizational resources necessary to
make them work.
The growing involvement of Australian companies
in the American economy means that despite the
declining importance of the United States as an export
market, Australian business has never been more
involved with the United States. A large and growing
number of Australians work in the United States, and
working in the United States is now seen as a normal
career move for many Australians. There is therefore
a solid and contemporary basis on which to rest the
political and security relationship between the two
countries.
The recent rapid growth in trade between China
and Australia is not a factor undermining the logic of
Australia’s relationship with the United States, nor is it a
factor pulling Australia in a new direction. Just because
China is a large and growing market for Australian
iron ore and coal, we are not warranted to assume that
Australia is becoming an increasingly unreliable ally.
China is in the early stages of economic development
when commodities are a disproportionately large
input to GDP; hence, for the foreseeable future, access
to an expanding supply of raw materials is a necessary
condition for continued Chinese growth.
While it is galling to Chinese policymakers, China
is a patsy when it comes to a willingness to pay high
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prices for commodities, particularly iron ore and coal.
Australia is in no way beholden to China for its access
to the Chinese market. If anything, China owes a debt
to Australia for satisfying China’s growing dependence
on raw materials in the same sense that China owes a
debt to Middle Eastern countries in the case of oil.
Moreover, Chinese growth does not alter Australia’s
traditional economic imperatives. For almost half a
century, Australia has depended on strong growth in
Asia, and this reality has not changed. Indeed, adding
China (and India) to the group of countries in Asia
with successful economies and thus greater potential
as customers, provides Australia with more options
rather than less. Thirty-odd years ago, Australia was
very dependent on Japan because there were few
alternative markets. That is no longer the case. If China
does not buy Australian raw materials, there are always
markets in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and India.
Until the last decade, Australia appeared to be
facing a long-term decline in trade; every year it seemed
that it had to export more commodities to buy the
same bundle of imports. With growing world demand
for a constrained supply of raw materials, Australia
now faces the reverse situation; every year the same
supply of raw materials buys an increasing bundle of
imports.
But most importantly, Australia’s foreign policy
for decades has acknowledged the key role that Asian
economies play in generating wealth and income for
Australians. Successive Australian governments have
become highly sophisticated at balancing security ties
with the United States on one hand, with the need to
maintain the stability of our region on the other. For it is
the stability of our region which delivers the cascading
wealth of Asian growth.
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In the past, Canberra’s strong alliance with the
United States comported quite comfortably with
Australia’s close economic and political ties to Asia.
Australian foreign policy at its most agile uses the
closeness of the U.S.-Australian relationship to magnify
Australia’s importance to its Asian neighbors; at the
same time, the sophistication of its relationships with
Asian neighbors makes it a far broader and potentially
more useful U.S. partner. But this has required careful
management. In recent decades, there has never been
a time when a simplistic or heavy-handed approach
to the Asia-Pacific region has been in Australia’s best
interests. A decade ago, conflict between China and
the United States would have been as challenging
to Australia as it is today. Though China over the
past 10 years has developed a growing dependence
on Australian raw materials, it would be wrong to
conclude that this is a factor pulling us away from the
United States. On the contrary, the importance of the
American alliance for Australia is as strong as it has
ever been.
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PANEL V
SECURITY AND DEFENSE ASPECTS
OF THE U.S.-AUSTRALIA SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP
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CHAPTER 13
PANEL V CHAIRMAN’S INTRODUCTION
Jeffrey D. McCausland
When one examines the defense relationship
between the United States and Australia, the overarching impression is that it works and is beneficial
to both states in pursuing their strategic goals in the
past as well as the future. At the end of the day, the
important thing is what works. In essence, this is a very
pragmatic relationship. To say this might appear to
some to be a superficial observation, but it nonetheless
is fundamental. For the United States and Australia—
like any two sovereign states—the ultimate question
is the utility of the relationship. There can be no doubt
that this relationship has been and will continue to be
extremely useful to both.
Furthermore, if one examines the overall relationship between these two states, to include foreign
policy, economics, commerce, politics, and defense,
it is the defense relationship that is most routine
and imbedded. Australian and American military
officers have served together in various theaters and
operations. Each attends the other’s schools; they
share intelligence, military doctrine, and materiel on
a regular basis. Australian policymakers even made
a request to expand the intelligence relationship
between the two countries during meetings in early
2006.1 In fact, this link is so routine that the greatest
danger is for it to become taken for granted, and thus
underrated in importance. In politics as well as life,
leaders constantly examine, renew, and underscore
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the value of enduring relationships if they are to
prosper. The defense relationship between the United
States and Australia is strong, but military and civilian
leaders must reevaluate this bond continually in the
future. They also must maintain a clear understanding
of internal domestic pressures in both states that policy
choices generate.
The defense strategy of any nation is a function of
three variables—ends, ways, and means. “Ends” are
the objectives the state is trying to accomplish. “Ways”
are the concepts, doctrines, and ideas the state brings
to bear unilaterally or in concert with other nations.
“Means” are the resources a state can or is willing to
invest in fulfilling its security objectives. This includes
people, money, technology, and time. The challenge for
the strategist is to seek a balance among these variables.
While some might argue that security is fundamental
to any state in the international system, this does
not mean that the resources available for defense
are unlimited. Objectives need to be prioritized, and
methods must be settled upon that, through synergies,
maximize the probabilities of success. Coalitions,
alliances, and bilateral relationships clearly are crucial
in this calculation.
There is manifest agreement between Australia and
the United States with respect to the broad objectives
of the war on terrorists and East Asian security more
broadly.
• Defeat those who seek to use terrorism against
the United States, Australia, or their allies.
• Prevent the spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).
• Wisely manage the emergence of China as
a major military and economic power in the
region and on the world stage.
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Australia has been an important partner for the
United States in Afghanistan and Iraq since September
11, 2001 (9/11).2 Both nations have forces deployed
to Iraq, which has become the central military focus,
and the road ahead in Iraq will be long and difficult
at best. As we move into 2007, there are suggestions
that the United States should reduce its forces in
Iraq at some unspecified rate. In fact, some observers
have characterized this as a debate between “cut and
run” and “cut and jog.” As this debate continues, and
particularly if American forces are reduced, the United
States must expect that all of its coalition partners
in Iraq (Australia included) will review their own
commitments. Furthermore, Afghanistan also will
remain a long-term challenge that both nations must
be prepared to confront in concert with NATO and
other allies.
The “Ends” of Defense Policy.
As Australians evaluate their defense “ends,” they
of course will consider their bilateral relationship with
Indonesia as well as the other states in the so-called arc
of instability. Over the longer term, Canberra’s regional
exertions may become more important to the country
than its contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
One Australian defense expert observed that
“Australia has an Islamic geography.” In addition to
being the planet’s fourth largest country, Indonesia is
the largest Islamic country. Large Muslim populations
exist in Malaysia and the Philippines as well.
Consequently, any suggestion that the so-called Long
War is a war of ideologies between the West and Islam
presents particular difficulties for Australia as to its
relations with its neighbors.
247

Some in Australia may believe that Americans
ignore one of the lessons of the book, The Tipping Point,
by Malcolm Gladwell.3 Gladwell underscores the
critical importance of context. For example, to assist
Americans in understanding Australia’s concern about
developments in Indonesia, they should visualize the
following notional picture: the Mexican population
has doubled and continues to grow at a dramatic pace;
the Mexican economy is quite weak, and large-scale
unemployment in Mexico, particularly among the
young, is endemic. To take this imagined scenario a step
further, Mexico is now an Islamic state, with several
communities committed to instituting Sharia law. By
thus vicariously experiencing a broad geographical/
political context similar to the one Australia actually
finds itself in today, Americans can thus obtain far
greater insight and empathy.
Clearly Australian forces as currently configured are
stretched. The Australian Army consists of only 26,000
active troops and 17,000 reservists.4 This force has had
as many as 10 ongoing deployments simultaneously
in such places as East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the
Solomon Islands, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Renewed
violence in Timor Leste suggests that a long-term
presence by Australian forces in that troubled country
will likely be required.5
One lesson from these efforts is that any successful
campaign to defeat international terrorism must have
a military component capable of expeditionary actions.
But such a campaign also depends on taking the steps
necessary to enhance stability in the target states, which
are often beset by complex problems such as economic
under-development, burgeoning population growth,
AIDS, etc., that create fertile ground for international
terrorists fired by religious fervor. One can argue
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plausibly that the most successful combined military
operations by U.S. and Australian forces since 9/11
have been tsunami relief and the assistance provided
in Pakistan after the devastating earthquake there.
The United States and Australia also have found
common cause in opposing the spread of WMD and
long-range missiles. The Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) is an important manifestation of this common
policy goal, with Australia having cooperated in this
effort from its initiation in May 2003.6 This effort has
the goal of preventing the shipment of WMD or their
components to terrorists or the countries harboring
them. Still, the PSI suffers from the absence of any
reinforcement of the existing legal authority for states
to inspect vessels traveling through their territorial
waters or those elsewhere not displaying a national
flag or lacking registry.
For the leaders in Washington and Canberra, the
primary country of concern in terms of proliferation
in Asia is North Korea. Both nations were reminded of
the challenge presented by North Korea following its
missiles tests in July 2006 and its nuclear test 3 months
later. Canberra supported American efforts in the
United Nations (UN) to sanction North Korea for its
nuclear tests. In addition, Australia announced it was
banning North Korea’s ships from entering its ports,
except in dire emergencies.
With Australia not being part of the six party talks
seeking to find a diplomatic solution to the Korean
nuclear issue, some Australians might wonder why all
the fuss. Part of the answer is that North Korea poses a
direct threat to South Korea, a major ally of the United
States, as well as to American forces deployed there.
But the greatest threat presented by North Korea may
be its apparent willingness to proliferate and share
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WMD and missile technology with other states as well
as terrorist organizations.
Finally, both Australia and the United States realize
that the most important geopolitical development in
the first half of the 21st century may be the sudden
emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as
a leading member of the world’s power elite. Canberra
and Washington understand that they must seek to
deal constructively with growing Chinese strength—
military, economic, and political—both in the Asia
Pacific region and in the world more broadly. In this
regard, there is a different view of China in the United
States and Australia. This was demonstrated in joint
remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
and Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in
July 2006.7
There is a debate in the United States about the
future direction of China, with many American leaders
construing the emerging China as a potential threat.
The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) annual
report to Congress (2006) describes the expansion and
modernization of Chinese military forces in worried
terms.8 In a similar vein, DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) observes that “China has the greatest
potential to compete militarily with the United States
and field disruptive military technologies that could
over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages.”
The possibility of conflict between the United
States and China over Taiwan or some other sensitive
issue is cause for major concern in Canberra. From the
Australian perspective, there is fear that an American
confrontation with the PRC might force the Australians
to choose between the Australia-New Zealand-U.S.
(ANZUS) alliance and their commercial interests in
China and elsewhere in the region.9 Australian leaders
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know that other powers in the region would most
certainly remain neutral in such a crisis.
As several contributors to this volume have observed,
while America tends to see the growth of China as
a threat, Australia is more inclined to view it as an
opportunity. Consequently, it may be time for leaders
in the United States and Australia to enter honest
dialogue about the emerging security environment
and China’s place in it. Washington and Canberra
would then be far better positioned to engage China in
a constructive, unified manner. The goal would be to
persuade Beijing to join the international community—
in spirit and in substance—as a partner fully
commensurate with its growing size and importance.
The “Ways” of Defense Policy.
The alliance as defined in the ANZUS Treaty is
the essential “way” or concept that gives vitality and
force to the U.S.-Australian defense relationship.
Alliances traditionally have been one method that
states employed to enhance their security. They are not
expressions of national altruism but rather practical
tools of statecraft in pursuit of interests. They must do
something. Alliances involve a sharing of resources
as well as responsibilities. Historically, they may lose
their relevance long before their formal demise. The
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), for
example, actually “existed” in an international legal
sense until 1977, but at some point long before that
date, SEATO had lost its relevance.
Article V of the U.S.-Australian defense treaty has
been formally invoked only once, and that was in
response to 9/11. This confirms not only the continuing
importance of ANZUS but also that the alliance is
changing. ANZUS, founded in 1951, is nearly as old
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as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
But ANZUS was formed to defend territory that at
the time both countries perceived as endangered by a
clear external threat. Today, neither country’s territory
is threatened—at least not in the classical sense of
invasion. Consequently, Australia and the United States
are bound together to defend common global interests
and values. The “threat” is highly contingent, growing
out of unforeseeable circumstances of the moment,
and when it does loom into view, it may menace
one partner more or less than it does the other. This
situation creates problems not only for strategists, but
also for those leaders who must explain strategy and
associated policies to their respective (and frequently
skeptical) publics. For example, Australian leaders
actively emphasize that the ANZUS Treaty cannot
be viewed as directed against any state, particularly
China.
Finally, leaders in Washington and Canberra must
understand that this will always be an alliance of unequal partners. As one Australian expert observed,
in many ways this relationship tends to consume
Australia, whereas it will obviously not be of the same
moment for the United States. This is not a comment
on the importance of the relationship, but rather an
acknowledgment of the relative power of the two
partners.
The “Means” of Defense Policy.
The 2006 QDR in the United States and the Australian 2000 Defense White Paper (with supplements for
2003 and 2005) are critically important in understanding
the “means” of defense policy for both states, and the
challenges associated with resource allocation. It would
appear, however, in light of the emerging security
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environment that both countries are threatened by a
serious strategy/force structure mismatch.
Australia invests only 1.9 percent of its gross
domestic product (GDP) on defense, as compared
with approximately 4 percent in the United States.
For Canberra, this low level of investment is a bone of
contention between the so-called Defender-Regionalists
vs. the Reformer-Globalists. The Defender-Regionalists
tend to be “little Australians or Continentalists” who
view the country’s defense obligation as being defined
by the fixed geography of the Australian continent.
For this school, the first if not the only requirement of
Australian military forces is to defend the nation from
attack and invasion.
The Reformer-Globalists, however, support a
broader role for Australian forces in defending national
interests, extending the circumference of their potential
employment to some distance from Australian shores.
This approach obviously calls for a force which is more
capable of maritime power projection. Sadly, this debate
has focused on roles and missions but has neglected
realistic discussion of the size of the Australian defense
budget vis-à-vis the missions contemplated. Thus the
argument so far appears to be over how to divide the
too small pie of acquisition funds available.
For the United States, the QDR described the
threats to American security in fairly cogent fashion.
The report’s emphasis on America’s need for allies and
renewed partnerships was welcomed in Australia and
elsewhere around the world. This was particularly true
in the aftermath of the first George W. Bush term that
many believed showed a greater emphasis on unilateral
action and ad hoc coalitions of the willing. The report
also recommended a shift in focus towards the AsiaPacific region, with a commensurate movement of U.S.
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forces to the Pacific, a move welcomed by many in
Asia.
Still, while the threat description and concepts as set
forth in the QDR seem appropriate, the force structure
recommended would reduce the strength of the Army
and reserve forces while investing in two new fighter
aircraft types, national missile defense, and new naval
forces. Some might argue that the 2006 QDR, coupled
with the 2006 report on growing Chinese military
power, reflects a heightened U.S. concern about China
as compared with Iraq and Afghanistan.10
In the case of Australia, if it is to continue to “box
outside its weight class,” tough choices may need to be
made to avoid a force structure that will not support
its commitments. While some in the United States
certainly will contend that the QDR describes a suite
of force capabilities ranging from nuclear to heavy
conventional to counterinsurgency, Australia cannot
match this force, even on a proportionate basis. It is
imperative, however, for Australian leaders to convince
their public that an increase in defense spending from
1.9 percent of GDP to at least something in excess of
2 percent is required. This increase would need to be
accompanied with a careful examination of investment
choices.
Australian purchases of the Hellfire missile, Global
Hawk remote-piloted vehicles, Abrams tank, and the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will enhance interoperability
with U.S. forces over the next several years. But real
problems may surface as a result of the spiraling cost of
certain systems. In this regard, the impending purchase
of the JSF may be crucial. For Australia, the purchase
of the JSF is the biggest defense project in the nation’s
history, with costs initially estimated at $10.5 billion
for 100 aircraft now having escalated to $16 billion.
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In addition, an internal Defense Ministry document
suggests that the aircraft may have potential flaws that
will reduce its overall effectiveness significantly.11 In
addition, Australian policymakers have threatened to
cancel their participation in the project if they are not
afforded the same full access to information concerning
the plane’s stealth technology which has been provided
the United Kingdom. Clearly, the United States must
do everything it can to support Australia in terms of
technology transfers. This is especially true during
the ongoing debate over the JSF, with Washington
appearing more willing to share information with
Great Britain than with Australia.
Developing National Security Strategies.
While ends, ways, and means are the components
of strategy, the process whereby leaders determine
policy also must be examined. Since 9/11 there is
broad agreement that the definition of national security
has changed. Natural disasters, pandemics, illegal
immigration, etc., have become part of the discussion.
American and Australian politicians have discovered
that while there may be few votes in individual defense
issues, there are votes in “national security,” and the
public pays close attention. In the United States, for
example, it was not lost on the citizens of Louisiana
that their National Guard brigade was in Baghdad and
not New Orleans during the immediate aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina.
In the United States, the proliferation of studies—
QDR, National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military
Strategy (NMS), Defense Strategy, Global Repositioning
Plan, etc.—actually may confuse allies about U.S.
strategic objectives. Consequently, the next U.S.
presidential administration should consider seriously
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a comprehensive national security review that seeks
to better integrate all elements of national power in
dealing with the Long War, including in particular the
role of allies.
Several Australian experts have pointed out that
Canberra is still using a pre-9/11 White Paper with
two updates, producing confusing and ambiguous
guidance. Australia thus would benefit also from a
defense review, an updated Defence White Paper, and a
more robust National Security Council structure aimed
at better integrating policy. Such improvements in the
national security policy processes in both countries
might allow a better determination of strategy for the
alliance. This might in turn facilitate more forthcoming
discussion of combined strategy to deal with the
emergence of China and other strategic challenges.
Finally, it is becoming increasingly clear that in the
war on terrorists, operations of military forces are only a
modest part of the total effort. Consequently, leaders in
Canberra and Washington must confront the question
of whether their respective governments are organized
to confront this emerging reality. Should the alliance
collectively and individually focus greater efforts on
building police forces that can be deployed to assist in
providing stability to failed or failing states? Do our
respective ministries of justice, treasury, agriculture,
commerce, etc., have a cadre of professionals prepared
to deploy, not unlike military forces, to troubled
regions?
Conclusions.
Yogi Berra, the quintessential baseball player and
philosopher, once observed, “It is hard to predict
anything, especially the future.” While this sage
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observation largely remains correct, we should remind
ourselves that real leaders make the future. The new
world of the 21st century that emphasizes the defense
of values and interests rather than territory presents
Australia and the United States with many new security
challenges and a changed environment. An essential
element in this new environment is the staggering
influence exercised by the international news media.
This fact demands that leaders more frequently and
clearly communicate with the public in both the United
States and Australia.
Defending Australian and American values,
interests, and populations unfortunately will demand
the expenditure of both blood and treasure. Some in
Australia may believe, based on recent experience,
that operations against terrorists and insurrectionists
can occur without significant casualties. This blithe
assumption obviously is not true, as the recent changes
in the deployment of Australian forces in Iraq and
renewed fighting in Afghanistan clearly indicate.12
In the United States, military and civilian leaders
have suggested that we may be able to reduce our forces
in Iraq significantly by the end of 2007. It is critically
important, however, that the American public and our
allies around the world not construe any such “success”
in Iraq (however it might be defined) as somehow
marking an end to the threat of terrorism from radical
Islamic groups. Consequently, it is incumbent upon
leaders in Washington and Canberra to speak candidly
to their respective publics in order to maintain popular
support for difficult choices that will need to be made.
To recapitulate, the defense relationship between
the United States and Australia is both strong and
pragmatic. It is based on many years of cooperation
between military forces in peace and war. It is based
on both national interests and common values that are
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embraced strongly by both countries. It truly has been
another “special relationship.”
In conclusion, let us return to our ever insightful
philosopher, Yogi Berra. Yogi was once asked by a
sportswriter, “How do you create a world championship team?” At which point Yogi quickly responded,
“Get world championship players!” The alliance
between the United States and Australia is a championship team. In raising, training, and equipping the
military forces that underwrite the alliance, it remains
the responsibility of future leaders of both nations
to assure that those forces remain of championship
caliber. The leaders must maintain and improve this
alliance for the benefit of all, never taking it for granted,
as the two nations confront the tough challenges that
most certainly lie ahead.
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CHAPTER 14
THE UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA,
AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER
IN EAST ASIA AND BEYOND
James J. Przystup
Cold War in origin, the U.S. alliance structure
in the years since September 11, 2001 (9/11), has
evolved—and continues to evolve—to allow the
United States and its alliance partners to address the
security threats of the 21st century. The Department
of Defense (DoD) 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) is a critical document in addressing challenges
to international stability and security for the United
States and Australia. In operational terms, the alliance
structure today is global in scope: North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are deployed in
Afghanistan, Japan’s Self Defense Force has engaged
in a postwar reconstruction mission in Iraq, NATO is
opening a security dialogue with Australia and Japan,
and Australia’s forces are operating in Iraq and again
in East Timor. These developments point to a shared
recognition among the allies of the global nature of
threats to international order posed by terrorism, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
and the uncertain direction of emerging great powers.
Defining the Threat, Shaping the Response:
The Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001-2006.
During the Cold War, the nature of the threat to
the United States, its allies, and the western world
was clear. Anticipating the nature of the post-Soviet
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world, Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger once
remarked that the United States would likely miss,
not the Soviet Union, but the certainty it provided
strategists and defense planners. The 2001 QDR
focused on the uncertain nature of threats in the post9/11 world, accepting surprise as the starting point for
defense planning. International terrorism, asymmetric
threats, the proliferation of WMD, the diffusion of such
capabilities to nonstate actors, and failing states were
identified as key security challenges.
The 2001 QDR also addressed the imperative of
transforming the U.S. military to allow it to meet the
challenges of the post-9/11 security environment.
Key concepts involved in transformation were the
development of a capabilities–based approach to force
planning; the development of joint operating concepts;
and the implementation of global force planning. The
capabilities-based approach meant that forces no longer
would be shaped to deal with a specific adversary in a
particular region of the world. Rather, forces would be
developed to address how any adversary with access to
a wide range of capabilities might fight. Joint operating
concepts highlighted networked-linked, dispersed
forces, benefiting from speed of decisionmaking and
flexibility in planning and execution, and allowing
for greater interoperability with allies. Finally, global
force planning would allow decisionmakers to manage
the integration of forces deployed across the globe
to dissuade, deter, or defeat adversaries in various
regions.
Over the past 4 years, these concepts have guided
the redeployment of U.S. forces in Europe as well as
the Asia-Pacific region. On the Korean Peninsula, U.S.
forces have pulled back from static defense along the
demilitarized zone (DMZ), moving south of the Han
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River and to the coast to establish more operationally
tenable positions. This has had the effect of increasing
flexibility and enhancing deterrence by complicating
North Korean planning. The process has been
complemented by the recent agreement with Japan
to redeploy U.S. forces into and from Japan and to
accelerate joint planning to deal with a wide range of
security contingencies.
The terms of reference for the 2006 QDR were set
out in the Global Posture Review (GPR) of August 2004.
In short, the GPR spoke to the need to expand the role
of allies and build new security partnerships in meeting
challenges to international stability and security. At
the same time, the GPR called for a reduction of the
overseas deployments of U.S. forces in order to reduce
tensions with host governments and make security
relationships more politically sustainable over time.
The GPR emphasized the need for greater operational
flexibility and mobility, and for the avoidance of
concentration. To this end, it called for the development
of readily deployable forces, with the ability to act
within and across regions. Released in February, the
2006 QDR does not herald a new beginning; rather, the
document represents continuity and is best understood
as an exercise in consolidating lessons learned.
Continuity is found in the emphasis on the elements
of uncertainty and surprise as the foundation for defense
planning. The document continues to underscore the
importance of transformation, the need to develop
forces that are expeditionary in nature, i.e., that are more
mobile, agile, and readily deployable. It continues the
call for adjustments in the U.S. global force posture—to
move from static defense to the development of surge
capabilities. And it continues to emphasize capabilities
as opposed to specific adversaries. In this regard, the
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development of intelligence and surveillance
capabilities is highlighted.
At the same time, the global war on terrorists has
yielded a number of critical lessons for both the United
States and Australia. Among them is the concept of
the Long War, a conflict unique in history, that will be
waged not against nation-states but simultaneously
against nonstate networks in regions across the globe.
The Long War is defined as being ideological in nature,
with terrorist adversaries attempting to advance “a
radical theocratic tyranny.”1 Similarly, Australia’s
Defence Update 2003 recognizes the ideological nature
of the conflict, defining the terrorists’ objective to be
the “roll back” of Western values, engagement, and
influence.”2 Likewise, it speaks to the global nature
of the threat, making clear that “Australia’s security
is affected if there are any regions in the world from
which terrorists . . . can operate internationally with
impunity.”3 Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the Long
War will be marked by irregular warfare as opposed
to conflict among nation-states. Consequently, all U.S.
ground forces will be trained for counterinsurgency
warfare. The division/corps structure of the Cold War
will transition to self-sustaining brigades.
The 2006 QDR, however, recognizes that the struggle
against terrorism “cannot be won by military force
alone.” Accordingly, the United States is focused on
helping partners “to police and govern their nations,”
thus “decreasing the possibility of failed states or
ungoverned spaces in which terrorist extremists can
more easily operate or take shelter.”4 The document
stresses the importance of both military and civilian
engagement with U.S. partners, the need to develop
greater language skills as well as cultural sensitivity
within the U.S. military, and the need for the military
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to build the capacity to work with police and interior
ministries.
In this regard, the 2006 QDR acknowledges the
importance of building partnerships and enhancing
the capabilities of partners to work together, allowing
the United States to act indirectly through others
and “shifting from conducting activities ourselves to
enabling partners to do more for themselves.” Working
with partners who possess “greater local knowledge”
is viewed as making counterterrorist actions more
effective at the tactical and operational levels, while at
the same time enhancing U.S. forces’ freedom of action
at the strategic level.5
Australia’s Defence Update 2005 accepts that global
war on terrorists will demand more of American allies
and partners. The report notes that in the post-9/11
security environment, the United States is seeking
“more flexible options” in the use of its military forces,
while expecting its allies to “contribute a greater share
of the cost of their own and the region’s security.” In this
regard, Defence Update 2005 details Australia’s efforts at
capacity-building in the Asia-Pacific region, enabling
neighboring governments to extend governance and
meet the challenges of economic development, internal
order, and security.
Beyond its military contributions in Afghanistan
and Iraq, Australia’s interest, knowledge, and understanding of its Asia-Pacific neighborhood are key
assets relevant to extending governance and denying
ungoverned operational space to terrorists. In Southeast
Asia, Australia has worked with various governments,
Indonesia in particular, to enhance border and maritime
security and to strengthen counterterrorist capabilities,
including intelligence sharing. In the Southwest Pacific,
the Australia-led Regional Assistance Mission has
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brought stability to the Solomon Islands. Australia also
is working with the government of Papua New Guinea
(PNG) to professionalize the PNG police force and to
enhance overall governance. In East Timor, Australia
again has deployed military units to assist in restoring
order and to prevent East Timor from becoming a
failed state.
Given the globalization of the international security
environment and Australia’s own national interests,
Defence Updates 2003 and 2005 recognize the increased
likelihood of Australian forces participating in coalition
operations beyond its immediate neighborhood. At
the same time, the documents note that instability
and the lack of governance affecting many states
in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific region
provide potential breeding grounds for international
terrorists. Australia’s particular interests in the AsiaPacific region will require that the Australian Defence
Force (ADF) be prepared to respond there as well. The
need to balance the demands of coalition operations
beyond the Asia-Pacific region with expeditionary
deployments closer to home is reflected in Australia’s
defense debate over force structure and procurement.
The recent deployment of the ADF to East Timor
and the decision announced by Prime Minster John
Howard on June 22, 2006, of Australia’s continuing
commitment in Iraqi underscore the global-regional
span of Australia’s security interests and the multiplicity
of the roles and missions demanded of and performed
by the ADF.
The QDR and China.
In 2001, the QDR characterized Asia as “gradually
emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military
competition.” Without naming China, the document
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raised the possibility that “a military competitor
with a formidable resource base will emerge in the
region.” The 2006 QDR, after acknowledging Russia
and India as emerging powers and crossroads states,
makes clear that “of the major and emerging powers,”
China has the greatest potential to compete militarily
with the United States and field disruptive military
technologies that, over time, could offset U.S. military
advantages absent U.S. counter strategies. Obviously,
Australia also is keenly interested in the emergence
of China, as it has experienced growing economic ties
with Beijing. The QDR does encourage China to play a
“constructive and peaceful role”; serve as a “partner in
addressing common security challenges”; and follow
the “path of peaceful economic growth and political
liberalization.” The hope is that, in so doing, China
ultimately will “emerge as a responsible stakeholder
and force for the good in the world.”
At the same time, the document expresses concern
with China’s ongoing military modernization, in
particular the growth of its strategic arsenal and
enhanced power projection capabilities, and its lack
of transparency. Accordingly, the QDR calls for a
“balanced approach” toward China, one that “seeks
cooperation but also creates prudent hedges.” In the
Pacific, key elements of the QDR’s “hedging” strategy
include the deployment of an additional carrier to the
region, diversification of U.S. basing, strengthened
alliance cooperation, and the development of longrange strike capabilities.6
The QDR’s treatment of China reflects the ongoing
policy debate in Washington over the implications of
China’s rise for U.S. interests in East Asia. In 2004, the
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) initiated
a study on China and Southeast Asia. In brief, the
findings of the study are as follows:
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• Southeast Asia increasingly sees China as a
partner and market opportunity: the days of the
“China threat” are fast receding into history. At
the same time, Beijing is effectively leveraging
its future potential to increase its influence.
• China’s economic dynamism is beginning to
restructure economic relations in Southeast Asia.
Beijing’s free trade agenda is viewed positively
as a way to build mutually beneficial economic
interdependence.
• Beijing’s embrace of multilateralism and acrossthe-board cooperation, often contrasted with
perceived U.S. unilateralism and a narrow focus
on fighting terrorism, is winning support in
Southeast Asia.
• Although the regional balance of power is
considered stable, the balance of influence is
perceived as moving in China’s direction. At
the same time, Southeast Asian governments
welcome a continuing U.S. presence in the
region as the key to preserving a balance of
power and managing China’s emergence.
• Southeast Asian governments will seek to avoid
any controversy that would involve making a
choice between the United States and China.
Within the Bush administration, views of China and
China policy more often than not follow the political
dictum “where you stand depends on where you sit.”
In U.S. perceptions, there are many “Chinas” and many
China policies competing for primacy.
For example, there is the World Trade Organization
(WTO) China, one that is integrating itself into the
international trading system, increasingly rules-based
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in its conduct and open to market-oriented reforms.
Over time, it is a China in which, it is hoped, the
workings of market forces will create political space
between the government/party and the individual,
resulting in some form of political liberalization. This
is the “good China.” There also is the post-9/11 China,
the U.S. partner in the global war on terrorists. There
is a third China that masquerades as the WTO China,
one that, while apparently accepting international
rules, is prepared to evade or violate them to secure its
ends. A fourth China is the Congressional China—the
China that violates human rights, pursues mercantilist
policies aimed at controlling markets, manipulates
currency, and threatens Taiwan.
A fifth China is former Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick’s “stakeholder” China. Zoellick was
attempting to assert the State Department’s voice and
primacy in the China policy debate. Beyond this, his
objective was to move China beyond integration into
the international economic system to the point of
becoming “a responsible international stakeholder,”
an approach representing an interest-based search
for accommodation at the global level. It holds out
the possibility that cooperation at the global level can
extend back into East Asia. Zoellick was expressing
U.S. respect for China’s interests in the region—
without specifically identifying which of the interests
in the United States was to respect and what degree of
respect the United States should accord.7
Zoellick’s China-centric engagement strategy
in both its global and regional dimensions marked
a departure from the strategy of the 2001-05 Bush
administration. Under then Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage, U.S. strategy focused on Japan
and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Armitage’s approach
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started with the bilateral alliance, grounded on shared
values, and worked outward toward the region and
the possibility of a mature global partnership. The
objective of policy was a strengthened alliance that
would enhance stability and security in East Asia and
beyond. While rejecting containment as a strategy for
China, the unstated direction of the report is toward a
hedging strategy. The United States and Japan would
work to encourage China’s evolution as a responsible
regional actor, but, should China move in an opposite
direction, it would have to deal with a reinvigorated
alliance.8
The 2006 National Security Strategy combines both
“stakeholder” and hedge strategies toward China. It
encourages China “to walk the transformative path
of peaceful development”; that is, to “continue down
the road of reform and openness” and thus meet the
“aspirations of the Chinese people for liberty, stability,
and prosperity.” At the same time, the National Security
Strategy expresses concern with China’s ongoing
military modernization and lack of transparency. The
document concludes by encouraging China “to make
the right strategic choices for its people, while we
hedge against other possibilities.”9
Successful implementation of the hedge strategy will
require paying careful attention to the proper balance
between the engagement and military elements of the
strategy. In the interplay of U.S. global and regional
security interests, it also will require a clear choice of
priorities in defining the right policy balance between
China and Japan. The choices made by the United States
with respect to security interests in East Asia also are
likely to affect the degree of global cooperation from
Tokyo and Beijing.
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The Challenge of North Korea
and the Korean Peninsula.
For the United States, Australia, and the rest of the
Asia-Pacific region, North Korea poses multifaceted
challenges. North Korea today is both a declining
state, whose implosion could destabilize the Peninsula
and large areas of Northeast Asia, and at the same
time a continuing military threat to the security of the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and to U.S. forces deployed
on the Peninsula. North Korea also is a rogue state
engaged in a large range of illegal activities ranging
from counterfeiting to the production and distribution
of illegal substances and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD).
It is as a proliferator of WMD that North Korea
poses the greatest threat to international security. To
deal with the threat of North Korean exports of WMDfacilitative materials, the Bush administration has
advanced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Australia, recognizing the threat posed by failing states,
terrorists, and WMD proliferation, has participated
in PSI-related exercises from their inception. Japan
likewise has participated in and sponsored PSI-related
activities. Recently, Japan’s Coast Guard organized a
multinational exercise aimed at stopping and searching
a ship suspected of carrying illegal cargo.
North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons
underscores the leadership’s intense focus on regime
survival. An equally important element in Kim Il
Sung’s survival strategy is North Korea’s growing
engagement with the South. This engagement
provides both economic and political benefits. In terms
of economics, the North benefits from shipments of
food, fertilizer, and hard-to-track cash transfers from
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the South. Politically, engagement has served to drive
wedges into the ROK-U.S. relationship.
While Seoul’s long-term strategic goal remains
peaceful unification under its leadership, the reality of
North Korea presents it with the immediate, day-to-day
challenge of dealing with Pyongyang. In this context,
Seoul seeks to promote reconciliation (not necessarily
unification); avoid war; avoid collapse in Pyongyang;
and prevent a nuclear North Korea. Seoul’s focus on
reconciliation and avoidance of collapse affects its
approach to the nuclear challenge posed by North
Korea. The hope in Seoul is that engagement ultimately
will dissolve North Korea’s security paranoia and
lead it to surrender the nuclear program. While the
ROK speaks of not tolerating a nuclear North Korea,
its engagement strategy actually helps to sustain it.
Meanwhile, Seoul and Washington today are involved
in a process of transforming the alliance and the U.S
presence on the Korean Peninsula so as to enhance the
alliance’s effectiveness and make it more politically
sustainable over time in both countries. Nevertheless,
the alliance will have to deal with the evolving political
situation both on the Peninsula and in the United
States.
On the Peninsula, the election of Kim Dae Jung,
the adoption of the Sunshine Policy, and the historic
June 2000 Summit in Pyongyang proved to be
transformational, at least in the South, with regard to
South-North relations. No longer was the North to be
viewed as the primary enemy, but rather as a downon-his-luck elder brother, deserving sympathy—and
subsidies—from the South. Kim Jong Il, however,
remained just unpredictable and volatile enough to
spook the South from risking criticism of the North
Korean regime and its practices, including human
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rights abuses and illegal activities. Once nuclearized,
an angry Kim could strike the South at a moment’s
notice, obliterating 50 years of economic progress and
wealth accumulation.
While the Summit proved transformational in the
South, North Korea’s political and economic system
largely remains unchanged. North Korea continues
to exploit concerns about the negative consequences
of regime collapse to secure a minimalist life support
assistance package. With regard to both Kim Dae
Jung and now President Roh, North Korea, in a
feat of diplomatic jujitsu, has been able to leverage
the proclaimed success of the South’s engagement
policies into a continuing cash cow. Joint meetings
are a frequently cited metric that defines the political
success of the engagement policy. But to demonstrate
success, the Seoul has to pay in the form of economic
and financial inducements.
North Korea’s ability to capitalize on fears of
its own collapse is matched somewhat by South
Korea’s apprehensions over the stratospheric costs
of unification. ROK officials, having studied and
restudied the German experience carefully after the
end of the Cold War, recognize that costs involved
in Korean unification would dwarf those involved in
uniting the two Germanies. Keeping the North afloat,
while costly, is economically and financially preferable
and infinitely less expensive than picking up the bill
for unification.
In this regard, China’s concern with stability on its
borders and apparent determination not to allow North
Korea to collapse are crucial factors in prolonging
the Kim regime. China’s steadfast support for the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has
served as a disincentive for Pyongyang to abandon its
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nuclear program. In Washington, Beijing’s reluctance
to manage its economic assistance programs so as to
move North Korea toward surrender of its nuclear
program has raised questions of China’s sincerity
regarding the stakeholder concept. China’s willingness
to support the Bush administration’s diplomacy on the
nuclear challenge likewise is viewed as a test of Beijing’s
commitment to being a responsible stakeholder.
Ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program
and the threat of proliferation from the Peninsula
remains the objective of the Six Party talks. Interests in
avoiding war and avoiding a nuclear North Korea are
shared broadly by the United States, the ROK, China,
Japan, and Russia. Interests, however, begin to diverge
on avoiding a collapse of the North Korean state, and
the priorities attached to the individual interests are
ordered differently in the respective capitals.
For Washington, ending North Korea’s nuclear
program is of primary importance. Of least concern is
the collapse of the North Korean state. Indeed, many
in Washington would regard the end of North Korea
as the only foolproof way to end its nuclear programs.
Few tears would be shed over the passing of that longtime thorn in the American side. For Seoul, and Beijing
as well, avoiding a nuclear North Korea is important,
but the real nightmare scenario is that of implosion and
collapse. At the same time, actions that could provoke
an unpredictable regime to react in unpredictable
ways, including the use of force, likewise are to be
avoided. This difference in priorities is reflected in the
clearly different tactical approaches to the North and
the nuclear issues.
Nevertheless, for the short term, the Six Party
process will continue because it serves the political and
diplomatic interests of all the governments concerned.
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• For China, it allows Beijing to exhibit diplomatic
leadership, play a central role in any resolution
of the issue, and increase its influence in Seoul.
• For North Korea, the process allows economic
aid and assistance from the South to continue to
flow, daily deepening South Korea’s engagement
and daily making it more difficult for Seoul to
criticize or pursue a hostile policy toward the
North. Meanwhile, Pyongyang continues its
nuclear program.
• For the ROK, the process represents another
link in its engagement strategy and strengthens
the hope that over time North Korea can be
persuaded to surrender its nuclear ambitions.
And as long as the process continues, it
serves to constrain bad behavior on the part
of Pyongyang—e.g., more missile launches or
nuclear tests.
• For the United States, the process is the best
hope of peacefully resolving an issue for
which there are no good answers should the
process fail. Should the process break down,
the Bush administration may find itself having
to “do something else,” which could be quite
unpalatable.
• For Japan, the diplomatic promise offers hope
of peaceful resolution, but the continuation of
North Korea’s nuclear program is a matter of
immediate security concern.
The policy question that must addressed is how long
the Six Party process can continue without progress on
the nuclear issue—what steps should be taken in the
event of no progress or, worse, intensification by North
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Korea of its missile nuclear weapons development. At
this time, there are no apparent answers, but diplomatic
divisions on this issue can degrade significantly
relations among the United States, the ROK, and
China, all to the benefit of Pyongyang. A breakdown
in alliance cooperation in Northeast Asia would affect
prospects for stability significantly across the AsiaPacific region.
Concluding Thoughts.
In a soon-to-be-published paper, Bill Tow and
Amitav Acharya accurately note that the U.S. security
role in East Asia is in the process of historic change.
The Cold War hub-and-spokes structure is giving
way to less traditional and more nuanced policy
approaches to deal with the challenges posed by the
global war on terrorists and nontraditional threats
and humanitarian contingencies. This evolution of
the U.S. alliance structure and security strategy is well
reflected in the 2006 QDR, which by self-admission is
a document of lessons learned. Among the principal
lessons are that the struggle against terrorism cannot
be won by military force alone—or even principally;
that the United States cannot succeed through its own
might or by acting alone; and that success will require
rather the building of coalitions and partnerships and
reliance on partners with greater local knowledge.
At the same time, long-standing alliance relationships in East Asia should not be thought outmoded.
The alliances with Australia, Japan, and the ROK
remain the foundation of security in the region and
beyond. Together with NATO, the Asian alliances
serve as the starting point for whatever coalitions
develop in the post-9/11 era. In the words of the 2006
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QDR, these relationships will “continue to underpin
unified efforts to address 21st century challenges.”
For example, the United States, the ROK, and Japan
provide a foundation for the Six Party talks; the United
States, Australia, and Japan strategic dialogue has
relevance not only for East Asia but for Iraq, Iran, and
the Middle East as well. The nascent NATO, Australia,
and Japan strategic dialogue undoubtedly will be
global in interest and scope. And of special note, these
alliances remain potent inducements for China to
move toward responsible stakeholdership, which is in
the manifest interest of the Asia-Pacific region and the
entire international community.
America’s Asian allies may no longer be relying
exclusively on Washington. That they are expanding
the range of security contacts is both undeniable and,
in the context of the 2006 QDR, supportive of post-9/11
international order. In sum, the alliances are evolving
and, in doing so, contributing to stability and security
in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
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CHAPTER 15
SECURITY AND DEFENSE ASPECTS
OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP:
AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
Michael Evans
Alliances are like girls and roses. They last while they
last.
— Charles de Gaulle

Since the middle of the 20th century, the AustralianAmerican alliance, based upon shared cultural values,
national interest, and a tradition of friendship, has been
part of the framework of Australian politics. Although
the emphasis and weight given by various Australian
governments to the alliance has differed over the past
half century, both major political parties, LiberalNational and Labor, have accepted the long-term
security and defense benefits of the special relationship
with America. In the words of the eminent Australian
historian, Peter Edwards, “The Alliance is a political
institution in its own right; it may be questioned from
time to time by Australians but its existence is seldom
challenged.”1 There is no mood in Australia for the
kind of insular nationalism that, in the mid-1980s, led
New Zealand to disrupt the original Australia-New
Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Pact over the issue of
American nuclear armed warships visiting its ports.
Because of Australia’s bipartisan political
consensus over the value of the alliance, the real
questions that will shape and define the future of the
security relationship with the United States in the
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early 21st century relate to custodianship of the
national interest and alliance management. From the
Australian perspective, the key issue regarding the
alliance is the level of political skill demonstrated by
the Australian government in the daily managing of
this bilateral relationship in order that its benefits may
be maximized and its costs minimized. This chapter
thus concentrates on examining the security and
defense aspects of the Australian-American alliance.
Four perspectives will be developed. First, the chapter
examines how, at the beginning of a new millennium,
the health of the alliance is connected intimately to
the internal Australian defense debate. Second, we
shall explore the implications of a new and different
globalized security environment for the workings of
an alliance forged at the beginning of the Cold War,
in order to assess whether the context for AustralianAmerican cooperation has changed irrevocably in an
age of transnational and networked warfare.
Third, this chapter assesses Australia’s latitude in
developing functional independence when managing
the diplomatic, defense, and security dimensions of
the alliance over the next decade—particularly as the
John Howard government attempts to evolve a globalregional policy seeking to reconcile relations with
America with engagement in Asia. Fourth, in an age in
which integrated national security policies are rapidly
subsuming autonomous defense strategies, the chapter
investigates whether Australia’s official strategic
doctrine as outlined in the 2000 Defence White Paper has
continued relevance. In this regard, the extent to which
the defense component of a national security strategy
might be reconfigured to meet the demands of a new
era is analyzed.
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Defender-Regionalists and Reformer-Globalists:
The Alliance and the Australian Defence Debate.
Ever since the al-Qai’da attacks on New York and
Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11), led to
Australian participation in the Bush administration’s
war on terror and to military campaigns in Afghanistan
and Iraq, questions of alliance management have assumed a sharper focus in Australian politics. Questions
have arisen in Australia over the balance to be struck
on such issues as alliance commitment versus national
independence; on global allegiance versus regional
commitment; and on dependence versus self-reliance.2
These questions have been magnified and complicated
by the fact that the Australian defense and security
debate currently is divided into two opposing schools
of strategic philosophy: the defender-regionalists and
the reformer-globalists.3
The defender-regionalists represent a strand
of strategic thought that first emerged in the mid1970s and 1980s in the wake of the controversy over
Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. It is a
school of thought closely associated with such figures
as Paul Dibb and Hugh White, who formulated the
geostrategic doctrine of the defense of Australia.
Defender-regionalists believe that Australian defense
policy should be governed by the principle of preparing
for the most serious contingency, namely, an attack on
Australian territory through the “sea-air gap” of the
northern island archipelagos. According to this logic,
Australia’s defense effort should be concerned mainly
with the creation of a powerful air and naval arsenal
designed to secure the continental approaches. The
defender-regionalists tend to be “little Australians”
or continentalists, who view the defense instrument
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as being defined by fixed geographical, rather than
fluid policy, imperatives. Moreover, advocates of the
defender school emphasize that Australia’s security
relationship with the United States is based on the
1980s notion of self-reliance in an alliance framework.
When it comes to 21st century security, many defenderregionalists tend to believe that 9/11 and the new
global security agenda of transnational threats may
be transient or exaggerated and is, consequently, far
less important than the old regional security agenda of
interstate tensions in the Asia-Pacific revolving around
such flash points as Kashmir, the Taiwan straits, and
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.4
The reformer-globalists are a school of thought
largely associated with former Defence Minister,
Senator Robert Hill. It is a strand of strategic thought
that views the 1980s Australian defense policy as a
form of unrealistic geographical determinism because
it seeks to disconnect defense planning from foreign
policy interests. Although it is sometimes erroneously
styled an Army school of strategic thought, reformerglobalists tend to be maritimists as opposed to
continentalists in their strategic outlook. They believe
that Australia’s geopolitical identity is that of a tradedependent maritime state in the Anglo-American
liberal tradition. Accordingly, Australia’s destiny lies
in its history as a liberal democracy and in the web
of cultural and trading links that give Australia both
its national identity and international purpose. Most
reformer-globalists view 9/11 as the seminal event in
revealing a new global security agenda dominated by
the emergence of networked conflict and by the reality
of America’s global power. The reformers tend to be
influenced by the writings of such theorists as Philip
Bobbitt, Robert Cooper, and James Rosenau on the
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changing character of global order and security. Such
concepts as Bobbitt’s Long War and the emergent
market-state, Cooper’s ideas of premodern, modern,
and postmodern states, and Rosenau’s bifurcation
theory of a two-world political universe provide a
framework for thinking about strategy in a fluid and
post-industrial, globalized world.5
For the reformers, the continuities of Australian
strategy derived from the Cold War are increasingly
insufficient to meet the changes that face Australia
in meeting 21st century security requirements. They
believe that Australian security policy must embrace
both global and regional imperatives, and that the
geographical doctrine of Defence of Australia (DOA)
is essentially a relic from the Cold War that should
be modified in favor of a more outward-looking
national security strategy. Such a strategy should
embrace regional and global policies, both near and far
security commitments, and accommodation for both
nonstate and traditional interstate challenges. For the
reformer-globalists, Australia has entered a new age
of globalization and transnational networks in which
national interests need to be upheld by a limited but
effective expeditionary capacity that transcends the
defense of local geography.6
Over the past 5 years, the course of events and
commitments to overseas operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq have tilted Australian statecraft and security
strategy in favor of the reformer-globalists. Yet the
ideological supremacy of the reformer-globalists has
not yet been translated into concrete change in strategic
doctrine. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is still
directed by a pre-9/11 strategic planning document
that upholds geostrategic imperatives drawn from
the Cold War era, namely, the Defence 2000 White
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Paper.7 In this respect, it is important to remember
that the recent Defence Updates of 2003 and 2005
remain essentially meditative statements about the
rise of global terrorism, the danger of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and the threats posed by failed
states.8 Both of the 21st century Australian Defence
Updates represent intellectual way-stations along the
road towards the evolution of new strategic doctrine.
The updates are not detailed policy documents;
rather, they are attempts to reconcile continuity with
change in an era of transition. Not surprisingly, both
reviews remain ambiguous and even contradictory in
tone—proclaiming simultaneously the arrival of a new
security era, yet adhering to the principles of Defence
2000.9
Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
the 2003 and 2005 reviews reflect the gap between the
rhetoric of change within the defense establishment
and the reality of stasis—at least in terms of endorsed
strategic doctrine. In part, the contradictory and
ambiguous tone of the two documents can be
explained by the divisions in the Australian strategic
policy community, which have prevented policy from
undertaking a full embrace of the reality of a globalized
security environment. It is to this new phenomenon
that we now must turn.
Australia, the New Global Security
Environment, and the Alliance.
At the beginning of the 21st century, the
traditional international system that links sovereignty
to Westphalian-style territorial borders has been
supplemented by a new globalized security environment. Increasingly, Australia faces a post-industrial
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world of networks, information technology, and
failed states in which violence and threat have become
global in nature and can bypass the barriers of national
geography.10 What American theorist Robert Keohane
has called “the globalization of informal violence”
has occurred. With it, distinctions between civil and
international conflict, between internal and external
security, and between national and societal security
have begun to erode in both time and space.11 It is
important to grasp that the emerging globalized world
of the 21st century has not abolished the traditional
world order of territorial states; rather, it has
superimposed itself upon that older order. In James
Rosenau’s famous phrase, humanity must now learn
to inhabit “two worlds of world politics,” the interstate
world and the nonstate world. In the new millennium,
global security challenge has been recast in terms of
a state-centric system and a multicentric system that
coexist in a bifurcated world.12
The globalization of security, and the bifurcated
operating environment it has created, have brought
with it three other important changes. The first is a shift
in strategic thinking away from a preoccupation with
national defense based on borders alone. As nationstates have lost their traditional monopoly over violence, there has been a greater appreciation by advanced
states of the phenomenon of networks, interconnectedness, and the potential danger posed by WMD in
the use of force. The second change involves the
increasing merger of foreign, defense, and domestic
policies in advanced countries under the impact of the
microelectronic revolution. Third, there is a blending of
what were once clearly defined and separate categories
of conventional and unconventional warfare into the
phenomenon of multidimensional armed conflict. At the
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beginning of the new millennium, the global diffusion
of technology and information networks has created a
mosaic of war in which violence and disorder are waged
by both state and nonstate forces. Collectively, this
complex, bifurcated 21st century security environment
places a premium on liberal democracies possessing
readiness, speed, and flexibility to meet unexpected
challenges through a mixture of expeditionary military
forces and an array of homeland security measures. 13
To what extent has Australia accepted, and
responded to, the reality of globalized security and to
the two worlds of world politics with their bifurcated
interstate and multicentric components? And what
has been the impact on the alliance? As will be seen, in
some of its key policy actions, the Howard government
has departed decisively from the geostrategic doctrine
it inherited from the 1980s and has embraced some of
the views of the reformer-globalists. The government’s
approach has been to recognize that Australia’s security
is interconnected with global security and that the
latter is dominated by a single superpower, namely, the
United States. As a result, the Howard government has
sought over the past decade to reinvent the AustralianAmerican alliance as a deliberate act of policy.14
Under a policy of alliance rejuvenation, Australia
has been prepared to undertake global as well as
regional security responsibilities. Although the policy
of reinventing the alliance relationship began in
July 1996 with the Sydney statement that sought to
relate the Australian-American special relationship
to the post-Cold War era, it was given real focus by
the attacks on New York and Washington on 9/11.
Howard was visiting Washington on that fateful day
and witnessed first-hand America’s collective trauma
and grief. Flying home aboard Air Force Two, on
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September 13, the Australian Prime Minister invoked
Article IV of the ANZUS Alliance. Not even a writer of
thrillers such as Tom Clancy could have foreseen that
ANZUS, originally devised as a Cold War pact for the
security of the Pacific region in 1951, would be invoked
by junior partner Australia following a suicide strike
by Middle Eastern fanatics on the continental United
States half a century later.15
Since 9/11, Australia has joined the United States
in combating transnational terrorism and has provided
military contingents to meet the crises in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Alongside these global commitments to the
alliance, the Howard government has sought to confront
festering regional strategic issues such as the spread of
militant political Islamism into South East Asia, and
the governance crisis in Pacific states such as Papua
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and East Timor. The
ongoing Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomons
(RAMSI) and the second military intervention mission
in East Timor in May 2006 demonstrate Australia’s
concern for regional stability. Indeed, there has been an
acceptance that the U.S.-led global war on terrorists has
regional ramifications since it is linked ideologically to
the politics of both Indonesia and the Philippines. These
linkages have been demonstrated by the rise of Jemaah
Islamiah and the 2002 Bali and 2004 Jakarta bombing
attacks and by the interlocking of global and regional
terrorist networks in the southern Philippines.16
The aim of Australian security policy therefore
has been to prevent what former Minister of Defence
Senator Robert Hill described in 2003 as a global arc of
terrorism intersecting with a regional sea of instability
in the form of failed and weak states in the Asia-Pacific.17
This global-regional strategy is reflected explicitly in
the December 2005 Defence Update that states: “The
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risk of convergence between failing states, terrorism,
and the proliferation of WMDs remains a major and
continuing threat to international security.”18 In this
way, the Howard government has recast Australian
thinking about security threats in the 21st century. Over
the last 5 years, Howard has upheld the primacy of the
alliance as the main bulwark of Australia’s security in
the new millennium. As the 2005 Defence Update puts
it:
The Australian-U.S. Alliance forged during the Cold
War remains as relevant and as important as ever. It is
based on shared values and interests and remains the
cornerstone of our national security. The continued
evolution of the alliance to meet new strategic challenges
is an enduring strength of the relationship.19

In June 2004, only a few months before the general
election, much of the Australian Government’s
thinking since 2001 was summed up in a key speech to
the Australian Strategic Policy Institute by the Prime
Minister. In this address, Howard dismissed those
in the Australian strategic debate who advocated
a “narrowly-defined defense doctrine that would
circle the wagons and deny Australia a capability to
cooperate with allies beyond our shores.”20 The Prime
Minister declared that “a geographically cramped,
value-free style of realism is dangerously complacent
and contrary to Australia’s interests.” He quoted
approvingly the work of such prominent American
scholars on the globalization of security as Philip
Bobbitt and Joseph Nye. He also expressed scepticism
toward the likelihood of conventional attacks upon
Australia and announced that Australia would develop
an integrated national security strategy in order to
promote global and regional security. 21 For Howard,
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maintaining a global perspective, albeit one that is
influenced by regional considerations, “is a measure of
our [Australia’s] maturity as a nation.”22 Thus, in some
key respects, the Howard government has accepted
the core arguments of the reformer-globalists, at least
in the areas of the primacy of the alliance, the reality of
a globalized security environment, and the need for a
national security strategy.
Alliance Management and Australia’s
Functional Principle.
It is no exaggeration to state that in the first decade of
the new millennium, the Australian-American alliance
is at its strongest since the height of the Vietnam War
in the mid-1960s. In an opinion piece in June 2006,
Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer
highlighted this reality in noting that “Australia is the
only country that has fought with the United States
in every one of its major conflicts since 1914, the good
and the bad, the winning and the losing.”23 Similarly
warm sentiments have been expressed at the highest
level within the administration of George W. Bush.
For example, in August 2003 Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage memorably told the closed-door
Australia-America Dialogue Meeting in Melbourne that
many Americans viewed Australians as a singularly
tough people whose men “shaved with a chainsaw and
trimmed their nails with a jackhammer.”24 Although
Armitage accepted that Australian and American
interests were not always necessarily identical, he
argued that historically they usually were highly
correlated because of a shared belief in the importance
of defending Western liberal democratic values. The
special relationship, he noted, was built upon a common
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perspective and action “forged out of the bones of our
fathers and grandfathers and now of the blood of our
children.”25
In May 2003, when Howard visited Bush at the latter’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, the American President personally hailed the Australian Prime Minister as
“a man of steel” for his support over Iraq.26 The passage
of time since the invasion of Iraq has not diminished
official American warmth towards Australia. Three
years later, in May 2006, when Howard again visited
the United States, the American President described the
Australian leader as a “man of conviction” and an “ally,
friend, and a good strategic thinker.”27 Yet, historically,
Australians and Americans have not always been on
such amicable terms. It is worth remembering that
President Woodrow Wilson found Prime Minister Billy
Hughes so difficult over the territorial settlement at the
Paris Peace Talks of 1919 that he described the latter as
a “pestiferous varmint.”28 Moreover, in the 1920s and
1930s, Australian-American relations were cool and
often marked by difficult trade disputes. Indeed, it was
not until World War II that Australians and Americans
found common ideological cause in a struggle against
totalitarian dictatorship and tyranny.29
The point to grasp is that the Australian-American
relationship is not static, but dynamic, and it is
conditioned by the state of international politics in any
given era. In 1951, the alliance began as an instrument
of Pacific stability, and its signing was influenced by
Japanese rearmament, the onset of the Cold War in
general, and of the Korean War in particular. In the
1950s and 1960s the alliance was marked by cooperative
military action in Asia using forward deployments of
U.S. and Australian forces in Korea and Vietnam. In
the 1970s and 1980s, the emphasis within the alliance
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switched towards greater Australian self-reliance
along with technical and intelligence cooperation. In
particular, the Australian-U.S. Joint Defence Facilities
at Nurrungar and Pine Gap became important installations in America’s nuclear targeting regime. In the postCold War era of the 1990s, cooperation on information
age weaponry in the form of the Revolution in Military
Affairs and the rise of networked warfare became
significant features of alliance activity. In 1996, the joint
Australian-American Sydney Statement described the
alliance as a major contribution to the development of
a stable regional security environment that promoted
democracy, human rights, and economic prosperity.30
In the early 21st century in the wake of 9/11,
the alliance has evolved yet again, encompassing
cooperation in the upholding of both regional and
global order. From the U.S. strategic perspective, the
alliance has become a multidimensional instrument,
with both the U.S. National Security Strategy and the
Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 viewing Australia
as a global ally.31 From the Australian perspective,
America’s focus on multidimensionality means that
America is a more active and demanding ally. How
has the Howard government reacted to this evolution?
Some figures in Australian politics, notably former
Opposition Leader Mark Latham and former Liberal
Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, have attacked Howard
as being too subservient to, and compliant with, U.S.
policies. Other critics have argued that the United
States is now a revolutionary superpower committed
to unilateralism and have implied that Howard has
sacrificed Australian engagement in Asia on the altar
of the alliance.32
The reality is very different. While there has been
increased strategic interdependence with the United
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States, Howard clearly has rejected the idea that
Australia faces a choice between the American alliance
on the one hand and Asian engagement on the other.
Rather, he has become a master of functionalism who
believes that the two approaches can, and should, be
managed adroitly as the strategic essence of Australian
statecraft. Indeed, the Howard years have witnessed
a great deal of policy subtlety based on a functional
principle that seeks to define a synthesis between
Australia’s Asian geography and its Western history.
A particular brand of Australian functionalism that
pivots on the alliance now represents the essence of
Howard’s statecraft.
The Prime Minister has sought to synthesize
national interest, alliance military commitment, and
international responsibility, and has embodied a
sophisticated equation of power, influence, capacity,
and responsibility—a policy mixture that is poorly
understood by many Australian commentators. Indeed,
Howard, who came to office in March 1996 largely as a
result of his grasp of domestic politics, has developed
over the last decade into the most significant Liberal
leader on foreign and security policy since Robert
Menzies. Howard’s journey from untried novice to
experienced practitioner of diplomatic-military affairs
represents one of the most remarkable transitions in
recent Australian political history.33
Howard, ever the student of political history,
has recognized that Australia will never be able to
achieve an equality of status in the alliance through
a functionalism based on strategic or military weight.
After all, the United States accounts for 43 percent of
world military spending, with Australia accounting
for a mere 1 percent. In boxing terms, the United States
is a heavyweight Smoking Joe Frazier, while Australia
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is a middleweight Les Darcy. Nonetheless, if the
alliance cannot be an equal partnership, the Howard
government has sought to cast every Australian
strategic commitment in the light of national political
purpose.
For instance, the military commitment to Iraq
in March 2003 involved 2,000 Australian military
personnel, some 2 percent of the Coalition’s military
forces. Yet, at the same time, alongside the United States
and United Kingdom, Australia’s deployment also
represented 33 percent of the coalition of the willing’s
political commitment. For Australia, the commitment
to Iraq represented a functionalism based on careful
military diplomacy. It was a military diplomacy that
employed niche military forces of world-class caliber
in order to maximize Canberra’s political and strategic
influence with the Americans. Moreover, in the 2003
Iraq commitment, the ADF contingent’s independent
command, force autonomy, and an exit strategy
were all well-defined by Canberra at the outset of the
mission.34
Australia’s functional approach to the alliance is
concerned with what the great diplomatic scholar
Arnold Wolfers once described as the goals of foreign
policy in today’s milieu in which nations “are out
not to defend or increase possessions they hold to
the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping
conditions beyond their national boundaries.”35
Australia has two overarching milieu goals in the
age of globalized security—namely, balancing the
demands of the alliance with America against security
and trade engagement in Asia. As Howard put it in
a major speech at the Lowy Institute for International
Policy in Sydney in March 2005, Australian security
policy must reflect the country’s unique East-West
293

intersection of history, geography, culture, and
economic opportunity. The choice facing the country
is not between Western history and Eastern geography
or between globalism and regionalism. Rather, the task
is to create a balanced alignment in national security
policy.36 Howard’s approach to the security dilemma
posed by Australia’s geography and history has been
to create an additive rather than an alternative dialectic—
an aggregate calculus that absorbs the cultural legacy
of history and respects geography, but does not make
geography destiny.
It is, then, what might be called the milieu goals of
global-regional integration that underpin contemporary Australian defense and security policies. For Australia, American power is the foundation stone of
strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific and is seen as
fundamental to integrating the United States into
the security architecture of the region. The Howard
government has declared openly that the Asia-Pacific
in the 21st century will be the decisive arena of global
politics. As Howard has put it, “History will have no
bigger stadium this century than the Pacific Rim.”37 It
is in this region that Rosenau’s “two worlds of world
politics” intermingle in the most combustible manner.
Great power dynamics merge with new transnational
threats; strong states mix with weak polities; rapid
globalization proceeds, but against a tapestry of
unique and ancient cultures; and traditional concerns
over sovereignty collide with nascent regionalism.
Moreover, the world’s greatest strategic imponderables
are found in the Asia-Pacific. The region is home to
eight of the world’s ten largest armies and to three of
the world’s most dangerous interstate flashpoints: the
Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula, and Kashmir.
At the other end of the conflict spectrum, in no area
outside of the Middle East are transnational, substate
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threats and Islamic terrorism more dangerous than
in parts of Asia. This is especially true in Southeast
Asia, where major security concerns exist in Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand. Thus, there has been
increased security cooperation between Australia
and Indonesia, as well as cooperative intervention
by Australia in the Solomon Islands, Papua New
Guinea, and East Timor. In Howard’s vision of globalregional security, Australia becomes an advocate of a
strategic partnership between the three great Pacific
democracies—the United States, Japan, and Australia—
through the agency of the new Trilateral Security
Dialogue.38 Thus, Canberra has supported Japanese
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s outward security
policy and the gradual modernization of the Japanese
Self Defence Force. For instance, the decision to send an
Australian cavalry regiment to al-Muthanna province
in southern Iraq to protect Japanese construction troops
is a classic illustration of the interweaving of Australian
global-regional security policy. The al-Muthana
deployment has as much to do with supporting Japan’s
outward security policy as it does with bolstering the
U.S. alliance. It also was the employment of aspects of
what might be called Australia’s additive dialectic of
alliance with America and engagement with Asia that
saw Australia accepted as a member of the inaugural
East Asia Summit in late 2005.39
However, Australia’s functionalism and its
simultaneous policy of deepening security relations
with both the United States and the Asia-Pacific face the
sternest challenge over China. If China’s rise translates
itself into strategic rivalry with the United States, then
the activity of Beijing will become a dagger that strikes
at the heart of the geographical-historical intersection
that currently shapes Australian policy. To date, the
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Howard government has chosen to deemphasize the
potential strategic repercussions of China’s economic
development. As the Prime Minister put it in August
2004, while America has no more reliable ally than
Australia, Canberra has “a separate strong growing
relationship with China, and it is not in Australia’s
interests for there to be conflict between America and
China.”40 Against the reality that Australia’s trade
with China has quadrupled in a decade, Howard has
rejected the view of China as a kind of Oriental version
of a pre-World War I Germany that relentlessly has
begun a march to seal its place in the sun. Instead, he
has warned that “to see China’s rise as a zero-sum game
is overly pessimistic, intellectually misguided, and
potentially dangerous.”41 In Canberra, the preference
is to view China as the Middle Kingdom of “Market
Leninism,” construing its emergence in an optimistic
light. As Howard told Chinese Premier Wen Jibao in
April 2006, China’s economic expansion and outward
moves were positive developments. Australia thus did
“not see any merit at all in any policy of containment
towards China.”42 The Prime Minister went on to
uphold the closeness of the Australian-American
relationship and its foundation in history and shared
values. He noted, however, that:
the strength and the depth of that [Australian-American]
relationship in no way affects or will it affect, the
capacity of Australia to interact with and form a close
and lasting partnership and friendship with China. I take
the optimistic view . . . of relations between the United
States and China. I do not subscribe to the school to
which some belong of an inevitable breakdown leading
to potential conflict.43

Yet there are, have been, and will continue to be
inevitable strains in the Australian policy approach.
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Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s August 2004
statement concerning Taiwan that implied Australian
neutrality in the case of a Sino-American security
crisis represents one example of the strain involved
in balancing Washington and Beijing. Moreover,
Canberra’s lack of opposition towards the lifting of the
European Union’s arms embargo on China alongside
a rather tepid response over Beijing’s passing of a new
Taiwan Anti-Secession Law, illustrates the potential
for China to become a running sore in the affairs of the
Australian-American alliance.44
Much of the future of the alliance may depend on the
prospects of China becoming a responsible stakeholder
in the regional-global status quo, a strategic partner
rather than a strategic competitor. Thus, regarding
China, it is unclear whether Australians will remain,
in American eyes, Bush’s men of steel or whether
they will become once again Wilson’s pestiferous
varmints. Something of the American attitude can be
gauged by Armitage’s blunt expectations of Australia
expressed in 1999. In the event of an Sino-American
armed clash over Taiwan, he stated, “We would expect
you Australians to bleed for us in the event of such a
war.”45 On another occasion, Armitage observed that
“if Washington found itself in conflict in China over
Taiwan, it would expect Australia’s support. If it didn’t
get that support, it would mean the end of the U.S.Australia alliance.”46
The great irony of Australia’s dual-pronged proalliance and regional-centric security strategy is that
while the alliance is at a historical high tide, this tide
has risen under the shadow of an ascending Chinese
dragon with an insatiable appetite for Australian raw
materials. Australia’s dual policy requires a balance
between alliance loyalty to the United States and
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pragmatic self-interest vis-à-vis China. In this sense, a
careful examination of Australian functionalism reveals
an approach to defense and security that increasingly
is refined rather than defined by alliance considerations.
Whether such a subtle balance can survive a future
Sino-American security crisis is one of the great
unknowns of Australian politics. It is far from clear
that Australia will be able to achieve what one leading
scholar has called “discriminate engagement” with
Washington and Beijing without paying the ultimate
price of “strategic entrapment.”47
Defense Posture and Australian National Security.
How has Australia’s rejuvenated approach to the
alliance and its global-regional approach to security
policy translated into military capability and strategic
doctrine? In terms of military capability, it is easier
to judge. Simply given America’s lead in military
technology, alliance considerations are vital factors in
Australian force development. Indeed, interoperability,
combined training, and intelligence exchange remain
at the military heart of the Australian-American special
relationship. Under the 2003 Defence Capability Plan,
some A$50 billion is allocated to equip the ADF for
21st century warfare. Modernization embraces missile
defense, maintenance of Joint Defence Facilities,
cooperation in the development of the Joint Strike
Fighter, and purchases of American military assets
such as Abrams tanks and Hellfire missiles. The planned
acquisition of the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) and of the long-range Joint Air to Surface
Standoff Missile (JASSM)—a self-guided land-attack
stealth cruise missile—further demonstrate the vitality
of the Australian-U.S. special relationship in defense
terms.48
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The most striking change in recent capability
development is the modernization of the Australian
Army to meet increased global-regional requirements.
After a quarter of a century as the Cinderella service,
the Australian Army is now being recast from a light
infantry force into a larger, medium weight mechanized
force through a 10-year A$1.8 billion program known
as the Hardened and Networked Army (HNA). Army
reform is designed to give the government more and
better options both within the alliance and for coalition
operations within the region. In tandem with the HNA
is the planned purchase of aerial warfare destroyers
and amphibious ships for the Navy that will, in
turn, give the ADF a greater expeditionary focus and
capability.49
Doctrinally, however, there has been considerable
disagreement and ambiguity with regard to defense
policy. Despite 9/11 and its dramatic aftermath,
Australia’s official defense posture remains governed
theoretically by the geostrategy embodied in the
December 2000 Defence White Paper. As noted earlier,
despite the publication of the 2003 and 2005 Defence
Updates reflecting the reality of a globalized security
environment, the principles of the 2000 White Paper
have yet to be formally superseded. Indeed, the
2003 Foreign Affairs White Paper and the 2004 Prime
Ministerial Statement on Counter-Terrorism that posit
global challenges in many ways are more indicative of
policy change and may imply the declining utility of an
independent defense strategy to the present coalition
government.50
In the strategic policy debate, there has been no
doctrinal resolution of the disagreement between the
reformer-globalists and the defender-regionalists. The
former school believes that the ADF is most likely to
299

have to fight on complex terrain in joint full-spectrum
operations that may involve sustained close combat.
The latter school believes that it is better to structure
the ADF to fight a traditional air-sea battle. To describe
the differences in shorthand, it might be said that the
reform school believes that the future of war for the
ADF is probably a littoral version of the 2004 battle of
Fallujah in the Sunni Triangle or an East Timor with a
land, sea, and air fight.
The defender school, on the other hand, believes
that the future of war for the ADF is the 1942 battle
of the Bismarck Sea redux with a force structure
conditioned, in the words of Paul Dibb, by the “the
iron discipline” of strategic geography.51 These views
highlight that the real difference between the reformers
and the defenders is at root a philosophical one related
to differing visions of the future of armed conflict.
The defender-regionalists retain an air-dominant,
continentalist view of strategy drawn from the late
Cold War, while the reformer-globalists believe the
real challenge in an age of globalization is one of joint,
global-regional maritime-style operations in highly
complex conditions that are likely to require a larger
and more capable army.
The importance of the outcome of this philosophical
debate has been highlighted by Major General Jim
Molan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in Iraq
in 2004-05 under U.S. General George Casey, and
currently Adviser to the Vice Chief of the ADF on Joint
Warfighting. Molan has warned that, with the exception
of its special forces, the Australian military has not
been tested in combat since the 1970s. Accordingly, if
the ADF is to develop into a capable, joint 21st century
warfighting force, it must learn rapidly from the
experiences of its larger American ally. In Molan’s view,
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American warfighting skill remains the benchmark for
the “world’s best military practice,” and the ADF must
adapt itself for a future in which “sophisticated joint
operations involving sustained close combat” may
become the military norm.52
At the higher policy level, the intellectual uncertainty with regard to Australia’s defense posture needs
to be resolved not by a new Defence White Paper but
by an articulated National Security Strategy. The
reason a National Security Strategy is required is that
Canberra needs to reconcile U.S. global strategy and
Australian regionalism and balance their interface
within a coherent strategic framework. Without such a
conceptual framework, the role of the alliance cannot be
integrated properly in an overarching security posture,
nor can the future roles of the ADF be analyzed and
refined properly.
Any new defense policy must be designed to reflect
the regional-global nexus that now defines Australia’s
foreign policy. Australian strategic doctrine should
be maritime (offshore and expeditionary) rather than
continental (defense of local geography) in character
and should have three components. First, the force
structure of the ADF should be reconfigured for
expeditionary littoral operations in the northern
archipelagos and the South Pacific. In effect, the ADF
of the 21st century needs to resemble a smaller version
of the U.S. Marine Corps—a force of great operational
and tactical versatility. Second, based on this maritime
force structure, there needs to be a clear recognition
that global out-of-area operations by the ADF are
central to the task of upholding Australia’s security
interests. Third, there needs to be an integrated focus
on sovereignty protection and homeland security as
opposed to an unrealistic doctrine of geographical
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defense. Australia’s security and defense policymakers
need to remember Dutch-American geopolitician
Nicholas Spykman’s famous dictum: “The geography
of a country is rather the material for, than the cause of,
its policy.”53
Conclusion.
In January 2006, former New South Wales Labor
Premier Bob Carr observed that the strength of the
Australian-American alliance may have reached a
historical high tide, and that such a situation is “as good
as it gets.”54 It certainly is true that, halfway through the
first decade of the 21st century, the alliance remains an
indispensable strategic asset to Canberra that has added
not only to Australia’s national security, but also to its
strategic weight and capability edge within the AsiaPacific region. The alliance gives Canberra access and
influence in Washington and the capitals of Asia out of
all proportion to Australia’s size as a middle power.
Howard’s view of the Australian-American alliance
is that of a sheet anchor that permits policy synthesis
between Western history and Eastern geography. In
the new millennium, the alliance has evolved into
a global-regional instrument to meet the challenges
of bifurcated nonstate and interstate worlds. In
consequence, Australia has developed a multifaceted
security outlook—one that is at once globally attuned,
regionally focused, and alliance-oriented. For
Australian policymakers, the great political challenge
is twofold. First, they must ensure that the electorate
continues to appreciate the strategic significance of the
alliance. Second, they continuously must seek to curb
the growth of any regional tensions that might escalate
into a sudden-death confrontation between America
302

and China over the issue of Taiwan. On the military
front, the great challenge for policymakers will be
to keep the ADF functional and interoperable with
the huge U.S. military without sacrificing Australian
interests, all within the constraints of an affordable
defense budget.
Over the next decade, Australia’s strategic outlook
will reflect the pursuit of milieu goals, while emphasizing
functionalism and refining an additive dialectic between
America and Asia. It will require a thoughtful synthesis
of national security requirements—one that embraces
history, political purpose, geopolitics, military power,
force readiness, economics, logistics, and diplomacy.
Such a policy synthesis will demand great skills in
statecraft and a cold-blooded recognition that such a
balance is contingent on Australia not having to choose
between America and China, between history and
geography, or between liberal values and burgeoning
trade. This is a challenge worthy of a Metternich or a
Bismarck, and it remains to be seen whether Howard’s
successors will be capable of mastering such a complex
diplomatic and security balancing act.
Finally, if there is a necessity for making a choice
in Australian foreign and defense policy, it should be
remembered that in every war and security crisis since
its foundation in 1901, Australia repeatedly has chosen
to defend its heritage of Western liberal democratic
values. As Foreign Minister Downer has recently argued,
the defense of liberal democratic values remains an
enduring aim of Australian foreign policy. “Australia,”
observes Downer, “continues to be a significant force
for the spread of freedom and democracy. We have
fought wars for these values in the past; we continue
to fight for them now.”55 Ultimately, then, while
economic relations are of significant moment, cultural
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beliefs remain binding because they determine identity
and meaning. The great historical lesson of Australian
statecraft is the principle that liberal democratic values
have always dominated policy. Such values are inherent
in the Australian-American alliance and are likely to
provide the essential foundation for the “other special
relationship” as it confronts the strategic uncertainties
of the early 21st century.
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CHAPTER 16
THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE:
ADAPTING TO NEW CHALLENGES?
James A. Schear
What does the future hold for Australian-American
relations? A spirit of cautious optimism pervades this
volume of essays. After more than half a century, the
alliance has proved remarkably resilient. It has survived
periods of turbulence, most notably during and after
the Indochina conflict, as well as the buffeting effects
of economic tensions and domestic political swings on
each side. Since the Cold War’s demise and, especially,
after the September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks and the Bali
bombings, both countries have hung together more
often than not on high-stakes issues. Shared character
traits help to reinforce this solidarity. While Australian
and American social mores are by no means identical,
we still share so much in common—immigrant origins,
democratic values, a (nearly) common language, and
an admirable disdain for aristocratic pomposity—that
the rest of the world could be forgiven for assuming our
relationship always will be close. And that assumption
may well prove accurate—perhaps.
Yet, an equally plausible view—evident throughout
this volume—is that complacency is never advisable
when it comes to managing complex alliance
relationships, even among kindred spirits. Ultimately,
alliances cannot afford to stand still; like sharks, they
need to move forward in order to breathe. Even its
most dewy-eyed supporters would concede that the
U.S.-Australia alliance can prosper only so long as
both sides firmly believe that what they are getting
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out of the relationship equals or exceeds what they are
putting into it.
Such pragmatism is especially apt as we look
toward the end of this turbulent decade. The latterday political intimacy enjoyed by Canberra and
Washington—due mainly to the close relationship
between Prime Minister John Howard and President
George W. Bush—has been genuine, but it could well
recede when new leaderships in each country come to
the fore. Moreover, as several chapters in this volume
have argued, changes in the larger geo-political
landscape, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, are
likely to test the relationship no matter how well our
leaders get along.
The looming test for the alliance, in short, is how
it will adapt in the face of cross-cutting pressures.
Will the pressures generated by a changing global
environment tend to act more like a glue that holds
the U.S.-Australia alliance together or a solvent that
erodes its foundations? In his Panel IV Introduction,
Brendan Taylor framed economic factors in terms of
their adhesive or erosive effects, and this metaphor
can be applied more broadly. In either case, the quality
of adaptability is going to be vital: most obviously, it
can help to moderate divergent pressures, but it can
help ensure that converging pressures will produce
effective policy and joint action. For without effective
action, solidarity by itself does not buy much. As
British historian A. J. P. Taylor once quipped about
Prime Minister Herbert Asquith: He was “unshakable
as a rock and, like a rock, incapable of movement!”1
Context Matters Greatly.
Security relationships usually are not products of
benign circumstances, and the U.S.-Australia alliance is
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no exception. It was forged in the darkest moments of
World War II. By 1942, international order effectively
had collapsed. Nazi Germany occupied much of
continental Europe. Imperial Japanese forces were
pressing down upon Southeast Asia and the western
Pacific. Singapore had fallen. British and American
forces were falling back in retreat. Northern Australia
was under attack. The future looked incredibly bleak;
there was no sense of inevitable victory.2 To be sure,
the wartime generation that endured those traumas
was no more clairvoyant than we are today. That their
worst fears proved short-lived, mercifully, prompts
one to wonder whether optimism in today’s volatile
context might be unwise.
Naïve optimism surely is unwarranted. One can
see looming challenges at every level of international
society, especially in greater Eurasia where the drama
of rising and rebounding powers is being played out.
At the center of this vast expanse is Russia, which has
faltered on its path toward democratic governance
while rebounding economically on its strength as a
global energy supplier. The challenge facing Russia is
not so much internal dissent—if anything, Vladimir
Putin fulfills a national thirst for strong leadership.
Rather, it is the increasing potential for confrontation
with neighbors along its vast periphery, most especially
Georgia and Ukraine, coupled with a desire to play on
a wider global stage—most notably in the Middle East,
the Persian Gulf, and East Asia—where its involvement
decidedly has been mixed.
In striking contrast to the Russian situation, India’s
upward path seems more assured, buoyed by its postCold War economic opening and its own democratic
traditions. Along with sustaining its own socioeconomic development and managing tensions within
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its large and diverse population, New Delhi’s biggest
test internationally lies in whether it can press forward
with Pakistan to achieve a modus vivendi over Kashmir,
while avoiding entangling involvements in and around
other parts of the subcontinent and southwest Asia.
What then about China? Its rise is surely the central
event of the early 21st century. Yet China remains very
much a work in progress. The country’s sustained
economic growth and its generally cooperative
diplomatic posture internationally belies an ongoing
military buildup and rising social discontent at
home, the latter generating tensions that may prove
hard to manage, especially in economic down-turns,
unless more responsive, accountable—and ultimately
democratic—governance takes root over the long run.
The concerns expressed in this volume regarding
China’s potential for driving wedges between
Washington and Canberra should not be taken lightly.
Clearly, the People’s Republic of China’s thriving
internal market has been a huge boon for Australian
exporters, especially on the natural resource side.
Over time, Beijing’s expanding ties with neighbors
throughout the East Asian community are bound to
constrain those who would attempt to isolate China
or confront it militarily, either over Taiwan or, more
generally, as its power and influence grow in the
coming years. One can scarcely miss the greatly
increased sensitivity throughout much of the region to
any posture that could be construed as a policy of antiChinese confrontation.
That said, geo-politics abhors systemic imbalance.
Let’s face it: something resembling a modern-day
Chinese-centric vassal state network is just not
something that Australia or most regional actors
want to see emerging in East Asia. Consequently, a
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U.S. posture that prudently hedges against possible
Chinese aggressiveness, maintains a military balance,
sustains its bilateral alliances, supports inclusive
multilateralism while actively pursuing cooperation
with Beijing on a range of international problems both
near (e.g., North Korea) and far (e.g., Iran, Darfur), is
going to be welcomed by most of China’s neighbors
for its counterbalancing effects. And despite U.S. distractions elsewhere, one can argue plausibly that this
is the present overall trajectory of American strategy in
the region.
To invoke the earlier metaphor, a rising China—
even a peacefully rising one—provides more glue than
solvent to our alliance structure. The adaptive challenge
will be to keep the hedging and cooperative tracks of
the strategy in balance, and, above all, to deflect any
suggestion that U.S. policy is bent upon unwarranted
confrontation.
So far as the U.S.-Australia connection is concerned,
the overall pattern of great power relations is, on
balance, good news. Why? Because unlike previous
eras, no emerging great power aspires to overturn
the existing global order, which has generated
unparalleled prosperity among its stakeholders.3 All
of the great powers, along with the larger community
of modern, well-governed states, have a huge stake in
a globalizing economy. This is not to say geo-politics
will be free from jostling, rivalry, or hostility in the face
of American preeminence. Furthermore, “powderkeg” situations (to borrow Andrew Scobell’s apt label
in Chapter 5) in places like the Taiwan Strait or North
Korea could, if triggered, wreak enormous damage.
But no aspiring great power could remain immune
from damage inflicted by its own capricious acts; and
none has an ideological disposition that would blind
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it to these realities. Moreover, while one can point to
haunting parallels with the globalizing world system
devastated by World War I,4 great power relations
today are not fettered by the kind of rigidly opposed,
interlocking alliance structures that drove millions to
their deaths in a disastrous sequence of events that
began with two shots fired by a tragically lucky Serb
assassin on a Sarajevo side street in June 1914.5
Looming Threats?
What about other possible threats to stability? One,
quite clearly, is the ongoing proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), either in the hands of rogue
regimes like Iran and North Korea or of currently
stable countries that could suffer political upheavals
in the future. There is also the problem of increased
radicalization apparent throughout the Muslim
world and its diaspora, inflating the sails of Islamist
jihadi groups which are vying against more moderate
constituencies for the hearts and minds of the Islamic
umma.6
To these challenges I would add a third category:
a cohort of state and state-like entities that perceive
existent threats and whose reactions could embroil
outside powers in regional confrontations. The list
here is a diverse one: Pakistan (vis-à-vis India); Israel
(vis-à-vis Iran, Syria, or Palestinian Islamists); Taiwan
(vis-à-vis you-know-who); Georgia (vis-à-vis Russia);
the Kurdish areas of Iraq (vis-à-vis all their neighbors);
and even North Korea (vis-à-vis the United States).
None of these chronically fragile situations are likely
to escalate to the kind of horrific conflagration that
ushered in World War I; but the risk of worldwide
reverberations from much smaller regional crises cannot
be discounted, especially if WMD is in the mix.
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It is essential that alliance partners strive toward
a common perspective on these problems—a task
easier said than done. Consider the WMD issue: the
U.S.–led invasion of Iraq of 2003, in which Australia
participated, was driven in large measure by fears that
an oil-rich tyrant with a history of aggression against his
neighbors and citizens would use his WMD capability,
once fully developed, to deter outside powers from
attempting to thwart his aggressive designs. Making
the world safe for conventional aggression is clearly
one motive for WMD proliferation. There is also the
proliferation-for-profit motive, either via official state
channels or via murky private transactions (e.g., the
A. Q. Khan case in Pakistan). Arguably, North Korea
presents the classic third party transfer problem—if
Pyongyang comes to view its stock of WMD materials
as just another illicit commodity that can be sold to any
would-be buyer with enough cash. Finally, there are
motivations that focus on empowering nonstate actors
with WMD, as extended deterrence against retaliatory
interference with aggressive acts elsewhere by the
state providing the WMD. Israeli analysts often point
to this nightmare scenario when considering future
Iranian patronage of nonstate clients like Hezbollah,
which array themselves as front line fighters against
the Israeli Defense Forces.7
Similar proxy problems bedevil assessments of
transnational terrorism. No issue has loomed larger for
the Bush administration and the Howard government
than effectively countering terrorism. And yet the
campaign to suppress the most threatening variant of
this phenomenon—al-Qai’da and affiliated groups—
has brought the United States and its allies face to face
with a broader range of militancy in the Muslim world
that blurs traditional lines between political radicalism,
insurgency, and terrorism.
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There are, for example, Shiite groups which have
communally-based political organizations supported
by armed militia loyalists—the Mahdi Army in Iraq
or Hezbollah in Lebanon. A rekindled neo-Taliban
organization fighting Afghan and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in southeastern
Afghanistan is a Sunni variant of a nationally-focused
Islamist group, but with an ideological commitment to
armed struggle against foreigners. Meanwhile, former
Baath Party loyalists attacking U.S. forces and the
fledgling Iraqi national government definitely are not
Islamists but rather Sunnis who have benefited from
(and occasionally fight with) foreign jihadi fighters
and suicide bombers bent upon attacking Western
“infidels” and fomenting sectarian conflict with Shiite
“apostates.” Closer to Australia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
has served as al-Qai’da’s eastern front in Southeast
Asia, promoting a regional Sunni Islamist agenda
through terrorist attacks aimed at foreigners and nonMuslim communities in the Indonesian archipelago
and beyond.
What kinds of glue or solvent pressures do these
WMD-proliferation and transnational threats pose for
our alliance? Terrorism can be a very corrosive issue
among allies and partners. Even when allies agree on
the magnitude and character of a particular threat, they
may dispute the underlying causal factors at work or the
optimal methods for combating the scourge. Judging by
appearances, the United States and Australia have not
stumbled across these kinds of disputes, certainly not
to the degree seen in U.S. relations with its continental
European allies. Australians and Americans know
they are targets and, tragically, have the casualities
to show for it—a sense of danger that conjures up the
old Franklinesque adage: “We must all hang together,
or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.”8 Both
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countries also share (as do other allies, to be sure) an
abiding concern about so-called threat convergence—
those “perfect storm” scenarios in which terrorist
networks, WMD proliferation, state weakness, and
criminal syndicates might feed off each other in malign
ways.
The real test for alliance adaptation is whether
both sides can keep their counterterrorism strategies
in close alignment. Enhanced homeland security
and more aggressive proliferation control measures
(such as the Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI]) are
essential elements and not much in dispute. Somewhat
more challenging is the management of integrated
civil-military operations within the Islamic world,
which attempt to strike a balance between “kinetic”
missions (aimed at capturing or killing terrorist or
insurgent actors) and capacity-building operations
(aimed at winning the trust and confidence of local
populations and thereby driving a wedge between
them and violent actors in their midst). This is the
classic counterinsurgency task—something with
which U.S. and Australian special operations forces
are well-acquainted but which, even in auspicious
circumstances, requires patience, effective crosscultural communication, and capable local partners in
whom one can repose trust.
What is controversial about counterinsurgency
is not how to do it but when to launch it, as well as
the place and utility of state-building, regime change,
and democracy promotion more generally within
the realm of counterterrorism endeavors. Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM, especially, has taught some hard
lessons regarding what outside interveners reasonably
can expect to accomplish when trying to stabilize a
large, fractious (even if wealthy) country which has
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no legacy of inclusive governance in living memory
and (as yet) no history of chronic civil war. While John
Higley’s dark forecast of U.S. post-Iraq retrenchment
(Chapter 8) almost certainly is too pessimistic, there can
be little doubt of deep American public consternation
(and allied angst) over future state-building projects
when the pathway into them is perceived to be a war
by choice. Ironically, Canberra’s involvement in statebuilding activity may be less domestically contentious
given that in most cases these activities are a function
of promoting stability within Australia’s regional
neighborhood.
Minding the Asymmetrical Gaps.
All of the challenges sketched out above would be
daunting enough if the United States and Australia
were allies of equal strategic weight. That we are
not is often assumed to throw yet another layer of
anxiety on top of an already complex relationship. On
the Australian side, familiar questions abound: Will
U.S. global assertiveness embroil Canberra in distant
conflicts and demand more commitment than a country
of 20 million citizens can possibly muster? Will future
Australian leaders be tarred as stooges or poodles for
acquiescing to ill-advised American expeditions? Will
the alliance be more of a millstone weighing down
Australia than a national asset to be preserved?
These are all fair questions, to be sure. Given its
preeminence, America is bound to be a polarizing
force—attracting some, repelling others. While U.S.
policies, in particular the war on terrorists, no doubt
have aggravated the problem, the trend towards greater
polarization already was apparent in the 1990s. U.S.
leaders wearily have grown accustomed to attracting
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criticism whenever Washington decides to throw its
strategic weight around (as in Iraq) or refrains from
doing so (as in Darfur).9 And for some of America’s
allies, the imperative of strategic protection has become
far less important than it was in the Cold War era, while
the domestic political hazards of becoming embroiled
in America’s behavior have grown. Bottom-line: It is
just plain tough to be an ally of the United States in
today’s unipolar world.
Australia is not immune from these problems. At
the same time, there are several mitigating factors at
work in the U.S.-Australia context. The oft-cited tension
between a global versus regional focus of alliancebased cooperation is far less a problem for Australia
than it is for the NATO allies. Many of the problems
that Americans regard as global in character—namely,
terrorism and transnational threats—for Australia are
problems of its immediate neighborhood. “Thinking
globally and acting locally” is a label that works well
as a policy stance for Australia. It provides Canberra
with latitude to organize its priorities in a fashion
that meets both sides’ concerns, while also helping
to foster realistic U.S. expectations regarding what a
country of its relatively small (demographic) size and
resource base can contribute on the global stage.10 It is
also worth noting that Australia’s alliance bona fides
benefit greatly from the fact that it is not any state’s
presumptive rival within the region; consequently, it
can burnish its credentials as both a bridge-builder and
a nonthreatening security partner with others in the
region, including not only countries in transition such
as Indonesia but also U.S. allies such as Japan and the
Republic of Korea.
For the United States, the greatest challenge in
sustaining alliance relationships is to keep its power
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in a broad strategic perspective. Not long ago, U.S.
commentator Charles Krauthammer observed that
“Australia’s geographic and historical isolation has
bred a wisdom about the structure of peace.” Australia
understands “that peace and prosperity . . . are
maintained by power—once the power of the British
empire, now the power of the United States”; and that
American retreat or defeat . . . would be catastrophic
for Australia and for the world.”11 That is an enticing
argument for American ears, but it begs the obvious
question: How should American power be used? What
counts as an adroit use of power when the purpose is
not merely defense of the homeland or an ally but the
maintenance of systemic stability?
To wield power without getting blinded by it
is no easy matter. The methods of mobilizing and,
especially, projecting vast amounts of power can be so
all-consuming that we lose sight of the larger objective,
which, as Frederick Kagan reminds us, is ultimately
persuasion.12 Power comes in many forms—military,
diplomatic, economic, and informational—and it can
be applied for various tasks—to destroy or construct,
to deter, coerce, dissuade, or entice. But in the end,
when the task at hand is maintaining global stability,
what counts most is one’s ability to utilize power
persuasively. That is to say, to maneuver an enemy,
competitor, partner, or, yes, even on occasion an ally
into a posture that you, they, and other stakeholders
regard as acceptable relative to all other plausible
outcomes.
That is not to say all actors on the global stage are
ultimately susceptible to persuasion—some, clearly,
are not. But that there are irreconcilables only serves
to reinforce the essential validity of the argument,
for their goal is also to persuade, and ours must be to
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negate and preempt their ability to do so by proffering
a more attractive vision. That is a tall order, one that
requires good knowledge of what others value and
how to adapt our methods to the task of influencing
their choices. Success, however, demands no less.
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